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NETWORKING THE FAVELAS: LEVERAGING INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH TO SUPPORT DIGITAL JOURNALISM IN RIO DE JANEIRO'S URBAN PERIPHERIES

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by

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Networking the Favelas: Leveraging International Outreach to Support Digital Journalism in Rio de Janeiro's Urban Periphery

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Abstract: This dissertation interrogates two recent positions regarding the position of community activists as change agents for marginalized populations. The first position, generated by dissatisfaction with how organizations like the World Bank and the US Agency for International Development approach community partners, argues that grassroots actors offer a more egalitarian and dialogic approach to community-based economic, social, and political development. The second position, grounded in the history and theory of alternative media production as well as theories of citizen, civic, and participatory journalism, argues that technological advances in portable communication devices and the increasing ease of publishing in networked venues has re-configured and democratized the process of media production in a way that allows non-professional actors to create and disseminate media content.

In order to investigate major theoretical and political implications of these two positions, I examine the *international networking activities* and *local digital journalism* programs practiced by Viva Rio, a Rio de Janeiro-based non-governmental organization

(NGO) that has been working in the city's favelas, or unincorporated urban slums, since 1993. Chapters 1-2 will address how Viva Rio used its position as the first favela-based NGO to draw in financial and political support from a variety of international organizations (IOs) ranging from the UN Development Program to the Inter-American Development Bank to Norwegian Church Aid. Chapters 3-5 will turn back to the local context to examine how Viva Rio channels resources gained through networking into its digital media production program, called Viva Favela. Drawing on interviews with staff members, quantitative and qualitative analysis of materials produced by the project, and participant observation of training workshops conducted in 2013, I examine how the international expansion of Viva Rio creates unintended consequences for Viva Favela including increased professionalization of staff and conflicting approaches to community outreach and training, and a distancing of the project from other favela-related media programs.

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Chapter 1. Introduction to Research Project and Approach

ADDRESSING RECENT ISSUES IN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNICATION AND COMMUNITY MEDIA

This dissertation interrogates two recent arguments made by scholars and practitioners regarding the position of community activists as change agents for marginalized populations. The first position, directly generated by dissatisfaction with how organizations like the World Bank and the US Agency for International Development approach community partners in their development initiatives, argues that grassroots actors have a privileged relationship towards local environments that should be fostered. This position, which goes by a variety of names including "post-development" (Rahneema and Bawtree, 1997) and "social entrepreneurship" (Bernstein, 2001; Dempsey and Sanders, 2010), has been growing in popularity in recent years as traditional actors within development industries have been heavily scrutinized while new organizations like The Open Society Institute and the Ashoka Foundation are becoming increasingly active in supporting grassroots development. The second position, grounded in the history and theory of alternative journalism and media (c.f. Worpole, 1982), argues that technological advances in portable communication devices and the increasing ease of publishing in networked venues has re-configured and democratized the process of media production in a way that allows non-professional actors to create and disseminate media content. Going by many names including "citizens' media" (Rodriguez, 2001, 2012), "citizen journalism" (Rosen, 2001; Allan, 2014), or "DIY citizenship" (Hartley, 1999), this position argues that everyday citizens or members of marginalized populations can

now create their own media products which can potentially undermine political and economic domination by States, corporations or other elites, promote human rights by providing visible evidence, or undermine stereotypes and other representational practices that preserve hegemonic relationships in society (Williams, 1974).

In order to investigate some of the major theoretical and political implications of these two positions for marginalized populations, I will examine how they impact the *international networking activities* and *local digital journalism* programs of Viva Rio (which roughly translates to "Rio is Alive"), a Rio de Janeiro-based non-governmental organization (NGO) that has been working in the city's favelas, or unincorporated urban slums, since 1993. Founded as a citizen coalition to protest the violence between police and the drug traffickers that have historically controlled favelas, by 2012 Viva Rio had become the second largest NGO in Brazil in terms of staff members and annual budget. Among its various projects, Viva Rio created the first favela-based community news site, called Viva Favela. This site was designed to provide a communication channel for favela residents to share stories about the history, culture, daily life, and political or infrastructural problems facing their communities. Since its formation Viva Favela has gone through a series of shifts in its programs ranging from photojournalism to collaborative blogging. Putting these the social entrepreneurship and digital media production elements of the organization into the same analysis, I hope to examine the impact of international networking and scaling up on the ways grassroots initiative launch and administer their local projects.

THE FAVELAS OF RIO AND VIVA RIO: AN INTERTWINED HISTORY

The role of Viva Rio and Viva Favela within the contemporary favela activism scene has become a point of intense debate in the last year. Due to a mixture of historical coincidence and the time intensive nature of ethnographic field research, I spent February-December 2013 living in Rio de Janeiro. During this time I bore witness to wide-scale social and political upheaval that ultimately shifted the coordinates regarding the relationship between favelas and the rest of Brazilian society as well as Viva Rio's legitimacy as an institutional intermediary for favela communities. Receiving copious attention from national and international researchers and press was a series of favela-based political mobilizations that accompanied the historical nationwide protests of June-August, 2013. These protests, which at their height brought between 110,000 and 120,000 to protest in downtown Rio on June 17, indexed a nationwide dissatisfaction with the way non-transparent financial practices of the current administration led to rampant corruption, unfettered cost of living increases, and outrageous spending on infrastructure upgrades for sports facilities designed to attract mega-events like the 2013 Confederations' Cup, the 2014 World Cup, and the 2016 Summer Olympics (see Saad-Filho, 2013). While the initial waves of protests did not specifically address concerns about favelas (Maricato, 2013), a series of subsequent protests were launched by community organizations or organized by private individuals from various favelas in later months. Among the claims made at these marches was that government programs within favelas were not keeping to promises made when these programs were originally lost. One of the major elements of this critique was the corrupt and non-transparent ways NGOs like Viva Rio had become complicit with government programs. As a 2014

UNESCO report on "Identity, Culture, and Resistance in Favelas" created by researchers from the London School of Economics sums up the result of their research on the interactions between NGOs and government agencies in Rio: "So, we have these organisations [sic.] like Viva Rio whose success also means, to some extent, a closer involvement with the State. For the State it is: 'You guys go, and we will give you the conditions' " (Jovchelovitch and Priego-Hernández, 2014, p. 161). This intimate relationship between NGO and government has lead many activists to derogatorily refer to Viva Rio as "Viva Rico" ["The Rich are Alive"] due to the amount of money the NGO receives through government partnerships. As these protests began to become more militant and confrontational towards the government development programs, groups like Viva Rio increasingly found themselves in a precarious position: in answering claims of complicity, lack of community involvement, and largesse, the NGO would risk biting the hand that had been feeding it for years. While Viva Rio's role as development agent was beginning to be questioned by favela activists, Viva Favela saw its position in jeopardy of being made obsolete by new social media and online communication outlets that erupted in popularity during the protests. Though Viva Favela had been around since 2001, a recent surge in favela-based media production obviated the group's claim to being the first favela-based digital news site.

Rio's favela communities can be characterized by a paradoxical combination of local instability and international popularity. Since their formations in the early 20th century, they have experienced problems with economic productivity, partially racialized social exclusion, political inclusion as voting citizens, and highly precarious access to

basic resources including electricity, potable water, and safe sewage disposal. Though a few government-funded programs community development programs focusing on issues such as public health and literacy existed in the early-mid 1960s under the Goulart administration (Ridenti, 2007), high levels of drug-related violence and political instability during the dictatorship years made these programs untenable (McCann, 2014; Arias, 2006). In recent years, though, favelas have become something of an international media sensation and an ever-growing site of cultural interest. Largely beginning with the worldwide success of *Cidade de Deus [City of God]* in 2002, favelas have become ubiquitous, as Hollywood blockbusters like *The Incredible Hulk 2* and interactive video games like *Call of Duty: Modern Warfare* feature these spaces as simultaneously wildly ungoverned and full of creative potential (Jaguaribe, 2004). The growing popularity of favelas in the international imaginary has been accompanied by an unprecedented increase in funding on the municipal, state, and international level for community outreach projects, mostly spearheaded by recently formed NGOs (Sorj and Guedes, 2007). Within these projects, the most heavily funded and internationally visible are those that focus on training favela residents how to incorporate information and communications technologies into grassroots economic development. In the last ten years transnational organizations and corporations ranging from the Inter-American Development Bank to the Gates Foundation to BP Amoco have donated around five million dollars to these ICT-based programs.

Even briefly delineating the social, political, and economic problems that have faced Rio de Janeiro's favelas since their formation in the early 20th century would and

has taken several book-length studies (cf. Perelman, 2010; Yúdice, 1994). However, a brief history of community politics in these areas will help set the stage for the genesis of Viva Rio. Though Rio's favelas date back to the early 20th century as informal settlements of ex-soldiers and their families (Oliven, 1999), they drastically expanded in the early-mid 1950s as migrant laborers began to move into the rapidly modernizing city under the administration of Juscelino Kubitschek. Due to geographical limitations of the city, the new immigrants were forced to construct their communities on the *morros* [small mountains] that surround Rio's urban pockets. As these communities were illegally zoned and construction occurred without the permission of the city government, the city and state governments of subsequent decades often went to great lengths to physically re-locate occupants (Perlman, 2010). In response, many favelas adopted citizen's councils in order to help mobilize protests against relocation as well as representing the interest of one favela to other favelas in order to create citywide protest networks that could, in some documented cases, bring up to 10,000 individuals together for a single event (Petersen, 2008). As the military dictatorship began to intensify attempts to destroy these neighborhoods, the councils in many neighborhoods began to increase the physical fortification of the neighborhood. For example, in the Novo Hollanda community in the city's North Zone, the citizen's council decided to actually tear up some of the poorly constructed roads leading into the neighborhood in order to obfuscate police access (Berenstein Jacques, 2002). While actions like this met the immediate goal of protecting the space from police and military attack, they unfortunately and unintentionally

segregated these spaces in a way that would provide incredibly useful for the narcos (drug traffickers) once they took over the communities in the 1980s.

The narco takeover of the favelas started in the 1970s as drug gangs began to grow in power in the favelas. Though before that time there had already been a large number of small gangs operating out of the favelas growing and selling marijuana, it was not until a few international actors from Colombian kingpin Pablo Escobar's organization moved into the area that the drug trade flourished (Perlman, 2010). As the United States' funded war on drugs began to effectively squash the drug trade out of Colombia, many of the central actors involved with the trade migrated to the favelas, which quickly became the major hub of cocaine distribution for South America (Leeds, 1996). After the cocaine trade moved to Rio, a whole new era of violence began.

Due to a combination of a boom in the domestic economy after the end of the military dictatorship (Leeds, 1997; Arias, 2005; Dowdney, 2003) and the re-orientation of the South American drug trade in the 1980s (Arias, 2005: 31), Rio quickly became one of the largest distribution hubs for cocaine and marijuana on the continent. Accompanying this growth in the drug trade was an increasing militarization of both the drug trafficking gangs and the Rio police (Dowdney, 2003). By the end of the 1980s the revolutionary political aspirations of the main gangs had disappeared while the military-like organization and tactics remained (Arias, 2005). [1] The most powerful gangs in Rio (namely the Commando Vermelho (CV) and Amigos dos Amigos (ADA) formed in the

[1] While in prison, many leaders of the largest gangs in Rio shared cells with left wing revolutionaries interned at the same prison on the island of Ilha Grande. From the paramilitaries, gang leaders learned about urban guerilla tactics, the regimentation of cells, and other strategies earlier employed to combat the military government. For more on this history, please see Leeds, 1997.

1980s with funding from Colombian cocaine. As the favelas had been modified to prevent police encroachment, the gangs quickly used forcible means to overthrow the citizen's councils and set up their own governing bodies (McCann, 2014). From here followed approximately two decades of intense violence between the drug gangs and the police that climaxed in the Candelária massacre where off duty police officers fired on a group of sleeping street children, killing eight and wounding numerous others (Yúdice, 2003).

The Candelária Massacre instigated a bloody wave of retaliations on both sides, ultimately resulting in the formation of Viva Rio. Viva Rio entered the favela scene in 1993 as a citizen's coalition created to voice public outrage over the increasingly violent confrontations between the drug traffickers who controlled these communities and the police who were adopting increasingly paramilitary tactics of intimidation and strategic attacks on civilians (Zaluar, 2004). Formed as coalition of favela community leaders, university professors, journalists, popular musicians, and other high profile figures, Viva Rio was founded to as a way to create dialogues through public workshops between drug dealers and police leaders about disarmament. After the initial workshops, Viva Rio incorporated as an NGO dedicated to "promoting the peaceful integration of favelas into the city as whole" (Viva Rio, 2013a).

The NGO would go on to establish itself in the 1990s as a mediator between national and international development agents and favela communities. Adopting a customized approach for community development designed by founder Rubem César Fernandes, it would help match international donors and national agencies with projects

in Rio's favelas (César Fernandes, 1994, p. 80). Working with the Inter-American Development Bank, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations Educational, Science, and Cultural Organization, Norwegian Church Aid, and the corporate social responsibility wings of BP Amoco and AMBEV, Viva Rio became globally recognized as what UNDP Haiti coordinator William Gardner would call "the most comprehensive example of community-based development in Latin America" (Viva Rio, 2013a; R. Lapa, personal communication, August 06, 2013). As its international reputation expanded, Viva Rio's ties to municipal, state, and federal governments continued to strengthen. From the government's perspective, Viva Rio's ability to penetrate areas where the police had been consistently and violently denied entrance and to "prove itself as a development agent on the international stage" (Viva Rio, 2013a) made it a funding priority. Recognizing that the type of community-based dialogue Viva Rio had practiced in Rio and then exported to Haiti, Venezuela, and other places helped build the international reputation of the city, the Brazilian government has consistently funded its projects. Accordingly, the group has since the early 2000s received an a yearly average of 20 million Reais (R$--roughly 11 million dollars) from various government agencies as well as public corporations (Viva Rio Annual Report, 2012; UNDP, 2005). Through its ability to leverage its multi-faceted work in favelas to international donors, Viva Rio has positioned itself as one of the most financially lucrative NGOs in Latin America with a very diverse set of national and international collaborators.

Viva Rio's adept fundraising tactics created an environment that insulated Viva Favela, the group's digital journalism program, from worrying about funding cycles,

donor influence, and other problems that generally affect grassroots NGOs (Wolch, 1990). The financial stability achieved by Viva Rio through its ability to take on multiple development projects at the same time left Viva Favela to experiment with different strategies for using new media technologies for community development in favelas. The first strategy was built around training classes in digital photography and blogging to produce material for a central web site that published news stories about favela culture. The ultimate product of Viva Favela's first training program was the launch of the web site www.vivafavela.com.br. Adopting an explicitly cultural orientation, the first site followed the logic of what photojournalist (and central group collaborator) Peter Lucas called "visual inclusion". Based around the idea that the ability to represent oneself is a fundamental human right (Lucas, 2013), this project prioritized the *capacity of digital media to empower marginalized communities by giving them the power of self-representation*. In 2010, the group announced the launch of a new phase of the site, Viva Favela 2.0, which would expand the "democratizing potential" of the first phase (Lucas, 2010). The new site made two major changes that expanded the scope of Viva Favela's work. The first change was to overhaul the site in order to greatly enhance its interactive capabilities (Lucas, 2010; V. Chagas, personal communication, November 18, 2013). The second change expanded the production training classes to serve satellite programs for favelas located in São Paulo, Brasilia, Recife, and other major Brazilian cities in order to expand the online network of contributors. In January 2013, the NGO decisively and abruptly ended the collaborative online network in favor of a much more focused attempt to make the site more closely attuned to the immediate needs facing the Rio's favelas.

More specifically, the new phase of Viva Favela (called "Viva Favela 3.0") is developing favela newsrooms to report on problems with police abuses as part of its public security division as well as offering collaborative media production classes for public health workers from the its community health division (called "Viva Comunidade").

The focal discontinuities between these two phases are conspicuous: one proposes a model based on horizontal knowledge production through cooperation while the other proposes a more traditional model of advocacy based on strategic claims made on behalf of communities. Furthermore, staff turnover was rampant during this period. Though Viva Favela 2.0 only lasted for about two and a half years (roughly July 2010-January 2013), the staff overlap from the original Viva Favela site to the 2.0 phase to the 3.0 phase was minimal: only two staff members remained. Combined with the drastic fluctuations in focus, the nearly complete turnover in staff members (including leadership roles) allows for each of these three periods to be analyzed as *distinct experiments* with how to deploy community media production through highly disparate channels with radically different definitions and approaches.

Guiding my investigation will be two central questions:

1. Through what strategies did Viva Rio become a powerful actor within global development communities?
2. What is the potential impact of Viva Rio's global ascent on the way it administered its constituent programs (namely its digital journalism project Viva Favela)?

THE NETWORKING OF VIVA RIO

Though it might be tempting to read the vacillations in Viva Favela as an example of how an increasingly globalized development actor loses track of its community roots, it is more productive to think about the difficulties in identity management and organizational structure that arise when an actor with a localized project begins to circulate within global development networks. This pursuit should begin with the unpacking of a term that many within the history of international communication and development studies have used as compliment designating the pinnacle of global achievement and a damning critique of a certain group of individuals complicit with colonial or postcolonial authorities: *cosmopolitanism.*

Within the historically intertwined fields of international communication and development communication, the idea of cosmopolitanism began as a way for the ideological architects of modernization theory to differentiate certain actors within nations of the newly minted "Third World" from the majority of the population (Shah, 2011). Foundational texts like Daniel Lerner's *The Passing of Traditional Society* construct their arguments by setting up conflicts between characters who embody traditional values like attachment to local communities, non-technological means of production like subsistence farming, and fidelity to oral/traditional communication and those cosmopolitan characters defined above all else by their ability to act empathetically, here defined as the ability to "place oneself in the shoes of others" and envision the world as defined by categories beyond local communities. Though less grandiose than Lerner's highly literary text, Everett Rogers' *Modernization Among Peasants* (1969) attempts to refine the concept of cosmopolitanism into "cosmopoliteness", a category that can be

broken down into a set of discrete psychological characteristics. Some of these characteristics include "exposure to urban environments" (Rogers, 1969, p. 47), "frequency of travel", "the development of 'mental transportation' capabilities through exposure to mass media", and the socio-economic stability of middle or upper middle class life (Ibid., pp. 149-150). Foreshadowing the work of Sassen (1991) and others on the cultural characteristics of urban dwellers in advanced capitalist societies, Rogers describes the cosmopolite class as defined through cultural sophistication, mass media literacy, mobility, and most importantly, the ability to be able to think both locally and globally at the same time.[2]

Providing the proverbial other side of the coin to early modernization theorists, many critics have argued that embracing this cosmopolitan psychology has produced a form of brainwashing where American political and cultural domination produces a group of "native informants" (to use Gayatri Spivak's famous term) who serve as agent provocateurs for Western ideology. This is the central argument of Mike Davis' uncharacteristically crude summation of community-based development NGOs in the conclusion of *Planet of Slums* (2006) as well as many political economic manifestoes about the ways in which "Western" (generally synonymous with "American") media products, cultural practices, and commodity flows (e.g. Levi's Jeans, McDonald's) are creating a new class of cosmopolitan elites who generally serve as formal or informal

[2] While this *psychological version of cosmopolitanism* has critiqued since at least the 1970s (c.f. Rogers, 1976), it still holds weight within the field of international relations Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart's *Cosmopolitan Communications* (2012) is a sterling example of how mainstream IR still takes seriously the psychological categories developed by Lerner and Rogers. In this provocative study the authors develop surveys that operationalize claims about "Westernization" into quantitative metrics that are then administered in seven different countries

change agents for Westernization (Barber, 1996). Without delving into this heavily treaded debate, it is sufficient to say that this popular argument often orients the way NGO activism in the developing world is discussed (Elyachar, 2001; Harvey, 2007).

Avoiding the ways modernization's champions and critics based their definitions of cosmopolitanism around psychological profiles or mindsets of certain individuals, recent social movement and technology theorists have re-defined this term to describe the way certain types of activists draw on tactics that engage both local and transnational environments. Social movement theorist Sidney Tarrow offers a similar notion through his idea of "rooted cosmopolitans" defined as "activists who face both inward and outward by combining domestic and transnational advocacy" (2005, p. 47). [3] These actors act as nodal points in social movement networks by connecting local projects with each other and with larger transnational coalitions or issue-based organizations.

Building on formulations like these helps us move beyond theorizing cosmopolitanism in psychological or biographical terms. Defining these agents instead as *mediators* that translate between local production contexts and larger audiences of readers, international institutions, governments, or larger NGOs offers a much richer starting point for considering the kind of activity they are performing. Organizational communication theorist Sarah Dempsey (2009; 2012) explicitly raises this problem in terms of the "communicative labor of NGOs", which she defines as a "form of work oriented around representing and speaking on behalf of marginalized groups" (Dempsey,

[3] Digital activism scholar Mark Zuckerman proposes a similar idea around what he calls "bridge figures" whose role is to "translate and contextualize ideas from one culture to another". (2013, p. 171).

2009, p. 328). Dempsey argues instead that NGOs and community-based media projects can be most productively conceptualized as intermediaries with the dual task of assessing the needs of local constituencies and representing them to transnational audiences. In this argument, they are no longer charged with maintaining fidelity to an idea of "the local as the primary scale at which resistance and agency to global forces occur" but instead work at different levels between the local and the global (Ibid., p. 331). More precisely, the communicative task of NGOs becomes one of conciliating the demands and experiences of local subjects with appropriate development channels for meeting these demands or linking experiences with other interested parties. If we accept Dempsey's redefinition of the NGO's role in grassroots development, the main goal becomes one of analyzing the *channels produced* between local, citywide, national, and international audiences.

Returning to Viva Rio, we can track the historical development of its mediating position as the cultivation of two overlapping yet discrete networks. The first was created through a steady series of community development initiatives that moved out from the local to the international. It started with community development activities localized to Rio's favelas in the early 1990s, became entwined with municipal and national programs as it contracted with government agencies to reinforce its local activities in the late 1990s, and by the early 2000s had created international partnerships with the United Nations Development Programme, Norwegian Church Aid, the World Bank, and other large bilateral or international organizations. As I will explain in Chapter 2, Viva Rio was able to expand its scale its work to the international stage by adeptly engaging in a process of "social movement marketing" where a local group attempts to align its goals,

strategies, and ideology in a way that maximizes its appeal to the broadest number of potential international partners (Bob, 2005, 2007). Through this marketing process Viva Rio has been able to accumulate a relatively permanent pool of financial backers and enough political/symbolic power to launch its projects in favelas without fear of government retribution (at least until very recently, as will be discussed). [4] The second network (or really set of networks) is constituted by the projects Viva Rio has attempted to launch and maintain within favelas. These networks are formed as Viva Rio re-invests its financial and political gains into local health care, public security, micro-credit, arts and culture, and (most importantly for us) *communication capacity building* projects. All of these local networks are maintained by a combination of paid professional staff members, city workers, and community volunteers. Looking specifically at the networks created by Viva Favela will illustrate how scaling up a community development project like Viva Rio inevitably leads to changes in organizational structure that often necessitate the employment or recruitment of members not originally attached. This in turn begins to transform the project from a grassroots or citizen *initiative* into a transnational institution that requires the coordination of different types of actors with varying forms and degrees of interest, investment, and professional expertise (Dempsey, 2009, p. 331; Dempsey and Sanders, 2010).

THE STAFFING OF VIVA FAVELA: CITIZEN'S MEDIA AS FIELD OF PRACTICE

[4] The way Viva Rio was able to accumulate different forms of financial and political capital over the course of its 20 years of its existence resonates with notions of building or accumulating "network power" that Manuel Castells offers in *Communication Power* (2009). Here he argues that digital communication networks manifest a novel form of power that comes out of the ability of certain actors to potentialize their role in the network.

Founded in 2001, Viva Favela represents the first and longest-running project for training residents from favelas (unincorporated neighborhoods that have grown up alongside Brazil's major metropolitan areas)[5] in digital journalism production. Though certainly not the only project of its kind in Rio (Mayer, 1998; Chagas, 2009), it presents a theoretically productive paradox. Launched with the explicit goal to provide a "citizen journalism for favela residents" (Viva Rio, 2001), operating within Viva Rio's open definition of community development has led to wild vacillations in how it designs and implements projects. In its 13 years of existence, the project has focused on culturally-themed blogging about everyday life in favelas, photography projects framed within international human rights discourses, a collaborative online platform designed to facilitate conversations between favela residents across Brazil, and (most recently) a series of columns on public health, sanitation, and infrastructure issues within favelas written by participants from Viva Rio's community health division. In every phase, Viva Favela has been heavily influenced by the expertise, ideological backgrounds and views on technology brought to the table by project leads running the project at different points in time.

One of the potential reasons for the fluctuations in Viva Favela arises from the very open ways this type of projects define their goals and parameters. As a type of media training and production that emphasizes the importance of content produced by

[5] The literal translation of the term "favela" itself has been hotly debated with many believing that the translation of "favela" into "slum" in English by activists like Mike Davis (2006) creates an overly negative interpretation of the living conditions and social cohesion in these communities. For a comprehensive study of the term "favela", please see Observatório de Favelas (2010). *O Que é a favela, a final?*

non-professionals in both empowerment and social change processes, citizen journalism represents a sub-category of a larger body of projects defined as "citizens' media". Coined by Clemencia Rodríguez (2001) and expanded upon by others (Gumucio-Dagron, 2009; Bosch, 2010), citizens' media offers a sophisticated theoretical framework for explaining how to empower individuals within marginalized communities to create media that reflects the complexity of their lived experiences of subjugation or oppression (Rennie, 2005, p. 118). While many theories of alternative or community-based media struggle with defining their central terminology[6] citizens' media achieves a significant degree of clarity through anchoring "citizenship" to a specific body of political theory. Drawing on work by contemporary political theorists like Chantal Mouffe (1988) and Sheldon Wolin (1992) that attempts to expand the concept of "citizenship" outside of traditional avenues of political representation and into facets of everyday life, Rodríguez (2001) lays out three fundamental characteristics: "First that a collectivity is *enacting* its citizenship by actively intervening and transforming the established media-scape; second that [citizens'] media are contesting social codes, legitimized identities, and institutionalized social relations; and third, that these practices are empowering the community involved…." (p. 20). Clarifying claims made by theorists of citizen journalism (Rosen, 2008; Allan, 2013), Rodríguez's formulation emphasizes the unique perspective individuals within marginalized communities hold and the transformational effect of media production on participants. As Atton (2008) usefully interprets the theory:

[6] For example, John Downing's *Radical Media* (2000) offers multiple criteria on which projects have been evaluated as "alternative" including position vis. a vis. mainstream media, affiliation with social movements, and promotion of Marxian views on class structure and power.

"Citizens use their own, self-managed media to become politically involved on their own terms" (p. 217). In this assessment we can see the strengths and potential aporias of the citizens' media approach. Though it offers the most flexible theory for incorporating individuals into the media production process, it runs the risk of de-emphasizing the mediating role of trainers, social movement activists, and others who might be influencing both the production of material and the way the material might be used later on.

Defining Viva Favela as "citizens' media" entails differentiating between this specific concept and the much more expansive designation of "alternative media". Though this term has been hotly debated for decades, most scholars and practitioners agree that one of its defining traits is an oppositional stance towards dominant media systems or socio-political orders (Atton, 2002). Regardless of historical or geo-political context, alternative media has been generally posited as oppositional in nature. However, this focus often biases authors towards adopting overly oppositional and potentially homogenizing readings of community-based media. As Rodríguez reiterates: "Communications academics and media activists began looking at alternative or community-based media as a hopeful option to counterbalance the unequal distribution of communication resources with the growth of big media corporations. This origin has located the debate within rigid categories of power and binary conceptions of domination and subordination…" (2001, p. 3). If alternative media research sees local media as an antidote to corporate control of media or political oppression (c.f. Worpole, 1982; Atton, 2000), citizens' media research looks at the way subjects in marginalized locales

interweave media consumption and production into their everyday lives. In the conclusion of her powerful analysis of the role of community media activists working in regions of Colombia caught between national militaries, paramilitaries, and armed guerillas, Rodríguez (2011) argues that citizens' media can fulfill a variety of emotional and practical roles including "keep[ing] armed groups at bay, resist[ing] the normalization of cultures of death, weapons, aggression, and violence, reconnect[ing] families and communities separated by war, assist[ing] refugees, and coordinating food distribution and other logistics" (p. 262).

Does this deep rootedness in local environments make it impossible for citizens' media projects to be incorporated into larger political or social discourses? Sometimes these projects take place within more expansive movements. For example, community media activists in the early 2000s often participated in the larger anti-corporate globalization movement (Juris, 2005). However, the move beyond the local is neither inevitable nor often discussed. This lack in discussion has led some alternative media theorists and practitioners to critique citizens' media for overemphasizing the production process to the point that ignores the potential impact the product might have in order to celebrate its effect on participants (Atton, 2008).

Though citizens' media offers the most flexible theoretical framework for describing how marginalized communities participate in collective meaning-making through media production, this openness also creates a degree of ambiguity when looking at how particular media production projects are conceptualized, planned, and executed. In order to strengthen this theoretical position, I propose to examine how different phases of

the Viva Favela project interpreted the role of citizens' media within the favela communities it claimed to serve. More specifically, I will look at three different phases of Viva Favela that were launched between 2001 and 2014. Each of these phases defines the role of digital production in social change in different ways: human rights and photojournalism; creative commons/copy-left digital activists; Investigative Advocacy Journalists.

Though scholars coming from the social shaping of technology (SSOT) approach have written provocative accounts of how social, political, and entrepreneurial forces combined to create communications technologies like the radio (Douglas, 1985) and the telephone (Fischer, 1992), I will turn to the work of Pierre Bourdieu and James Carey to discuss the *fields of professional practice* that develop around certain fields of media production—in in our case journalism. Bourdieu's work offers two important elements for thinking about the professional cultures of news production. While many SSOT theorists focus their accounts on the genesis point of communications technologies in order to complicate narratives of technological *construction*, Bourdieu approaches the sociology of technological artifacts precisely from the point of repetition and redundancy that comes from the maturation of a discourse (Callon, 1982). Put another way, he is interested in the rules and practices that have developed over the course of time from a position of *contingency to one of normalcy* (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 6; 1972). Bourdieu's *Outline of a Theory of Practice* lays out this position clearly through a discussion on the regularization of discourses: "Discourse are managed through strategies aimed at producing 'regular' practices through officializing strategies, the object of which is to

transmute 'egoistic', private, particular interests into disinterested, collective, publically avowable, and legitimate interests" (1972, p. 40). Officializing strategies are those that codify the rules, logics, and characteristics of a certain type of practice. Applied directly to the institutional environment of work, professions are determined by the accretion of rules and laws that give the field legitimation and the authority to determine insiders/outsiders within a given formation (1972, pp. 56-60; see also Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005, p. 116). Journalism is thus a field that has been historically conditioned to operate according to certain norms—as Schudson (2002) has argued coming from a similar theoretical position.

The second thing Bourdieu might offer for thinking about "professional" citizens' media practitioners is the *permeability of discourses*. Unlike Foucault, Bourdieu does not advocate a form of radical empiricism that disavows questions of ideology in favor of mapping the contours of a given discourse (see Deleuze, 1994). Furthermore, we can differentiate his approach from McChesney (2008) and others who argue that economic transformations over-determine any other possible factors within a certain field of media practice. As Rodney Benson puts it in the editor's introduction to a collection of essays addressing Bourdieu's impact on the sociology of journalism: "In contrast to the mechanical thinking that underpins political economic theories, field theory is dedicated to understanding the web of mediations which intervene between Marx's 'structure' and 'superstructure'" (2005, p. 10). The fields in field theory are not cut off from the influence of other factors. The social capital (understood crudely as socio-economic status) of the journalists also influences how they perceive their professional roles. James

Carey (1995) offers a usefully bifurcated definition of journalism along these lines. This definition argues that journalists exist within two worlds: one world is governed by "the narrative of a public community, a community of general citizenship rather than one restricted by class, race and gender" and another "embedded in the communities of private identity—family, city, tribe, nation, party or cause" (1995, p. 230, see also Schudson, 1999). In the explicit case of Viva Favela, we can argue that staff members operate according to implicit or explicit guidelines that are governed both by the rules of the particular type of journalism they practice and the socio-economic characteristics that underpin the fields of journalism, information activism, and digital media production in Brazil.

For the purposes of this analysis, Viva Favela's projects will be broken up into three distinctive phases. These phases, which will be addressed in chapters three-five, have been labeled using the popular terminology coined by open source entrepreneur Tim O'Reilly:

Viva Favela 1.0 (Chapter 3): Launched in 2001, the original version of the project was designed to offer training classes in blogging and digital photography for favela residents in Rio de Janeiro in order to produce material for a central website, www.vivafavela.com.br. In 2006, the project added a series of photo essays about "human rights and visual inclusion" to the photo/written narratives about favela life already on the site. This addition, heavily inspired by American photojournalist and group collaborator Peter Lucas, explicitly framed the project as part of an international

conversation about human rights and visual culture. Viva Favela's international re-focusing began to instigate a series of nationwide training tours in 2007-2008

Viva Favela 2.0 (Chapter 4): The nationwide training tours of the previous phase gave way to a conceptual and technical overhaul of the Viva Favela project in 2010. The new version, dubbed "Viva Favela 2.0" by staff, featured a new interactive web site open to any contributor who registered, coupled with a series of training classes across Brazil. Influenced by and in coordination with Pontos da Cultura [Cultural Points], the Brazilian Ministry of Culture's attempt to create a national network of digital media projects in favela communities across Brazil, this version of Viva Favela amassed a substantial number of contributors from over 14 different Brazilian states between 2010 and 2012.

Viva Favela 3.0 (Chapter 5): In January 2013, Viva Favela closed down its interactive site and began a new project dubbed "Viva Favela 3.0" that featured a new training program for favela-based journalists called the "favela newsroom" as well as a series of training classes for community workers participating in Viva Rio's Viva Comunidade public health program. The idea behind this shift was to bring Viva Favela back in touch with its roots within Rio's favela communities and to integrate the project more closely with Viva Rio's other development initiatives. In its attempt to move away from collaborative digital production back to a more traditional form of journalistic news reporting, this phase offers the clearest example of what Bourdieu calls *hysteresia:* a situation where the values imposed by a certain group are palpably out of sync with contemporary attitudes or beliefs (Bourdieu, 1979, p. 201). If citizen journalism had been the leitmotif of Viva Favela from the beginning and Viva Favela 2.0 represented the

version of citizen journalism that departed most dramatically from the field of journalism, the 3.0 phase might seen as a recidivist return to a pre-digital/online form of news production. However, viewed in the context of Viva Rio's larger institutional project, this version is better characterized as an attempt to introduce an advocacy dimension into the Viva Favela program.

STRUCTURE OF EACH CHAPTER

Each of the four body chapters analyzes a certain phase of organizational activity launched by Viva Rio or Viva Favela. The first focuses on the history of Viva Rio's community development work in Rio de Janeiro and within international contexts. The subsequent three each engage a certain model of journalistic practice associated with a specific phase of the Viva Favela digital journalism project.

All of the body chapters are structured in the same fashion. They begin with a short introduction to Viva Rio's activities during the period under discussion. Then, they move into the conceptual models that underpin the type of practice adopted by each phase. The bulk of the chapter consists of a discussion of how Viva Rio/Viva Favela planned, implemented, and evaluated each respective project. Chapters 3-5 conclude with considerations of how the various profession/habitual fields of *socially engaged journalistic practice* influenced Viva Favela. Specifically, it looks at the impact of larger conversations around visual inclusion and cultural rights (Chapter 3), collaborative media production and digital storytelling (Chapter 4), and advocacy communication (Chapter 5) on the project. Special attention will be paid to the conflicts that arise within the staff around these different discourses, particularly between digital storytelling and advocacy

communication. The conclusion will begin by arguing that conflicting notions of "professionalism" exacerbate antagonisms in the group between different phases of the project. It will then move to questions of organizational management within grassroots projects by looking at how working within Viva Rio's open definition of community development has led to wild vacillations in how the Viva Favela journalism project designs and implements its series of projects.

RESEARCH APPROACH AND DESIGN

My investigation draws on an exploratory case study approach that will examine how larger questions about NGO-based development and the sociology of citizen's media are expressed through Viva Rio/Viva Favela. Following Stake (1995, 2010), Elyachar (2005), and other qualitative researchers, I believe the case study method of analysis can be seen as an ideal tool for capturing the richness of a complexly structured environment in which multiple types of processes are occurring simultaneously as it emphasizes elements of "self-centering, complexity, and situational uniqueness" (Stake, 2006, p. 6). The first reason relates to the nature of the environment where I am working. Though there have been copious studies on NGO-based development and community media production in favelas (Jaguaribe, 2004; Chagas, 2009; Freire-Meideros, 2013; Yúdice, 2003, 2009, 2013, among many others) only a few of these (c.f. Sorj and Guedes, 2007; Pastuk, 2012) have attempted a larger-scale explanatory analysis. Hence, the vast majority of the studies on which I am basing this research have used an "exploratory" approach that attempts to record reflections about favelas without making causal claims.

As Streb argues, the exploratory nature of case studies makes them useful for this type of analysis (2010, p. 329).

Case studies are also well suited for the multiple types of issues I am addressing. As my project engages a variety of topics related to funding, governance, community outreach, and technology appropriation, a case study offers a single unit that can potentially incorporate all of them. Furthermore, case studies are designed to address questions of "How" and "Why" (Yin, 2013, p. 17). More specifically, I am asking questions related to *how* Viva Rio became a global development actor and *how* this impacted the way it administered its constituent programs (namely its digital journalism project Viva Favela). I am also attempting to answer *why* the Viva Favela project adopted certain types of media production practices at certain points in its history.

Beyond its suitability to address the type of questions I want to answer, case study research is also suited for projects that are working in environments where the behavior of participants cannot be influenced by researchers (Ibid., pp. 18-20). Finally, case studies are useful when attempting to analyze events that are currently unfolding. As a significant amount of my research came from fieldwork conducted during 10 months in Rio de Janeiro, using the group Viva Rio/Viva Favela as my case study provided me an anchor point to incorporate information gained through unfolding events.

Drawing on the case study framework to investigate Viva Rio/Viva Favela, I draw on three distinct methodological tactics. These include a critical analysis of published documents provided both by Viva Rio/Viva Favela and by corporate/governmental partners, focused interviews that drew on questionnaires adapted to different types of job

within the organization, and participant observation of Viva Rio public events, Viva Favela staff meetings, and (most significantly) Viva Favela training classes. As Jankowski and Wester (1991) observe, combining methodological approaches opens up the research process to differences in questions of time and space that come with disparate types of data collection. For example, issues related to tracing funding strategies largely require analysis of published documents or individual interviews. The methods for addressing these issues can be into discrete units of time (such as the length of the interview). On the other hand, attempting to figure out how the process of training digital photography works for Viva Favela, for example, would necessitate a methodology with a much different set of time/space parameters. In this context, the expansive durational and experiential characteristics of participant observation would be much more beneficial. Using a multi-method approach between allows for a more holistic assessment of a much more complex process.

Due to the historical nature of this investigation and the limitations of fieldwork funding and scheduling that allowed for short fieldwork visits (1-2 months) in the summers of 2010 and 2012 and an extended period of fieldwork in 2013 (10 months), each section adopts a different approach. Chapter 2 and 3 cover the genesis of the Viva Rio NGO and the Viva Favela project (between 1993 and 2012). Due to the historical nature of these sections, I rely heavily on the analysis of published artifacts (including public records, press releases, power point presentations, and internal memos) as well as content from the Viva Rio and Viva Favela web page. I also draw on interviews with NGO founders, public relations staff, and Viva Favela staff who worked with the project

between 2001 and 2010. Chapter 4, which discusses the spread of Viva Favela's nationwide training programs for its interactive site, draws heavily on a quantitative content analysis of the 2010-2013 version of the site. Specific attention is paid to the geographical distribution of users during this period. This analysis is supplemented by interviews with Viva Favela staff members who were in charge of the project during this period as well as representatives form some of the larger favela-based media projects that were started in collaboration with Viva Favela during this time frame. Chapter 5 combines interviews with current directors of the Viva Favela project and those conducted with participants in its 2013 "Citizen Health Journalism" courses. This chapter also draws upon the author's own observations of the classes as well as interactions with participants during the classes.

In terms of sampling, each stage similarly reflects an eclecticism in individuals recruited depending on the nature of the chapter. Following this project's overall focus on the ways beliefs of professionalism influence how group members define "community-based development" and "community media", participants were recruited following a loose purposive sampling protocol. Chapter 2 builds heavily on interviews conducted with founding members of Viva Rio and the Viva Rio public relations staff (namely communications director Ronaldo Lapa). For Chapters 3-4, I interviewed Viva Favela staff members who were working on the project between its inception in 2001 and the shift to the 3.0 version in early 2013. Chapter 5 not only includes interviews with staff members but also with participants in the "Citizen Health Journalism" training classes that the NGO launched in May, 2013. The difference in the socioeconomic and

professional identity among different participants was noted in different versions of my interview questionnaire (see Appendix A).

RESEARCH APPROACH: CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF PUBLISHED MATERIALS

Analyzing published materials at multiple levels is crucial for setting the background for the other elements of my study. For the sections of my project investigating the interactions between international or bi-lateral donors, I will look at printed documents produced by the institutions/foundations. This includes a variety of press releases and project reports from IOs like the UNDP, the World Bank's InfoDev division, and the Inter-American Development Bank, as well as Brazilian government agencies. Annual budget reports provided by Viva Rio provide insights about who the group's international collaborators were at different points as well as the differences in government spending on the NGO. Newspaper reports and editorials from the 1990s-present also provide an invaluable source of information, particularly for the early days of Viva Rio when the project received copious coverage in local/national newspapers. A final and invaluable set of print sources is the stable of Viva Favela training guides. Thanks to the cooperation of multiple project directors from different points in the project, I have collected training materials from various points in the project's 13-year history. As subsequent chapters will reflect, these guides played a pivotal role in the training classes Viva Favela conducted.

These print materials have been essential when trying to understand the earliest stages of the NGO and the digital journalism project. For example, the "Future Stations"

program for setting up a series of public Internet cafes across Rio's favelas analyzed in Chapter 1 had completely ended by the time I came into contact with Viva Rio (around 2008). Therefore, a significant amount of the data I used when writing this section came from two published reports: Bernardo Sorj's *Brazil@Digitaldivide.com* (2001) written on behalf of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); and Batchelor et. al's *ICT for Development: Contributing to the Millennium Development Goals* (2003), an InfoDev report that contained copious statistical information about the project. Beyond filling in gaps in empirical information about the projects, printed material helped me assess the overall rhetorical strategy of Viva Rio. This was especially important when sifting through the voluminous amount of press materials provided to me by the Viva Rio public relations division. This material, which included archived news material, strategic action plans, flyers for public events, and even power point slides from talks given at international meetings, was invaluable in helping me address how Viva Rio strategically acted within these transnational networks.

RESEARCH APPROACH: OPEN-ENDED INTERVIEWS

When conducting interviews, I adopted what Robert Merton (1956) calls a "non-directive approach": a style of interviewing that begins with a series of structured questions but leaves a large degree of space for the interviewee to add his or her interpretation of the project; the ultimate goal of this type of interviewing is to "elicit as complete of a picture as possible of what was involved in the experience of a particular situation" (Merton, 1956, p. 21). The interview questions were designed for three different audiences: individuals working for donor organs and government agencies,

group members or volunteers directly associated with the everyday running of the projects, and individuals attending public demonstrations and training sessions. Topics broached include a combination of general demographic information for each interview subject, personal reasons why individuals joined the projects (whether they be directors, paid employees, volunteers, or participants), how each interviewee conceptualizes the NGO's community outreach strategies, training protocols, and other specific elements of each case, and more general opinions individuals displayed about the role of digital media in promoting community development within favelas. Appendix A contains draft copies of interview questions with rationales when necessary for three types of interview: ones with individuals working in foundations/grant agencies; with individuals with staff positions or deeply involved volunteer positions; and with individuals more loosely affiliated with the projects whom I will encounter at training sessions, public events, and related activities. As these questions were often translated into Portuguese and aimed at eliciting the most open-ended responses, the language has been left explicitly simple. Furthermore, many questions were repeated across the different types of interview conducted.

RESEARCH APPROACH: PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION

Though it will be unavoidable when delving into the deeper intricacies and complexities of the two case studies, participant observation proves a much more difficult methodology to define and defend than either of the first two. My potential discomfort in using this approach arises from the wide spectrum of ascribed definitions given to this method. In a foundational essay on the topic, Gold (1969) lays out four types of

participant observation including “complete observer”, “observer-as-participant”, “participant-as-observer”, and “complete participant” (Gold, 1969, pp. 33-36). The “complete observer” might be thought of as the classical (or perhaps stereotypical) ethnographic researcher capable of capturing the empirical specificities of the fieldwork environment without intervention (Geertz, 1983). In this approach, the researcher is able to almost completely deracinate his/herself from the studied environment in order to faithfully record and analyze without bias. Though this approach has gained traction as part of a backlash against recent strands of reflexive or engaged anthropology (Adler and Adler, 1999), its fundamental tenets have repeatedly (and often rightfully) come under attack for their claims to objectivity and quasi-scientific rationality (e.g. Clifford, 1987; Mohanty, 1990).

On the other end, the increasingly popular method of activist anthropology coming out of the tradition of *participatory action research* (a tradition with roots in the radical pedagogical techniques of Paolo Freire and Orlando Fals-Borda) flatly disavows any claim to disinterestedness or objectivity in fieldwork. As Charles Hale (a major architect of the movement) writes in a polemic addressed to the Social Science Research Council:

> There is no objectivity in activist anthropology. Instead, this practice simultaneously emphasizes a demystification of the researcher’s role in the process of knowledge creation and an expression of solidarity between researcher and research subjects. Moving beyond reflexivity on the part of the researcher, activist anthropology pushes for active engagement by community members in all stages of the process, from influencing the initial questions addressed by the researcher to actually writing published material and participating in the intellectual design of this project (Hale, 2001)

While this radical recasting of the anthropologist's position within the research process is certainly favorable to models characterizing the researcher as detached observer, it risks creating too intimate a relationship between the aims of the research project and those of the group. As Grossi and others have pointed out, activist research often risks falling back into an uncritical "idolization of local wisdom" that replaces one objectified version of research population with another (1980, p. 71). This substitution does not do anything towards empowering local communities with whom scholar-activists are trying to collaborate.

Though I draw upon participatory action research to a large degree (in fact the project would be impossible without the cooperation of group members), I also tried to maintain a degree of critical distance. These two ends of the spectrum represent obvious extremes, masking a deeper issue in participant observation with what Murphy and Kraidy label *cultural translation*. Though not entirely new (this concept can be dated back to the work of anthropologists associated with the rise of so-called "postmodern ethnography" in the 1970s-80s (c.f. Asad, 1983)), this idea acknowledges the precarious position the ethnographic observer must maintain between insider and outsider within an often-unfamiliar environment (2001, p. 14).

For this specific project, participant observation was conducted through *unstructured observation* of multiple types of activities conducted by the groups including staff meetings, public presentations, and training classes. I began by setting up interviews with members of the project introduced to me by Professor Bernardo Sorj of the Sociology Department at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (the faculty sponsor

for my Fulbright research project). Professor Sorj was one of the original members of the Viva Rio board of directors and has helped me conduct background interviews to form the basis of my dissertation research since 2010. His history of working with Viva Rio since its inception helped provide me quick access to leaders of the Viva Favela project. These leaders introduced me to other members and informed me of events and training sessions, particularly during the time the 10 months of fieldwork in 2013.

Between February and December 2013 I attended nine public events sponsored by Viva Rio/Viva Favela and 33 Viva Favela training sessions. During these sessions I engaged in numerous informal conversations with professional staff and participants that led to some of the most critical insights in my analysis—particularly for the Viva Favela 3.0 "citizen health journalism" classes. More specifically, I served as a kind of teaching aid to the Viva Favela instructor in helping clarify theoretical concepts when necessary, providing examples of citizen journalism projects, and helping participants with rudimentary technical aspects like photographic composition, constructing interview questions, and interview transcription. In the process, I also talked with class members about my personal history, experience being a foreigner in Brazil, and my beliefs regarding the relationship between favelas and the rest of Brazilian society. Due to a combination of participants' recognition of my own clear foreignness and the overall informal nature of the courses themselves, I would characterize my presence more as a friendly and benign conversant than a potential collaborator within any larger activist or social change project.

ETHICAL CONCERNS AND POTENTIAL RESEARCH LIMITATIONS

As mentioned in the participant observation sub-section, my data collection process entailed a substantial degree of repeated interaction with individuals; this inevitably resulted in personal relationships being established with those involved. However, as my project attempts to make a critical intervention within debates over how NGOs work between higher-level funding sources and local communities, it inevitably touched on sensitive issues within the organizations and potentially the neighborhoods where these organizations work. Though it is highly unlikely that my research caused any damage to the continued funding of Viva Favela or any other project, the results of my dissertation could potentially raise issues about recruitment, training protocols, and other elements related to how they function. This ethical concern could potentially serve as a positive outcome for the NGO if framed in terms of helping them in developing best practices. In this regard, I have offered feedback on what I have observed to Viva Favela staff members who seem receptive to some of the issues I raised including more concrete ways to turn concepts like citizenship and human rights into teachable examples through local examples and some potential ways to connect the Viva Favela site with other online favela news sites to spread the potential influence of the stories. The reception of these and other of my observations will be discussed in the conclusion.

The second and more pressing potential ethical issue is the job security of members participating in the study. Though Viva Favela's leaders and trainers of are paid employees, many contracts are offered on a part time basis—partly because of all of the amenities for full time employees that are mandated by Brazilian law including paid meal accounts, health insurance, and compulsory paid vacation days (see Bresser-Pereira,

1999). Therefore, many of the individuals I worked with are not full time employees of the project. Hence, putting them into a situation where they criticize their employer might create a job risk for them. I have attempted to address this potential issue through the writing of this dissertation by only invoking individuals to reference information provided to me. For any controversial content stated by Viva Favela staff members, participants in the health training classes, and other community media activists in Rio, I have adopted pseudonyms to avoid any potential ethical oversteps that might damage participants in any way.

In terms of how I defined my research to participants, I have developed a few steps. In the most immediate and institutionally sanctioned way, this problem was addressed through *printed consent forms* (translated into Portuguese) that individuals were asked to sign before participating in the interview process. However, as Reddy (2009) has noted in her study of consent practices used by the Human Genome Project, potential participants are often unfamiliar with both the language and the process of informed consent. With this in mind, the best way I have found to deal with these issues is to be very open and transparent in my intentions with everyone involved. For Viva Rio and Viva Favela staff members, this usually meant explaining the larger picture my project is addressing at the outset of field research, discussing drafts with participants, and monitoring my interactions to ensure that they are not offended or made uncomfortable about the claims I am making.

I often used my relationship to Professor Sorj to build trust within the organization. For the participants in the training programs, I was able to build trust with

them largely because of the rapport I had been developing with the Viva Favela trainers. The vast majority of classroom sessions were characterized by an air of amicability and an extremely positive rapport between Viva Favela staff and the class participants. Therefore, my association with the staff helped me slide relatively smoothly into participating in classes—as smoothly as a random person from the United States plopping down in their class could be perhaps.

More specific elements of the safeguards developed to address confidentiality and livelihood issues around my participation with Viva Rio, Viva Favela, or related parties are available in the report I filed with the University of Texas Institutional Research Board. The report number is IRB # 2012-06-0082; I would be happy to share it with any interested party.

The two major limitations I faced and continue to face in the production and reception of my research revolve around depictions of the organizations presented by members and the nature of favelas as case sites. As one of the main arguments of my dissertation is that organizations like Viva Rio have been able to adeptly navigate the professional world of international development, it often might be in the best interests of individuals working on these projects to present their organization in the best possible light in order to preserve a harmonious relationship with the groups responsible for the group's survival. This limitation was addressed by tempering my language in interviews and constantly monitoring my interactions to ensure that I do not come across as threatening to the organization; once again my relationship with Professor Sorj and some of the senior members of Viva Rio helped facilitate my interaction with staffers.

Furthermore, I pretested my questions with close Brazilian and international contacts I had already established working in the NGO scene in Rio before I began interviewing individuals associated with Viva Rio/Viva Favela.

The second limitation relates to the favela as an extreme or *deviant sample* of case study research**.** Defined by Patton as a "case so unusual as to distort the manifestation of the phenomena of interest" (2001, p. 234), these samples again risk not being relevant outside of the specific context in which they exist. Due to the international attention they receive both in terms of media coverage and (potentially) donor interest, favelas are aberrant in relationship to other communities with similar historical circumstances and demographic profiles (Perlmann, 2010). Therefore, my case study is possibly even less generalizable. While this might present an initial limitation, both the strategies that Viva Rio used to draw in international support and the conflicts that arose from Viva Favela's fluctuation in direction speak more generally to trends in development communication and the sociology of media.

Chapter 2. The Branding of Viva Rio: From Community Initiative to Global Social Entrepreneur

VIVA RIO: A COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT NGO FOR THE FAVELAS OF THE WORLD

From the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, Viva Rio steadily grew from a "citizen action initiative" (Yúdice, 2001, 2003) to a local provider for health programs, police sensitivity training, public Internet access (in the form of telecenters), vocational training, environmental protection (through recycling programs and "greening" initiatives), and a series of other practices. Though these actions originally began in favelas within the state of Rio de Janeiro, they eventually spread to other parts of Brazil, other countries in Latin America including Paraguay and Venezuela, and to more global locations include Port-Au-Prince, Haiti, and Vancouver, Canada. This evolution from local to national to transnational NGO has been facilitated by sizable grants from large multi-laterals like the United Nations and the Inter-American Development Bank; aid programs sponsored by national governments from Venezuela, Norway (Norwegian Council of Charitable Churches), Canada (IDRC); international foundations like the Soros Open Society Institute and the Ashoka Foundation; and corporate social responsibility wings of AMBEV, and others (Lucas, 2013; Viva Rio, 2013a; UNDP, 2005).

Though from a strictly economic perspective, national and local government programs provide the lion's share of its funding (Viva Rio, 2012; McCann, 2008), Viva Rio's ability to flourish in international development circles bestowed a large amount of prestige on the group's ability to be what group founders have called "more of a network

between local communities and global resources than a traditional NGO" (Yúdice, 2003). In short, Viva Rio has been very successful at branding itself as an transnationally oriented NGO that can work in multiple local contexts.

By presenting itself from its earliest stages as a community development agent that centers its work around low-income, politically unstable regions *instead of* on particular types of intervention (medical assistance, human rights advocacy, environmental protection, etc.), it has been able to accomplish what international relations theorist Clifford Bob (2005, 2012) argues separates local projects that are financially and politically successful in the world of international donors and ones that are not: the ability to create and circulate a broadly defined group identity that appeals to multiple sets of actors. By creating and branding an image of itself as a one-stop shop for a plethora of community-based development projects, Viva Rio was able to brand itself as a *development sub-contractor that specialized in community-based interventions within precarious regions*.

This chapter examines how Viva Rio grew from a Rio-based citizen's coalition in 1993 to a highly professionalized NGO with an almost 20-million Real annual budget (Viva Rio, 2014a), staff of over 1000 employees, and projects in six different countries including a permanent office in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Viva Rio's success was dependent on both the group's ability to depict its activities in a manner attractive to international interlocutors and the transformation of the international development industries away from professional-led interventions planned and implemented by highly-trained Western "development workers" in favor of supporting locally successful grassroots projects. The

combination of these two factors facilitated the rapid ascension of Viva Rio from a local initiative to a global development player.

THE MARKETING APPROACH TO GAINING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

How was Viva Rio able to attract support from so many different organizations in different locales? Though it presents this expansion as a natural fruition or gestation of its core values that seems almost inevitable (R. Lapa, personal conversation, August 2, 2013; Viva Rio 2013a), theories of transnational networking in social movement theory argue that there are explicit strategies followed by grassroots initiatives that seek international support. The typical path for this type of process follows what theorists Margaret Keck and Katherine Sikkink (1998; Sikkink, 2005) call the *advocacy boomerang* (1998, pp. 13-15). The boomerang occurs when groups representing marginalized communities use communication campaigns to spread word of their struggles to commiserating international audiences. The boomerang then returns to the original site when international supporters pressure political leaders or international NGOs to put pressure on local authorities (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, p. 20). This popular model accommodates many political struggles like the Tibetan and Burmese freedom movements where local activists called on international audiences to pressure national governments to step in and apply diplomatic pressure or (in extreme cases) impose economic sanctions. It also works for situations that speak to a sense of geopolitical urgency such as genocides, human rights violations, or mass political oppression (Keck and Sikkink, 2002; Tarrow, 2001). However, this model falls short when addressing how a grassroots project with a *long-*

term agenda that speaks to a number of *political, economic, and culture* issues builds and maintains support.

In order to cultivate a project that will continue past a discrete or bounded objective requires a much more overt focus towards questions of securing funding, making institutional connections, and being able to participate in transnational NGO networks. How does this happen? Clifford Bob's *The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International Activism* (2005) offers an extensive look at how a local group's ability to the display of certain attributes that attract support can determine the survival or destruction of initiatives. Bob draws on two cases, the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional [the "Zapatistas"] in Mexico and the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) in Nigeria, to analyze the main attributes a local group requires to gain material and political support. The two cases from the 1990s were chosen because they both contained an explicit appeal to international NGOS as well as governments and individual citizens in the Global North (Bob, 2005, p. 67). Starting from the assumption that financial and political support for local projects is drastically lower than the need for support, he uses market theory to lay out a series of factors that determine which local groups can "win" the zero-sum game of international support.

In Bob's account, the three main factors influencing the ability to garner international support are *size of financial base*, *international standing of group members*, and *value and strategy-based marketing*. The first two of these are largely self-explanatory. If the group has wealthy members committed to spending on the cause, it will be able to leverage the personal assets of semi-affluent or affluent members in order

to pay for legal work, campaign materials, public relations, and a host of other activities. Similarly, if the group contains or is sanctioned by a figure with international repute, potential international supporters will feel significantly more comfortably supporting the project. The third factor, marketing, is the most complex but also the element that allows for the largest degree of strategic planning on the part of the grassroots group. Figure 3.1 draws from Bob's work to illustrate in table form the different attributes or strategies that are likely to invite donor support or alienate donors.

Element of "Marketing"	**Likely Attributes to Receive Support**	**Unlikely Attributes to Receive Support**
Locus of Initiation	Rootedness in local context; proof that group knows what goals fit the community.	Disconnect between aim of project and issues facing local community
Goals	Goals reflecting new social movement issues including human rights, environmentalism, women's rights, equal access to health and education	Calls for regime change; call for potentially politically divisive changes.
Organizational Characteristics and Structures of Governance	Democratic governance measures; community outreach; public budget reports	Opaque decision-making processes; composition of NGO draws too heavily on supporters from a certain area or political party.
Strategies	Public relations or media campaigns that utilize charismatic spokespeople; attempts to promote transformations in globally sanctioned manner; partnership in participation in large civil society conferences.	Anything that even hints at embracing or supporting armed struggle, including even loose affiliations with armed insurgents or revolutionary forces

Table 2.1 Table illustrating how a local project draws in support through value and strategy based marketing (taken from Bob, 2005; 2007).

From the perspective of goals, the most important element is proving that one's group is representing a problem that affects a disenfranchised constituency. The Zapatistas' 20-year long transformation from Marxist guerilla agitators to representatives of local communities in Chiapas provides Bob's archetypical example of proving awareness of community issues. Once this awareness is proven, the next stage consists of the group attempting to frame its project in a way that resonates with issues deemed important to transnational NGOs and other actors. Many of these issues are those that resonant with so-called new social movements (Mellucci, 1989; Burkart, 2014; Risse, 2001) including environmentalism, freedom of speech protection, and human rights issues broadly construed. Focusing on how the Zapatista strategy largely consisted of re-framing radical or revolutionary claims into new social movement claims, Bob that their ability to generate global support significantly increased when they downplayed their call for a regime change in Mexico in favor of objectives based in environmentalism and indigenous rights. In what might be the most overtly pragmatic or even cynical element of his analysis, Bob argues that local groups who mirror their governance structures on those popular or in fashion with NGOs in the global north often are able to leverage this element when asking for support. For example, groups that have an elected board of directors that is the result of equal inclusion practices and regular elections are strong contenders for support. For the Zapatistas, a lack of formalized democratic governance structure was compensated for by a rhetorical focus on inclusion regardless of gender or ethnicity and the lack of president or formal head (the "commandante" of the Zapatistas

has always been "the people" Bob, 2005, p. 277)) . Thus, they performatively invoked democratic governance even while using obscure practices. Finally, the tactics adopted by local groups plays possibly the most important role in generating support: carefully crafted public relations or media plans that are able to encapsulate group activities in a concise yet provocative manner can exponentially multiply the audience for a certain group. The creation of "Subcommandante Marcos" as the pipe smoking, rugged-yet-erudite former college professor turned activist played a major part in the spread of the Zapatista cause through Internet and news media channels (ibid., p. 250; Cleaver, 1998). On the flipside, any perceived support of armed struggle or the strategic application of violence will ostensibly bar a group from receiving international support except possibly through underground or clandestine networks (Bob, 2012; Ronfelt and Aquilera, 1999). Hence, it is crucial for most international supporters from the United Nations to smaller faith-based charities to activist groups, that the local group is neither affiliated with an armed insurrection nor condones violent responses even in the case of human rights abuses (Holloway, 2010).

By wrenching networking for international support outside of a morals or ethics-based discourse that claims some groups "deserve" more support than others, Bob allows the process to be considered through the lens of strategy. Being able to maximize the positive elements of strategic networking while avoiding the damaging connotations of the negative (i.e. that a group is 'non-democratic', 'violent', or 'factious'), allows a local project to successfully negotiate the world of international support. And, as the Zapatista example illustrates, this type of support can provide the material and symbolic support

that can sustain local interventions facing non-responsive or even repressive political conditions.

FROM SPECIALIZED INTERVENTION TO SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE DEVELOPMENT INDUSTRIES

The way Bob theorizes the of "marketing" of grassroots projects gives us an excellent framework for examining how Viva Rio strategically positioned itself in order to draw in support. However, its ability to grow to the size that it did would never have been possible without a fundamental reconfiguration of the international development industries in the late 1990s-early 2000s. This transformation is best conceptualized as a shift from a discourse of professional development implemented by highly trained specialists with little knowledge of the locations where they are working (Rist, 1997; Shah and Wilkins, 2004) to non-professional, grassroots interventions generated by a growing group of "social entrepreneurs" who often come from marginalized areas. During this time span we see a radical shift away from privileging local knowledges in the so-called "developing world" in the 1950s in favor of a professional management to a gradual turn back towards engaging the grassroots that leads to the rise of a variety of "post-development" (Esteva and Prakash, 1997; Mignolo, 2010) narratives in the contemporary moment. It is crucial to note that Viva Rio was born during a time when many international organizations including the World Bank and the United Nations were facing considerable pressure from civil society to incorporate local voices and perspectives (Easterly, 2007; Hellinger, 1987) and NGO-based development was ballooning due to the crumbling of the Cold War bi-partite system (Willettes, 2011). The

decline of "professionalized" development institutions and the rise of multinational NGOs like Amnesty International, Greenpeace, and others as the torch bearers for civil society created a geopolitical configuration in the development scene that makes a broad-based yet profoundly grassroots organization like Viva Rio a candidate for so many of the projects.

Beginning at the conclusion of World War II and expressed most directly in texts like Walter Rostow's *The Stages of Economic Development: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (1959) and Daniel Lerner's *The Passing of Traditional Society* (1958), "development" was defined in a holistic manner that incorporated multiple interconnected elements. The primary element was an economic focus on opening countries up to international free trade while divorcing domestic economies from governmental intervention. Coupled with this call for economic transformation are a series of cultural transformations ranging from lowering birth rates (Rostow, 1959, p. 18) to using public transportation for inter-city travel (Lerner, 1960, p. 18). This interwoven process of economic transformation coupled with attitude change became widely known by advocates and detractors as "modernization".

This holistic conception of development began to decline as Western organizations like the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the World Bank, and the United Nations tasked with promoting and overseeing modernization began to grow in size and geographical scope. Many of these organizations had grown in budget and staff by over 500 percent in the 1970s (Toussaint, 2010). Hand in hand with the growth in these development industries was a new approach towards Modernization

according to a logic that privileged *bureaucratic management* and *professionalization of development protocols and practices* (Escobar 1994; Murray-Li, 2005). For development institutions, application of these formulas by experts were used to justify every success and explain every failure even in situations like the "East Asian Tiger" phenomenon of the 1970s-1990s where intense government planning instigated economic growth through subsidized industrialization (Surin, 2003).

This professionalized bureaucratic view of development met opposition from its very inception. The loudest cries against the development industries came from grassroots or local activists and community leaders in the nations who were supposed to be receiving aid (Esteva and Prakash, 1994; Fisher and Ponniah, 2003). The list of development's naysayers grew in the 1990s to include a wide array of famous activists and celebrities from Marcos of the Zapatistas to journalist Naomi Klein to U2 lead singer Bono to the Dalai Lama. Across the world, the resounding cry was "another world was possible". Though arising from various local contexts across the globe, this loose grouping unified around a general unwillingness to compromise with the institutions of international development from foreign aid programs to IOs like the World Bank, the IMF, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). According to this line of thought, these institutions are the inheritors of the ideological commitment to Modernization and Westernization espoused by Rostow, Lerner, and cohorts. This ideological bias creates an environment wherein these organizations are unable to think about development recipients as anything other than less-developed and guileless pupils. Hence, the World Bank and its siblings actively produce a form of what Walter Rodney (1970) calls

"structured underdevelopment": the formation of a financial, political, and cultural infrastructure that constructs and maintains a rigid structural division between development "experts" and underdeveloped "students". Refusing to acknowledge that shifts or self-crises in the development industries over questions of "stakeholder participation" or "institution-client" relations are much more than semantic reformulations, this position advocates a total transformation of how development on the global scale operates (McEwan, 2009, p.147).

What does this post-development perspective propose as a replacement or alternative to the modernization paradigm? Supporters of this approach often advocate for the recovery of pre-existing traditions and practices eclipsed by development. From this position the only way to promote self-directed and autonomous development for local communities is to replace the ideologies promoted by development organs with indigenous content. Examining a few of the leading scholars of this discourse, known as the "autonomist school,"[7] (LaTouche, 1991) illustrates the radicality of the break they propose. Coming from an educational perspective, Esteva and Prakash (1995) argue that development is an extension of colonialism's attempt to erase indigenous knowledges in order to re-condition local subjects. The authors make this point by drawing a distinction between organic and industrial memory (1995, pp. 67-80 passim). Organic memory refers generally to the cosmology held by indigenous populations regarding everything from property rights to leadership structures to the imposition of European languages that

[7] This is not to be confused with the autonomous or workerist school of Marxist theory coming out of Italy in the 1970s.

operate according to a "fundamentally different logic regarding the relationship between the individual and the totality in society" (1995, p. 72). In a similar vein, both Ivan Illitch (1987) and Walter Mignolo (1999) have argued that the way the colonial encounter re-shaped language to follow a Latin alphabet wrecked immeasurable havoc on religious, political, economic, and cultural forms across the globe. Mignolo in particular has attempted to rediscover these occluded systems of thought through creating an exhaustive intellectual history of knowledge production in pre-Exploration South and Central America. All? of the autonomist theorists share a political interest in invoking "medieval cosmopolitan community" (Grewal, 2008), a space of cultural miscegenation and flourishing indigenous knowledges that ruled the symbolic world of populations in the so-called "Global South" before being eclipsed by first the colonial and then the modernization projects.

Though the work of autonomist theorists like Vandana Shiva played a pivotal role in amplifying *moral or ethical claims* about the disruptive impact of international development on ecological processes, indigenous communities, and local economies in the developing world, as an actionable strategy it has encountered significant resistance. To put it simply, many post-development theorists are more focused on emphasizing and re-emphasizing the conviction of their ideals than thinking through the deployment of these ideas in empirical contexts. For many scholars and activists working in the global south who have explicitly dealt with the transition from "traditional" to "modern" in marginalized communities, the unsophisticated way the autonomist theorists conceptualize the "outside" of modernization as a space of resistance is of little use to

help understand the position of subaltern groups within contemporary economic and political processes (Garcia-Canclini, 2014 [1996], p. 49). Other critics like Nederveen-Pieterese have even gone as far as to argue that the answers to the problems created by modernization provided by autonomist theorists are so out of touch with reality that "to call this type of work "theories of alternative development" is a misnomer because no alternatives are ever offered" (2000, p. 176).

While some in the post-development camp (namely Escobar, 2008) have attempted to move beyond the moralist posturing plaguing other versions of this approach, the pushbacks that have received the most serious attention from development institutions have generally come from *disillusioned or disaffected practitioners and administrators from within the aid industries*. These individuals draw on first hand experiences of the disconnect between these global institutions and local beneficiaries. William Easterly (2007) represents an extreme position that advocates for the total abdication of decision-making to local communities. Instead of foreign aid he proposes a system of "aid vouchers": "Suppose we issue development vouchers to target groups of the extreme poor, which the poor could redeem at any NGO or aid agency for any development good they wanted—for example, vaccinations, life-saving drugs, a health workers' visits, an improved cook stove, textbooks, seeds, or food supplements. All of the official aid agencies would set aside some of their money for an independent 'voucher fund' that is kept separate from any one agency. The poor would then choose both the goods they wanted and the agency they wanted to provide them" (Easterly, 2007, pp. 378-379). This purposefully hyperbolic solution hints shared concern with the autonomist

camp around current development practices: *the absent or anemic consideration of local input*. Some development practitioners address this problem by attempting to improve the communication channels between development institutions and local environments beyond a simple feedback process proposed by early development writers like Schramm (1964). A unifying theme among the diverse body of critics is that community input should play a pivotal role in every stage of development (Tufte and Mefalopolus, 2009; Mefalopolus, 2002).

Calls for reorientation of development towards bottom-up solutions have often endorsed the growing practice of *social entrepreneurship* as a theoretical and practical avenue for increasing local involvement. Though the discourse has been largely created around lionizing biographies or popular "how-to" guides (Bornstein and Davis, 2012; Bornstein, 2003), a few theoretical accounts do posit some key features that are shared by most social entrepreneurs. Building from the criteria developed by the Ashoka Foundation, the first institution to apply the concept of social entrepreneurship to their funding practices, McAnany (2012) points out a few key criteria underpinning this development practice: "*Creativity* (a new and original idea about how to solve a significant social problem, tested in the field), *entrepreneurial value* (not satisfied until the idea works locally and is spread to the whole country or particular arena of application), *social impact of idea* (others like the idea, and it leads to greater scale and adoption by many), and *ethical fiber* (the person inspires trust)" (2012, pp. 111-112; my italics). This definition presents the key formula for successful social entrepreneurship: a combination of innovation through the contribution of the local entrepreneur and an

astute consideration of his or her role in the local social, political, and economic environment. Nicholls and Young argue that by introducing new forms of practice in local environments the social entrepreneur can potentially create small-scale transformations in the political and economic structures in their environment (2008, p. xv). Thus, the innovation can produce environmental transformations that resonate from a localized origin to a larger scale.

Social entrepreneurship's flexible approach towards development practice has won favor in a variety of circles. Beyond its popularity within professional development institutions, it has also been declared a best practices model by philanthropic organs including the Ashoka and Ford Foundations, the Open Society Institute, and the PATH Global Health Foundation. This growth has potentially created a new environment within development communication where local projects have become increasingly in fashion. The popularity of post-development, empowerment (e.g. Mefalopolus, 2002), and social entrepreneurship discourses has potentially created a new environment within development communication where local entrepreneurial projects have become increasingly in fashion (potentially making them the new "dominant paradigm"). Viva Rio's ascension from local intervention to a multifocal, global development actor certainly fits within this new horizon.

VIVA RIO'S DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

In order to track Viva Rio's ascension from local initiative to globally recognized pioneer in social entrepreneurship, we must engage with the strategy behind its ambitious community development projects. Though theorists of social entrepreneurship

(McAnany, 2012) often emphasize the way this phenomena refuses characterization into a series of best practices or normative set of steps to follow, we can draw some generalizations among Viva Rio's development activities. *These include an emphasis on community outreach and understanding a certain geographical/social/political area instead of a certain form of intervention (such as public health, communication infrastructure, etc.); an ability to act as a mediator who can "speak the language" of both government experiments/international aid workers and community opinion leaders/specialists; and an approach that explicitly and repeatedly references the group's non-partisan approach.* These three facets reinforce the group's founding statement, which foregrounds the group's pragmatic agenda: "Viva Rio is working on the simple, elementary things that unite us all, despite our many differences of opinion, ideology, religion, and politics […] The point of Viva Rio is "to create actions that neither fall into the political games of social movements, political parties, or trade unions, nor fall prey to the hindrance of red tape characteristic of government projects" (Cesar-Fernandes, cited in Pereira, 1996).

Even though it originally took the form of a multi-sector citizen's initiative responding to escalating violence in Rio, the main architects of Viva Rio (many of whom still coordinate the group) came out of O Instituto Sociológico do Estudo da Religão [The Sociological Institute for the Study of Religion] (ISER), a controversial public think-tank founded in the 1970s. Hence Viva Rio's shift towards NGO-based community action had been envisioned by leaders of ISER, many of who were leftist academics. More specifically, Viva Rio founder Rubem Cesar-Fernandes and many of his early partners on

the NGO's board came directly from ISER and had been working together for decades. By the time Viva Rio launched, ISER had become an important center for producing research on a variety of civil society issues ranging from de-militarizing the police to looking at how to make the national government more accountable to public input as the military dictatorship waned (Cesar-Fernandes, 1994; Landim, 1988, 1992). This bit of history is important when consider Viva Rio's genesis. Even before favela issues came into the citywide and national radars, Cesar Fernandes and colleagues had been working for years to try to strengthen the fabric of Rio's civil society during the post-dictatorship transition in the early-mid 1980s. Having engaged in this type of work set ISER up to make the transition from a research center addressing theoretical claims about citizenship and community development to a community change agent engaged with on-the-ground projects—through Viva Rio (Cesar-Fernandes, 1994; McCann, 2014, p. 166).

As an intermediary actor perched between the worlds of favela activism and academic research, Viva Rio has constructed an innovative form of community engagement that has garnered international accolades from individuals ranging from the William Gardner, the Latin American director of the UNDP, to Hugo Chavez, former president of Venezuela. Looking at some of its largest projects from the last 20 years through Bob's framework of "strategic networking" elucidates how the group's flexible approach to community development generated multiple types of intervention. Viewed chronologically, we can see a progression from individually generated Rio-based projects to projects based in non-Brazilian sites and accomplished through increasingly complex partnerships with development institutions and national aid programs like the Canadian

International Development Research Center (IDRC) and Norwegian Church Aid. As a simple chronology of its voluminous activities in Brazil and abroad over the last 21 years would take dozens of pages (for a full list see Viva Rio, 2013), I have created a selective discussion of some of its major interventions based around Bob's typology.

The central points of this analysis are:

1. *Drawing upon local outreach to build strong connections with favela-based NGOs in an effort to "prove" deep knowledge of local problems*
2. *Embracing new social movement goals including gun control/anti-arms trade activism and environmental protection.*
3. *Adopting structures of governance that include community membership on board of directors and local outreach for input on projects (most notably in Viva Rio-Haiti activities)*
4. *Investing heavily in public relations activities like co-sponsorship of other NGO projects in Brazil and participation in civil society meetings/summits.*

BUILDING LOCAL OUTREACH: 1994-2000

Returning to Bob's framework, the element of strategic marketing that predicates all other elements is the proof of local investment. In order to gain international support, projects must show that they represent the needs and wishes of local constituents. For Viva Rio , this entailed providing support for a series of community NGOs in favelas. Between 1994 and 1998 Viva Rio offered volunteer staff, publicity, fundraising, and intellectual mentorship for eighteen different cultural projects started in Rio's favelas (R. Lapa, personal communication, August 02, 2013). In the process, they helped promote three of the highest profile groups: the acting, film acting and production school Nós de Morro [Our Hill] in the Vidigal favela, the percussion and musical performance group AfroReggae in Vigário Geral, and the Luta Pela Paz [Fight for Peace] boxing gym combat sports program in Complexo de Maré. Nós de Cinema, which gained

international attention for training a significant number of the cast members from the blockbuster film *Cidade de Deus* [*City of God*] (2001), received a large amount of seed money from Viva Rio in its formative stages and then continued on its own for roughly 10 years as a training program. Started by television producers and directors who participated in Viva Rio vigils, this project used Viva Rio funding to build infrastructure and purchase equipment. After a few years it separated from Viva Rio and has remained inoperative since 2009 (Perlman, 2010).

The other two projects much more clearly illustrate the *intimate relationship between Viva Rio's holistic brand of multi-issue community development and extensive collaboration with groups in favela communities*. The most famous, AfroReggae, grew out of the same crisis of city governance and public security that created Viva Rio. The group was started by Anderson Sa, a former drug trafficker and musician from the Vigário Geral favela in Rio's northern suburbs, and Jose Junior, a local entrepreneur who had been both working in cultural NGOs and managing hip hop bands since the early 1980s. As a community activist from Vigário Geral (the favela that experienced the largest number of homicides as a result of renegade police violence), Sa was heavily involved with Viva Rio vigils Viva Rio vigils and workshops on police violence. Though not a favela resident himself, Junior (who would go on to become an Ashoka social entrepreneurship fellow in 1994) began organizing musical festivals in the 1980s and in 1992 founded the Rasta Reggae Dancing day, a festival that over 15,000 attended. Working together, Sa and Junior founded the group to serve Vigario Geral through combination of cultural programming like music and dance (taught by Sa) and

community development programming coordinated by Junior that included literacy and job skills classes, HIV-prevention and rehabilitation programs for crack users, vaccinations for pets, and a variety of other activities (Junior, 2002). Today AfroReggae has grown to the point where it can support various international programs ranging from a favela-based circus that toured Europe in early 2014 to police sensitivity trainings in Venezuela in May 2013. Though Viva Rio only collaborated with AfroReggae for a short time and in a limited capacity by providing specialized instruction for topics related to public health and computer skills training, many of the original directors of Viva Rio (Cesar-Fernandes, 1994; P. Strozenberg, personal communication, October 2, 2013; Lucas, 2010) cite AfroReggae as a major influence on how they conceptualize the relationship between building ties with local communities and assessing what type of intervention the community requires.

Luta Pela Paz [Fight for Peace], founded by the British ex-patriot and sociologist Luke Dowdney in 1997, began as a boxing gym with accompanying daycare, proposes a holistic approach to community development that English acquisition, computer skills, and vocational training, and public health clinics (UNDP, 2002). Working with Viva Rio to secure the space, Dowdney received immediate recognition for starting his project in the Novo Hollanda section of Complexo de Máre, considered the most precarious favela in Rio due to its central location between the international airport and the tourist neighborhoods of the South Zone as well as its strategic position as a point of intersection between all three of the major trafficking gangs political struggles. Like AfroReggae, Fight for Peace adopted a strategy that offered both recreational activities aimed to deter

young (and largely male) favela residents from participating in the drug trade and education in both applied/vocational training classes and more conceptual classes aimed at providing cultural literacy through discussing the negative impact of the drug trade on poor communities, the history of racism against Afro-Brazilian populations, and other facets. Though Dowdney separated from Viva Rio in 2008, his collaborative work with Viva Rio provided a great deal of early attention for what Viva Rio projects were accomplishing in favelas from the international development industry.

Figure 2.1. Luta Pela Paz boxing team at a tournament in Baixo da Sapateira favela, Complexo da Mare, September 21, 2013.. Photo by Nick Wong/Luta Pela Paz; used with permission.

Praising Fight for Peace for its innovative approach to informal education, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) launched a study to analyze how the

project developed its training protocols, recruitment strategies, and curriculum. This resulted in the publication of *The Fight for Peace Methodologies Manual* (2002), a guidebook for combining sports and civic education that has been translated into six languages (UNDP, 2005, p. 6). Despite the dissolution of their partnership, Fight for Peace played a pivotal role in building interest within international institutions to the work Viva Rio had been promoting within favelas. *The Fight for Peace Methodologies Manual* started what would become an ongoing collaborative relationship between Viva Rio and the UNDP. This particular branch of the UN, long considered to be the organization's most community-centric and locally responsive wing, has been increasingly looking at how to use cultural activities to promote civic engagement and informal education in precarious areas (Murphy, 2006, p. 344). Viva Rio's deployment of culture as a way to approach development activities struck a chord with the UNDP who eventually funded the creation of a semi-permanent Viva Rio office in Port Au Prince as well as Viva Rio satellite branches in Venezuela, Kenya, and in other locations across the globe.

Though critics have argued about the effectiveness of Viva Rio's local projects in producing long-term social and political changes in Rio's favelas, the group has been resoundingly successful at generating international focus on Viva Rio's perceived ability to use innovative cultural strategies to promote development activities and provide healthcare and security services in communities that had long been considered inaccessible by other development actors. A substantial part of Viva Rio's global appeal comes out of the perceived ability to work in this type of area.

EMBRACING NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENT ISSUES

Beginning in the late 1990s, Viva Rio began to expand its work from favela-based community development projects to lobbying for nationwide reform in areas related to the arms trade, environmental protection, and other topics that fit within the terrain of new social movements. For Melucci (1989), Buechler (1999), and others, one of the primary differences between old (or "historical") social movements and NSMs comes from the way each type of movement defined its *constituencies.* Historical social movements represent the wishes of a certain group of actors usually coming from within a marginalized population. Accordingly, the goals of these movements have been to achieve political and economic gains on the behalf of the subject population. Some examples would be the Civil Rights movement in the United States (McAdam, 1990) or the various workers' movements in Europe, the US, and Latin America in the late 19th to mid-20th centuries (Tarrow, 1998; Laclau, 1977). New social movements, on the other hand, do not often represent a single constituency. Instead, they are characterized by an engagement with issues that are considered to affect large swathes or the entire human population. Some central NSM concerns include discrimination around gender/sexual identity, environmental degradation and destruction, nuclear weapon proliferation, the international arms trade, and more recently issues of communication rights and fair access to information online (Melucci, 1989, pp. 10-20; Burkart, 2014). From this position, the main goal is to create policy conditions that will address these concerns that are considered to have *universal applicability*.

Considering Viva Rio through the framework of traditional vs. new social movements, we can see that its earliest phases resonated with the historical social movement framework to the degree that it explicitly claimed to be a change agent acting on behalf of favela residents. However, its international collaborations in the late 1990s coincided with a growing interest in issues that much more closely reflect a NSM approach. Viva Rio's main interventions in this regard were gun control and anti-international arms trade activism and environmental protection/conservation. Working in these areas helped expand the group's global profile as it was able to translate the work it had accomplished in Rio de Janeiro in explicitly international terms.

Like so many of its other activities, Viva Rio's turn towards gun control activism was articulated in terms of an organic scaling up of its experiences working in favelas (Cesar-Fernandes, 2008; Bob, 2012). Though this focus grew out of the group's effort to de-escalate violent confrontations between favela-based traffickers and Rio police, the NGO did not explicitly develop a pro-gun control position until much later. In the early years, Viva Rio leadership actually did not support domestic gun control laws in Brazil. As Cesar-Fernandes himself would describe in a reflexive 2008 essay on the history of gun control in Brazil, Viva Rio founders (who were largely "left-wing veterans of the Cold War, dictatorship era") were reluctant to get involved with arms control policies administered by a national government that had until very recently been controlled by an authoritarian military regime (Cesar-Fernandes, 2008, p. 204).

The group's engagement with gun control policy began in the late 1990s when the administration of Henrique Cardoso (himself a veteran of 1960s radicalism) collaborated

with a number of single issue NGOS to create legislation that put gun control on the policy foreground in 1999-2000 (Bob, 2012, p. 151). In an abrupt U-turn from its original position, in 2001 Viva Rio wholeheartedly launched its support for the new gun control legislation. Rationalizing this change, Cesar-Fernandes argued that the group was acting through with its long-standing belief that the uncontrolled sale and distribution of arms within Brazil was one of the root causes of endemic violence in favelas. What was different now, though, was the fact that the government reached out to civil society in order to build a foundation that included non-governmental activists and concerned Brazilian citizens (Cesar-Fernandes, 2008, p. 205). From this point onwards, Viva Rio created a series of campaigns that invited topical experts from a huge number of other countries and IOs to help draft a Brazilian gun control policy. It also worked with transnational gun control advocacy groups like the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) to hold a series of workshops and publicity events to raise public awareness about the dangers of uncontrolled gun distribution. The symbolic pinnacle of these endeavors was a successful campaign by IANSA and Viva Rio to get the UN to declare July 9 the annual "Small Arms Destruction Day" in 2002 (Bob, 2012, p. 154; Stohl, Schroeder, and Smith, 2007, p. 45). In every subsequent year, Viva Rio has hosted a celebration at its headquarters in downtown Rio. At this event, key favela leaders, Rio politicians, members of allied associations in other parts of the world and many members of the original NGO board of directors gather to display some of the weapons collected in citywide anti-gun violence events held throughout the year and destroy a few of them as part of a process symbolizing the transformation of Brazilian society into a more

peaceful, tolerant polity. Figure 2.2 offers a promotional photograph from one of these celebrations.

Figure 2.2. Publicity photo from Viva Rio's 2002 celebration of "Small Arms Destruction Day". Cesar-Fernandes (far right) and other board members are getting ready to surrender their guns to a metal smith as part of a symbolic performance. Photo Courtesy Viva Rio.

Viva Rio's involvement in firearms legislation and anti-small arms distribution is ongoing, including a highly publicized series of workshops launched by the NGO's gun policy expert Antônio Rangel Bandeira in Venezuela and Colombia—areas historically dominated by the small guns trade (Viva Rio, 2013d).

Though both less publicized and less coherently integrated into the group's philosophical vision than its work on gun control, Viva Rio's work in environmental protection and conservation has featured a number of workshops and policy proposals conducted with international partners. The largest project has been a multi-country preservation, eco-tourism, and re-forestation campaign directed at preserving and rehabilitating the Atlantic Rainforest. This campaign, launched as a partnership with the Oswald Cruz Foundation (the largest scientific research center in Brazil), featured a series of interventions in five Brazilian states as well as portions of Paraguay and Argentina. Viva Rio's rationale for starting this program again re-iterated the local specificity of the group's concern by arguing that the Atlantic Forest provides the natural background on which many of Rio's favelas were constructed (R. Lapa, personal communication, August 02, 2013). Helping maintain a healthy environment for this rainforest was intimately linked with environmental concerns within Rio's favelas.

Figure 2.3. Favelas in the West Zone of Rio de Janeiro constructed within the Atlantic Rainforest. Photo Courtesy of Viva Rio.

Between 2010 and 2013, this project worked throughout the Atlantic Rainforest to create eight permanent environmental protection centers that offer training classes on conservation, recycling, gardening, and eco-tourism as well as greenhouses to cultivate seedlings to be replanted. The project had also created 173 full time positions for forest rangers in these areas as well as the coordinated re-planting of 17000 saplings as of May 2013 (Viva Rio, 2013c). The results of this project have been featured at a series of international meetings and the project was featured as an example of best practices for community-based conservation at the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development held in Rio de Janeiro.

In both gun control and environmental protection, Viva Rio has developed strategies to tie its local commitments to transnational conversations. Furthermore, in working on with *relatively non-controversial issues* that speak more to the universalist values of NSMs, the group was able to gain international support without fear of alienating partners by taking positions that might be seen as overly controversial or partisan.

FOSTERING COMMUNITY-BASED, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE PRACTICES: VIVA RIO HAITI [8]

Out of all of Viva Rio's international networking projects, its Haiti program (called "Viva Rio Haiti") offers the most explicit example of how the group exports its "location" (*not* "issue") based approach. In this project, Viva Rio launched versions of more than ten of the projects it had created in Rio including the construction of new sewage systems within four of the poorest neighborhoods in Bel Air; the opening of community health centers, daycares, and public access internet centers; and the creation of youth martial arts and music programs. Furthermore, this project received the most accolades of any other project, being praised by the IDB, Ashoka Foundation, and the UNDP (who would offer the most flattering praise of all the organizations) As part of its 20-year celebration in July 2013, Viva Rio included a video showcasing the first eight years of its Viva Rio Haiti program. A substantial part of the film was narrated in English by William Gardner, director of the UNDP's Haiti branch. In the introduction to the film,

[8] The last two sections of this chapter draw extensively on press materials supplied by Viva Rio public relations coordinator Ronaldo Lapa and his assistant Fidel Perez Flores. I would like to thank them for allowing me access to these materials that, while part of the NGO's PR plan, are designed to be distributed to international development partners. Access to these materials proved invaluable in explaining the details of Viva Rio's networking strategy.

Gardner offers an extremely useful example of how the UN and other IOs perceive Viva Rio's strengths as a development agent. He begins the film with this statement:

> The difference between Viva Rio and any other development organization is impressive. They have lived in slums [favelas], with people from slums. Unlike the UN, which is built in a hierarchical fashion, they hold on to the idea that the beneficiaries in Haiti are on the same level as the Viva Rio workers. (Gardner, cited in Viva Rio, 2013a).

This statement encapsulates the attractiveness of Viva Rio to the "post-development" era development industries. Its ability to act as a mediator between local communities and outside development actors in Rio de Janeiro proved attractive to IOs (and to the UNDP in particular). Consequently, in 2004 Viva Rio was invited by its longtime collaborator the UNDP to help deal with disaster relief in the Bel Air neighborhood of Port Au Prince. Though the project was originally supposed to last for six months, it has become a permanent fixture in the UNDP's disaster relief/infrastructure building in Haiti. For Viva Rio, Haiti became a place where they could create new versions of the community-based development projects launched in the favelas in the 1990s. Its original project in Haiti was to create a center called "Kay Nou" ("Our home" in Haitian Creole) that would provide a wide range of community assistance projects including emergency relief shelters, first aid, food and water distribution, and medical assistance. However, after a few months the UNDP asked them to continue the project, which ultimately ended up becoming an internationally registered NGO in Haiti called "Viva Rio Haiti". The project now offers a multitude of services including public health,

community garbage collection and sanitation, English classes, and a variety of cultural activities like theater, capoeira, and dance. [9]

In the eyes of Viva Rio, though, the major difference between Viva Rio and Viva Rio Haiti is the composition of leaders and workers within the NGO. Unlike the original Viva Rio project, Viva Rio Haiti was not launched by a group of public intellectuals, academics, and activists and later staffed by professional members. In the group's earliest stages, teams of paid professionals from Viva Rio and UNDP as well as volunteers from different American and Brazilian churches recruited and trained community members to lead the various aspects of the project. As of 2013, Viva Rio Haiti's staff is composed largely of Bel Air residents who now occupy coordination and training positions in the group. As Bob and other social movement theorists like Tilly (2004) argue, one of the strongest ways to draw in support for a cause is to illustrate that it represents in a democratic fashion the interests of those it claims to serve. Viva Rio accomplishes this with the Haiti version because it can show how its stated commitment to democratic governance is practiced through the way Viva Rio Haiti operates within the social infrastructure of Bel Air. This resonance between group ideals and group projects strengthens the group's reputation as being able to promoting community-based development in a way that considers the particularities of a given geographical, political and cultural space..

PUBLIC RELATIONS AND THE BRANDING OF VIVA RIO

[9] As of September 2013, Viva Rio is even thinking about starting a Viva Favela wing in Bel Air Office that will produce materials in Haitian Creole.

Though perhaps the most straightforward element of its networking strategy, Viva Rio's focus on public relations and networking with large NGOs has provided the main vehicle for turning its innovative approach to community development into a tool that can be used for garnering international support. Using a 10-person public relations team, Viva Rio has made a consistent effort to create publicized partnerships since its inception. When planning the first march against police violence in 1994, the group created and distributed white t-shirts to participants that contained what would become the Viva Rio logo. Since that point Viva Rio has made a point of sponsoring and financially supporting as many favela-related activities in Rio as it possibly can. As of August 2013, the NGO sponsored an average of 60-70 municipal or regional events in a year (R. Lapa, personal communication, August 2, 2013). Viva Rio has also been very active in a variety of international civil society meetings and summits in Brazil and beyond. In 2013 it sent members or partners to events or workshops in Vancouver, Oslo, Berlin, Caracas, Denver, New York (For even more examples see www.vivario.org.br/en/calendar.html). It has also been very active in hosting events aimed at international audiences. For example, in October 2012 if hosted an International Day of Peace at its Haiti branch and invited representatives from Human Rights Watch, UNICEF, the Ford Foundation, and other international NGOs. While it casts a wide net in its attempt to strengthen its network, it only directs its invitations/participations in line with projects it is supporting in Rio. This crucial element of its networking strategy attempts to maintain coherence between its local projects and international work.

Besides its sponsorship and networking with domestic and international partners, Viva Rio has also made a point of opening its annual budgets to interested parties including the UN, the IDB, and foundation partners. Like other elements of its PR strategy, transparency might appear to be so obvious as to not warrant mention. However, taking in consideration numerous studies on how many local NGOs working with larger partners in the development industries often engage in irresponsible bookkeeping or even funneling accrued funds into criminal activities (c.f. Lewis and Mosse, 2006; Cooley and Ron, 2002), financial transparency becomes a big deal.[10]Furthermore, as Sinek (2012) and McCann (2008) argue, disclosing financial information is far less common in Brazilian NGOs than those working in other nations with similar demographics.[11] Hence, making opening financial records becomes a strategic move designed to differentiate the NGO from others in the same area.

The public relations staff also attempts to build Viva Rio's reputation by opening its budget and its evaluation reports to journalists and large international organizations in order to help them create group profiles. One of the most conspicuous examples of this transparency element of Viva Rio's public relations program was the group's participation in the *Global World* journal's "Best NGOs in the World" competition in 2012 and 2013. As part of the application process, they had to submit annual budgets with revenue and expenditures, employment records, and mission statements for its

[10] The World Bank has been pushing transparency for development partners and national/local governments since the early 2000s. City governments run by the PT made a large point initially of transparent and participatory budget planning, starting in Porto Alegre.

[11] For an extended discussion of the political economic scene for NGO funding in Brazil with special attention paid to favelas, please see Wendy Sinek (2012). *The Money Trap: NGO Funding and Political Action in Brazil's Favelas*. Chapter Six explicitly mentions Viva Rio.

various projects including Viva Favela. The Viva Rio public relations staff consistently emphasizes the importance of promotional materials that emphasize transparency for building trust within the international development arena (R. Lapa, personal communication, August 06, 2013).

ASSESSING VIVA RIO'S GLOBAL NETWORKING STRATEGIES: RETURNING TO THE LOCAL

Viva Rio's financial and political success in the world of international development were the result of two interwoven elements: an ideological and political economic shift in the development industries that privileged "rooted cosmopolitan" (to again reference Zuckerman, 2013), actors from local contexts over professionalized development actors; and a politically intelligent set of considered strategic decisions made by NGO leaders to network with both community-based development agents in Rio and international collaborators engaged in topics deemed relevant to the group's ever-expanding mission.

Turning towards critical literature within development communication, Viva Rio's outreach strategies might be viewed as both a reversal of dominant discourses around *"marketing"* as a strategy as well as a case of the complications that arise for concepts of social entrepreneurship when a local project negotiates the labyrinthine world of international development. Since the 1970s, marketing within development projects has largely been associated with information strategies designed to promote adoption of innovations, technologies, or practices. Often linked to projects such as public health awareness campaigns (Walsh et. al, 1993) or entertainment-education initiatives (Sabido,

2003), the practice of social marketing is generally used to describe projects using unilinear communication techniques in order to persuade audiences into adoption. Theoretically inspired by psychological literature on social learning espoused by Albert Bandura, this practice has been critiqued within development circles for "subscribing to a utilitarian model that privileges ends over means" (Waisbord, 2000b, p. 6). Crucially, the "utilitarian" function of the campaign is generally determined by the larger institution that creates the campaign—reinforcing the "dominant paradigm" framework hotly debated since the 1970s (Rogers, 1976). Literally turning the formula around, Viva Rio's ambitious networking moves the locus of power away from the institutions traditional responsibly for planning and initiating development campaigns. Instead of serving as a local intermediary for a project designed at larger levels, Viva Rio signals a new approach to "marketing" built around entrepreneurship instead of diffusion.

While it subverts the dominant logic of social marketing through its ability to strategically navigate the world of IOs and transnational NGOs, Viva Rio offers a more potentially vexing instance of social entrepreneurship in action. Looking back at the NGO's rise to global fame over the course of 20 years one is tempted to follow Mike Davis' damning critique of local development NGOs in *Planet of Slums* (2006) and claim that Viva Rio has seized the opportunity to line its pockets by using its experience in favelas to ride the waves of various international issues that come in vogue (like human rights, environmentalism, gun control, etc.) in order to get funding from an enormous number of international organizations and philanthropic foundations. While this critique might provide a rationale for some of Viva Rio's more far-fetched projects (like working

with beer mega-producer AMBEV to create alcohol rehabilitation programs), it does not acknowledge the specificity of Viva Rio's historical position within city and favela politics. In 1993, a combination of escalating citywide violence, the systematic crippling of favela community activism during the years of military rule (Vargas, 2009; Ridenti, 2007) and the freshly minted guerilla armies raised by drug traffickers (Dowdney, 2003) created a situation where civil society actors became the only viable agents for producing any social change within favelas.

Given recent trends in gentrification, real estate speculation, and exploitative tourism practices in Rio's favelas (Freire-Medeiros, 2013; Frisch, 2012), Viva Rio's attempts to market its work in favelas as part of a global networking agenda cannot be read simply through the lens of co-optation. However, the group's expansion onto the international stage raises questions about its ability to manage its work in Rio. As many of its early projects were created directly through personal interactions of group leaders with community actors, the project's growth might potentially create new issues at the local level. The question, then, that will drive the rest of this dissertation follows as thus: *Does Viva Rio's increasing international profile affect its abilities to plan, coordinate, and assess local activities?* Instead of arguing that Viva Rio gives up its commitment to community-based development, I will argue that keeping this commitment while moving into becoming an enormous transnational actor creates difficulties when coordinating and prioritizing between its projects—particularly those operating according to frameworks like citizen journalism that emphasize open-ended, non-prescriptive forms of engagement. Turning towards Viva Favela, its digital citizen journalism program, I will

examine how the NGO's expansion complicates communication networks between various parts of the organization to the point that its local projects become created and managed by an itinerant paid staff that design programs based more on professional beliefs and ideological positions regarding the role of digital media in social change than on community engagement.

By January 2013, Viva Rio had an annual operating budget of almost 20 million Reais (15 Million USD), a paid staff of over 5200 (more than 100 times the number of paid employees working for the NGO in 1999) as well as over 50 different projects worldwide (Viva Rio 2014a). Within Rio, the group has about 2300 full time employees working out of its headquarters in the Gloria neighborhood.

Figure 2.4: Viva Rio's headquarters in the Gloria neighborhood of downtown Rio is housed in a four story former colonial mansion. Photo Courtesy of Viva Rio.

To date, the NGO's most heavily funded and staffed projects within Rio are Viva Comunidade, its network of favela-based community hospitals; Viva Cred, its longstanding microfinance program, Viva Rio Socioambiental, an umbrella program for a variety of projects focused on "social inclusion" for favela residents including drug rehabilitation, public speaking courses, professional internships, and professional certification workshops; and Viva Favela.



Figure 2.5. Visualization of Viva Rio's Rio-based projects circa 2013.

Though all of these programs had offices within Viva Rio's Rio headquarters, they nonetheless worked largely autonomously from each other: each one had its own staff, budget, and its own set of community interlocutors. Even as each still claimed to represent a strategic intervention to help improve lives of favela residents, the larger

NGO largely left them to their own devices (R. Lapa, personal communication, August 02, 2013).

This two-fold sense of autonomy (from other projects and from NGO leadership) sets in motion a process that will provide the primary theoretical motor for this dissertation: the motor of bureaucratization. As community-based projects scale up, they inevitably expand in terms of staff. This shift towards professionalization can lead to a transformation in organizational culture built around small groups of trained specialists working in their own independent professional fields. These professionals, often trained in highly specialized skills, are caught between the debates and demands of their vocation and the community-based operations of the project. If left unaddressed, this tension can lead to potentially debilitating communication blockages between the specialists and the larger NGO whose leadership is often more concerned with the position of the project within the larger infrastructure of the group—**not considerations arising from professional considerations.** These communication blockages can instigate or exacerbate financial or political conflicts between the specific specialized project and the larger NGO.

The next three chapters will attempt to illustrate this project as it tracks Viva Favela's unmooring from Viva Rio.

Chapter 3. Viva Favela 1.0: Anti-Instrumental Communication and Audiovisual Human Rights

INSTITUTIONAL LINKS BETWEEN VIVA RIO AND VIVA FAVELA

This chapter argues that Viva Favela, started by Viva Rio in 2001 as a digital pathway for favela residents to share their experiences with worldwide (albeit largely Portuguese speaking) audiences, was founded according to a philosophy that emphasized two central facets. First, it argued for the political importance of allowing favela residents to create narratives with minimal intervention from staff: this position claims that favela communities contain within them a wealth of personal and collective narratives that have been occluded by mainstream media representations. The second and more complex facet is an emphasis on human rights and visual inclusion adopted by the project around 2008. This theoretical position was largely sculpted by the American photojournalist Peter Lucas, who collaborated heavily with the project from 2005-2010. Lucas, who before joining Viva Favela had worked extensively with professional publications like *Magnum*, international foundations like The Soros Institute and Ford Foundation, and various human rights organs connected to the UN, brought to the table an explicit formulation of favela based media production as a way of protecting and extending human rights to residents (Lucas, 2008; Magnum Foundation, 2011; Medeiros, 2005).

The chapter will conclude with a brief consideration of how these two elements impacted the way Viva Favela related to the rest of the Viva Rio NGO. I argue that Viva Favela's early opposition to the *instrumentalization of digital communication in favor of open-ended projects tied to international definitions of visual human rights*

engendered a laissez-faire attitude on the part of Viva Rio towards overseeing the project. In later chapters we will see how this attitude (which began in July 2001 shortly after the project began) led to internal conflicts in later years over how Viva Favela was supposed to fit within Viva Rio's originally stated goals. Furthermore, the focus on a particular discourse on visual inclusion that drew directly on how the UN and Amnesty International defined the concept set up Viva Favela as a project that was addressing larger issues rather than problems facing favela residents within the municipality of Rio de Janeiro.

THE PREHISTORY OF VIVA FAVELA: FUTURE STATIONS AND PUBLIC INTERNET ACCESS

Viva Favela launched in the immediate aftermath of the "Estaçoes Futuros" [Future Stations] initiative to open public access Internet centers (or "telecenters") in Rio's favelas. Launched in 1997 through a partnership with the Inter-American Development bank, this program aimed to provide the first non-profit, non-black or gray market Internet access in favela history. It was also the most expensive non-public health project Viva Rio conducted at the time it launched (B. Sorj, personal communication, July 18, 2010). During the 1990s Viva Rio's stable of local projects had grown to incorporate a wide array of strategic development activities aimed at infrastructural development in favelas). As outlined in previous chapters, Viva Rio's ability to draw in collaborators was positively related to its ever-expanding interest in various types of "development". As the group's number of international collaborations increased, its range of activities followed suit (Strozenberg, personal communication, November 11,

2013). As mentioned in the previous chapter, Viva Rio began to set up informal classes and programs in community policing, cultural programming and informal educational programs in reading, English-language acquisition, and computer skills training almost immediately after the original 1993 march (Soares, 1996, p. 110). Throughout the mid-late 1990s it added programs that entailed a much more extensive infrastructural presence including childcare centers, shelters for victims of domestic abuse, microcredit programs, recycling centers, recreational gyms, and eventually community hospitals (see Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1. Viva Rio health post in Rocinha, circa 2013. Photo by Stuart Davis

As the budget grew, the group's projects began engage more directly in installing various forms of physical infrastructure in favelas. Since its early collaborations with groups like Afro Reggae and Nós de Morro, Viva Rio prioritized the distribution and maintenance of equipment that supported its cultural projects in favelas: the music programs received new equipment and necessary supplies, filmmaking programs received upgrades in production software, etc. (UNDP, 2005). Future Stations, started in 1997 as a three-year long partnership with both the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank's Information for Development (InfoDev) division, was designed to provide public Internet access centers in favelas across. The project's central goal was to provide both the infrastructure and the instruction to help favela residents use computers for personal and (potentially) professional activities Until that point, local, national, and international media had depicted favelas as hotbeds of criminality, insecurity, and unregulated violence. Consequently, favelas did not experience the same level of government interest in installing public Internet centers or subcontracting with local providers as other Latin American nations like Argentina and Peru. (For a comparison of these three countries, see Fuentes, Straubhaar, Davis, and Spence, 2014). Due to the perceived threat of violence in favelas, only one NGO (Rodrigo Baggio's Center for Digital Inclusion) had piloted public access centers in favelas in the early 1990s. Hence, Future Stations provided the first sustained attempt to create long-term public access and learning options for favelas (Sorj, 1999; Inter-American Development Bank, 2001).

Between 1997 and 2003, 20 Future Stations were developed in 16 favelas within the city of Rio. The Stations were designed to function as public access Internet

cafes that offered training in Internet use and major computer software as well as informal advice centers for employment and career counseling for favela residents (Batchelor, et. al, 2003, p. 30). Involving community leaders and public school teachers as board members for each station, the stations held special sessions for students and adults interested in career changes. Though in reality they were largely staffed by paid Viva Rio employees, Future Stations were designed to incorporate the training of individuals within each partnered favela to learn how to manage and maintain the technology themselves. Accompanying this technology training, Viva Rio tried to train community members through creating community web pages that could sell advertising to local businesses, charging for private classes in web design and integrated advertising for local businesses, and even acting as consignment agents for local clothing and arts and craft. All of these activities were designed to provide the fiscal resources necessary for keeping the centers open after the initial grant period ended (Ibid, p.32; IDB, 2001, p. 3) The ultimate goal was to create a public, free Internet access center that would end up becoming an information and communication hub for its favela community.

In practice, the Future Stations faced a number of performance and training issues that presented barriers to penetration within communities (B. Sorj, personal communication, July 18, 2010). The first set of problems arose during launch stages. Due to the often ad-hoc building and electrical infrastructures within favelas, the construction of each Future Station often involved intensive re-furbishing of the buildings that would hold each center (Sorj, 2008). The second set of problems revolved around staff training. Beyond installation costs, the group had to pay for permanent staff, equipment upgrades,

and hiring personnel to work on the machines if they broke. The training protocols developed by paid staff members were not always reinforced or explained by community volunteers working at the stations. Hence, volunteers had difficulty explaining equipment/software usage to users, which often led to functionality problems with the machines. Most drastically, none of the Future Stations could develop a revenue model that would make it independent from Viva Rio or partnering organizations. According to initial reports by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank on the project (IDB, 2001; Batchelor, et. al, 2003) the shift from public/IO/NGO-funded telecenter to financially self-sustaining telecenter required an intricate balance of intensive training in small business management and entrepreneurship (to be conducted by a partnership between Viva Rio and Cisco Systems) and outreach with local businesses.

Figure 3.2: Private Internet café that used to be a Future Station, Novo Hollanda, Complexo da Maré, Rio de Janeiro. Photo by Stuart Davis.

The Future Stations' directors could never find a suitable way to address these organizational design and implementation issues (B. Sorj, personal communication, July 18, 2010). Along with these internal issues, there was an even larger exogenous problem none of the Future Stations partners really anticipated at the project's beginning: the rapid rise of cheap private Internet cafes. Throughout Brazil, favela communities were experiencing a dramatic increase in available options to access the Internet within favelas through private Local Area Network (LAN) houses (Santos dos Passos, 2013). As the infrastructure for Internet grew to cover larger parts of the formal cities, these Internet cafés grew rapidly.

In the late 1990s into the early 2000s, the diffusion of ICTs into these communities was very low and mostly accomplished through public access telecenters. In a survey conducted in 1998 by the NGO Center for Digital Inclusion (CDI) across seven of the central favelas in the Rio municipality, only about one out of every 10 respondents said they used the Internet for one hour a week (CDI, 1998). In the same survey, only about 10% of the respondents claimed to have a personal email account. The CDI survey, which became a major policy document in subsequent years, was cited by prominent board members at the time as a primary impetus for the development of the Future Stations (Sorj and Guedes, 2005b). According to Bernardo Sorj, the former director of the Future Stations project, the lack of Internet access points in favelas reflected a more general belief that these neighborhoods did not belong to the infrastructure of the city (Sorj, personal communication, July 18, 2010). Therefore, an explicit element of the program was the political claim that favelas needed to have the infrastructure to go online in order to be better integrated into the life of the city. In the 1990s, Internet access in Rio de Janeiro and other large Brazilian cities had only penetrated roughly 60% of the population (Fuentes, Straubhaar, Davis, and Spence, 2014). In Rio the areas with highest levels of Internet penetration were those that either surrounded financial or commercial centers downtown or those in the highest income neighborhoods that already had digital cable and other services (Sorj and Guedes, 2005b).

By the early 2000s the Internet access situation was quite different. Resonant with the experiences of NGOs in other parts of the developing world that started public access computer centers independent of state planning and control (Hudson, 2006).

According to Sorj and Guedes (2004)' survey conducted in 2007, published under the title *Internet na favela: Quantos, Quem, Onde, Para quê[Internet in the Favelas: How, Who, Where and Why?*] over 70% of residents surveyed in the South Zone favelas of Rocinha, Vidigal, and Vila Canoas, reported going online at least twice a day. Out of the population between the ages of 12 and 20, 85% reported using the Internet at least twice a day. A study by Albagli et. al (2009) found that LAN Houses provided over 90% of internet access points in the neighborhood of Rocinha—even higher than diffusion inside of individual homes. The booming popularity of these LAN houses brought into stark relief a fundamental problem for any not-for-profit organization that attempts to set up telecenters: organizations that rely on grants or public allocations for variable costs like staff and equipment maintenance will *always* be at a disadvantage against private enterprises that rely on a steady income flow (Galperin and Mariscal, 2009). Therefore, even one like Viva Rio with a sizeable budget and international partners cannot take on the kind of infrastructural investment necessary to build and maintain two-dozen telecenters. Even with financial help from the IDB and World Bank, the Future Stations program still was around five times more expensive than any other Viva Rio communications or cultural project (B. Sorj, personal communication, July 18, 2010). Other telecenter projects started at around the same time, like those of the Comitê para Democratização da Informática (CDI), were able to avoid some of the competition Viva Rio faced from LAN houses through moving outside of Rio to open new centers in other favelas and rural areas in Brazil, attracting private donor support in order to reduce reliance on public funding cycles, and putting more funding into paying trainers to offer a

larger variety of low cost courses at the centers (Baggio, 2000, p. 16; B. Sorj, personal communication, July 18, 2010; World Bank, 2002).

The popularity of the LAN Houses effectively drove Viva Rio/Viva Favela out of the Internet access business. The last Future Station closed in March 2004. Therefore, according to Future Stations co-director Sorj Viva Rio then decided to use Viva Favela to make an intervention on the quality of Internet product provided (B. Sorj, personal communication, April 04, 2013). In other words, Viva Rio's project no longer became one of providing and promoting access among the population, but of how to train favela residents how to use the Internet for publishing media. More specifically, it began to create a program for recording and disseminating narratives from favela residents.[12]

VIVA FAVELA 1.1: THE ORIGINAL PROJECT

The main idea behind Viva Favela, to train residents to produce materials that would be disseminated via a Viva Rio-sponsored site, was fomenting during the Future Station phase. During this time, trainers began to notice that some users displayed both a high level of interest in computer-based production skills like blogging and web design as well as a natural propensity for performing these activities (Sorj, 2001). Therefore, when the Future Stations project ended, the shift to Viva Favela already had supporters within the Viva Rio staff as well as a small but committed group of correspondents (X. Vargas, personal communication, May 09, 2013). Beginning from a similar ideological position as the Future Stations, Viva Favela's original goal was to provide training classes in all

[12] Though other groups like A Agência de Notícias das Favelas creating web sites for publishing news about favelas, Viva Favela was the only one to explicitly focus on media production.

aspects of digital media production along with non-regulated space for favela residents to use newly gained skills to publish any content they wanted as long as it observed certain decency standards (M. Júca, personal communication, August 1, 2010).

From its inception Viva Favela directors were encouraged to keep the project disconnected from any of Viva Rio's other favela development projects because of its unique position as an *organic communication channel* for residents (X. Vargas, personal communication, June 30, 2013). Among Viva Rio's projects, Viva Favela is the most openly defined in terms of objectives and strategies. Though other Viva Rio projects observed the hierarchies of profession in interventions related to fields like health care, Viva Favela did not think of its media production team as experts—though they were certainly all possessed college degrees, had professional experience in digital media production before joining the project, and had gone through a competitive hiring process (M. Jucá, personal communication, August 02, 2012). The project's explicit opposition to notions of professionalism was rooted in a political commitment to letting favela residents speak for themselves as a way of responding to a long history of racist, classist, and otherwise discriminatory narratives about these areas and their inhabitants. The most dominant stereotype at this time was that of the "balas perdidas" ["lost bullets"]. According to this narrative, armed violence between different trafficker factions and between traffickers and the police was so constant that there was at all times a danger of stray bullets hitting innocent people (see for example, Agência Estado, October 21, 2001).

Before explaining the philosophical underpinning of Viva Favela, it is important to note what it was *not*: the political inspiration for the project was to provide something distinct from either development communication or traditional journalism. In its earliest incarnation, the project was designed to be the exact opposite of what development and health communication scholars call "development support communication (DSC)" (Melkote and Steeves, 2003, p. 188; Rogers, 1995; Melkote, 2000). DSC comes out directly out of a diffusion of innovations paradigm that privileges communications' ability to clearly and persuasively convince populations to adopt certain new tools or behaviors. Viva Favela founders argued that this type of communication privileged the persuasive role of communication that was the antithesis of their goal in the project (X. Vargas, personal communication, May 09, 2013). Furthermore, project leaders wanted to avoid an advocacy communication or investigative journalism model (c.f. Ryan, 1991) because they felt that the project's main focus should be building communication capacities within the communities it served (Lucas, 2010; P. Lucas, personal correspondence, February 07, 2013). Viva Rio would go on to set up a communications branch in 2002 independent from Viva Favela that would handle public relations and press releases, and support communication for other Viva Rio projects. Viva Favela was left on its own, financially enriched and encouraged to design and implement all of its own projects without Viva Rio interference—a dynamic that remained unchanged until the summer of 2012.

Viva Favela went live on April 01, 2001 with a recipe for a beef jerky and banana casserole by Rocinha correspondent Ana Carolina Lima (Viva Favela Archive,

04/01/2001). Building from this modest start, the Viva Favela website would go on to publish up to 40 stories a month by 2003. The project's original director, Xico Vargas, had been a celebrated columnist and reporter for *O Globo*, the largest Rio-based newspaper at the time. However, he was also part of the original ISER coalition that planned the first marches in 1993. Along with Ventura, Vargas was an integral player in the attempt by journalists within the city to reform how mainstream media covered favela communities (Cesar-Fernandes, 1994; X. Vargas, personal communication, June 30, 2013). From the beginning he tried to orient the side to train as many favela residents as possible in a short period of time to grow the body of published material about life in favelas. This became the initial goal of the project.

It is crucial to note that Viva Favela was initially set up as a reaction to negative media representations of favelas. In this spirit, the project began in *a mode of critiquing* the way "professional" journalists working for Rio-based and larger newspapers, television programs, etc. depicted favelas. Therefore, it really did not begin with a clear philosophical or conceptual framework other than *not being the mainstream media.* Following this anti-expert emphasis, early Viva Favela also distanced itself from acting as a news organ for favela communities. Though it called itself the "first Favela news site", it selectively adopted certain elements of the then burgeoning field of convergent journalism—focusing more on autobiographical essayistic publishing than on providing an online news site.[13] In this regard, it trained individuals in skills like photography and web production as well as providing editorial assistance in writing and (in rare cases)

[13] For a distinction between the various forms of "Web 2.0" publishing, see Bruns, 2005.

translating to English narratives from favela residents. The closest thing that it had to an ideological orientation at this point was a nod towards what creative industries scholar Jean Burgess (2007) calls "vernacular creativity," a portmanteaux of Walter Ong's focus on traditions built around intergenerational oral communication and Richard Florida's claim that each geographical location has its own unique set of non-tangible characteristics: "Vernacular creativity refers to the variety of everyday creative practices like storytelling, family photographing, scrapbooking, journaling and so on that pre-exist the digital age and yet are co-evolving with digital technologies and networks in really interesting ways" (Burgess, 2007, p. 14). In examining the history of this concept, Burgess argues that digital media have greatly amplified the ability of local communities to preserve and disseminate these traditions without having to turn to interlocutors.

In the beginning, Viva Favela's network was largely created through the informal networks already developed by project founders (people like Vargas or Pedro Strozenberg), former Future Stations workers, or partner NGOs like Luta Pela Paz who had built numerous contacts with leaders and peace activists in favelas. Between 2001 and roughly 2004, Viva Favela created a stable of around 15 regular (defined as contributing at least once a month) "community correspondents" who would produce weekly or bi-weekly stories about their views on favelas. Many of the contributions use personal narratives to explore how contemporary Rio de Janeiro society denigrates or discriminates against favelas.

A brief look at the contributions of three of the early sites' heaviest contributors shows the *personal, anecdotal, and non-professional emphasis of this*

period. Like many early correspondents, Bete Silva wrote short features about various aspects of everyday life (or "a vida cotidiana", a phrase often invoked by favela activists to combat mainstream media representations of these areas as dens of criminality and ubiquitous violence– (see Chagas, 2009, p. 244, en.2) within Complexo de Alemão, the favela where she lived. Silva's stories largely address the daily life of community members who were at that point never talked about by mainstream media: the elderly, house wives, and young children (Figure 3.4). She also focuses on leisure activities within the favela that outside observers would never associate with a favela (B. Silva, personal communication, July 03, 2013). Figure 3.5 presents a clip from a Saturday night at the most popular karaoke bar in the neighborhood. Silva's stories resonate closely with how Viva Favela conceptualized the community correspondent program to operate: Rio's favelas are giant, complex social organisms that share as many commonalities with the rest of Brazilian society than differences. Though interviewing one of the oldest men in the neighborhood or writing a feature on a karaoke bar, Silva is potentially beginning to re-articulate how favela communities are mediated by communications technology.

Figure 3.3 Shot from Bete Silva's profile of Nilo Gomes de Santos, one of the earliest living residents of Novo Brasilia favela, Complexo de Alemão. January 2, 2002. Photo by Rodrigues Moura, Viva Favela staff.

Figure 3.4 Karaoke action shot from Bete Silva's story on nightlife in Complexo de Alemão, May 18, 2001. Photo courtesy Viva Favela.

Mariana Leal, a 25-year-old college student and Nós de Morro alumnus whose family lived in the northern favela of Acari, wrote short articles about fashion, cinema, cuisine, and theater in the favelas. Though her stories took a more objective journalistic approach than many other Viva Favela correspondents, she ended most of her pieces by laying out personal reflections on the importance of these areas for de-stigmatizing favelas and producing sources of income for favela residents. For example, July 2004 a piece on favela-based participants in Rio Fashion Week entitled "Solidarity in Fashion" looked at how participation by favela-based designers deconstructed dominant stereotypes about fashion design being a professional field for the upper middle classes.

In this regard, she tells the story of Iramar Alves da Cruz, 42-year-old single mother and aspiring fashion designer with no professional training (Figure 3.4). Beyond attacking stereotypes this piece also emphasizes the importance of national and international fair trade distribution networks for distributing favela-produced clothing and accessories. Through this individual case Leal interweaves the recording of favela cultural events, larger discourses on de-stigmatization and fair trade, and her own personal viewpoints.

Figure 3.5 Iramar Alves de Cruz in Mariana Leal: "Moda Solidaridia"["Solidarity in Fashion"]. *Viva Favela*. July 02, 2004; Photo by Beto Pêgo, Viva Favela Staff

The oldest Viva Favela correspondent was Manuel Bonfim, a 76-year-old resident of the Parque União favela (Complexo da Maré) who emigrated as a teenager

from the northern state of Ceara. Between 2002 and 2004 he wrote a series of poems for Viva Favela that documented his migration to Maré in the 1940s. Across the fifteen poems he created for Viva Favela, we can see two recurring elements: an invocation of himself as a descendent of generations of "cordelistas", or Northeastern story-tellers who disseminated legends and folk tales through cheap chapbooks (Slater, 1982); and the joy he experienced when moving to Maré and observing how the community bonded together to combat government evictions in the 1950s. All of these incorporate facets of cultural life in favelas, a first-person narrative style, and an embedded discussion of topical problems in favelas, which characterized the earliest stories on the Viva Favela website.

The only goal of the first Viva Favela site was to provide a loosely structured environment for facilitating the expression of favela's unique cultural and political identities through digital storytelling (p. 309). Through this strategy, it had modest success in covering events in favelas that mainstream media (both domestic and international) would later cover. It also used Viva Rio's status and connections to create scholarships for some willing correspondents to attend universities and receive formal training in the hopes of career advancement. Success in this realm was also modest (only a few of the participants took advantage of the scholarship program) (X. Vargas, personal communication, June 30, 2013; Lucas, 2013, p. 22). However, the conceptual and political direction of the project remained vague and open-ended until new leadership and collaborators began to change it in 2005.

The first version of the project also generated more academic scholarship and reflection than any later incarnation. Probably due to the novelty of the project as the first

favela-oriented website, Brazilian and international scholars including Baroni (2013), Baroni, Aquilar, and Rodrigues (2011), Gama (2009), Sorj (2001a; 2001b), Lucas (2013), McCann (2014), and Perlmann (2010) have written extensively on this phase of the project. In the process, they have widely interpreted Viva Favela as a "space for empowering favela residents to use digital technology to tell their own stories for the first time" (Gama, 2009, p. 120). While this phase did offer the first training program with website for favela populations, its openness towards publishing all types of material with little editorial direction led to a series of reformulations of the project's purpose in subsequent years.

VIVA FAVELA 1.2: VISUAL INCLUSION AND CULTURAL RIGHTS

The first of these reformulations was offered by Peter Lucas, an American photojournalist who came to Rio to collaborate with Viva Favela in 2005. By this point, Vargas had left Viva Favela to create two public opinion blogs, Ponte Aêrea and Conversa Carioca (Viva Rio, 2013b; V. Chagas, personal communication, July 30, 2013). By then the project had already grown to include two full time coordinators, a photography editor, text editor, and two full time trainers. Vargas had decided to return to political journalism. In his wake the project was managed by a series of directors largely drawn from the pool of graduate students at the Universidade Federal de Rio de Janeiro [Federal University of Rio de Janeiro](UFRJ)'s innovative Laboratório de Estudos em Comunicação Comunitária. These staff members had been hired by Vargas on the recommendation of Sorj, UFRJ Communications professor Ivana Bentes, and Cesar Fernades. The new leaders, recruited through academic/intellectual connections to the

NGO, were highly influenced by both theoretical and practitioner discourses in areas like citizen journalism, media literacy, and human rights activism. Furthermore, none of them were parts of the original 1993 Viva Rio coalition. In fact, many were of high school age or younger when the first march occurred. As new blood circulated through the group, its original commitment to using media produced by favela residents to fight stereotyping and discrimination began to grow into a much more complex and expansive philosophy.

Though neither the training strategies nor the type of material produced changed drastically between the 1.1 and 1.2 phases of Viva Favela, the conceptual orientation of the project adopted a much more international approach grounded in global discussions on the role of media production in advocating for human rights. The single most important player in this transformation was Lucas, a New York-based photojournalist who had worked heavily with the United Nations' "Cyberschoolbus" program (B. Zornita-Pereira (Viva Favela web editor, 2007-2010), personal communication, July 20, 2010). Invited by then director Mayra Jucá (herself a product of the UFRJ communication program, Lucas brought a new conceptual direction to the project. Shortly after he joined the team in an advisory capacity (which eventually turned into a de facto leadership role), the project started to shift its focus from Rio or even Brazil to international audiences.

In 2007, Lucas edited the first English-language Viva Favela pamphlet that inaugurated the project to an anglophile audience with this statement: "Viva Favela is not just a local site for Rio communities or an online resource about favelas: it is part of an international visual inclusion movement that is transforming how dominant media

portrays underprivileged communities" (quoted in Baroni, Aquila, and Rodrigues, 2011, p. 311). Lucas, who learned about the project through friends from the much larger CDI NGO, was very interested in the way Viva Favela had attempted to politicize everyday aspects of life in favelas through community journalism. Before coming to Viva Favela, Lucas worked extensively in children's photography programs internationally and had eventually been awarded grants from the MacArthur Foundation and the Magnum Photo Collective to develop courses aimed at teaching young children human rights and photography at the same time. These courses eventually led to a job as one of the central architects of the UN's Cyberschoolbus program (http://www.cyberschoolbus.un.org), a media production-based component of the its Global Teaching and Learning Program.

One of the main accomplishments of Cyberschoolbus was to develop the first applied curriculum to both teach media production skills while translating the 1989 Convention on the Human Rights of the Child into language that children could understand. The training program *translates abstract human rights into tangible activities from a child's daily life*. Outlining strategies for teachers in technical and conceptual skills, this guide moves back and forth between the legal discourse of human rights and the lived discourse of childhood. It is worth taking a look at how the guide introduces the 1989 Convention:

> Examine the legal instrument created by the United Nations - the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Are there any articles in the Convention in relation to your memory of a perfect summer day? Are there any articles in the CRC that match your vision of a perfect childhood world in the future? Try to draw parallels to the childhood essentials you brain-stormed as a group (Lucas, 2003).

The guide is accompanied by a photograph entitled "Perfect Afternoon" that shows children playing in the water with their father. No information is given about the photo regarding its origin, its location, or when it was taken (Figure 3.9). In its ambiguity and lack of specification, it opens itself up to have multiple potential meanings attributed to the scene by those observing the photograph. It thus serves as what Roland Barthes calls the "punctum" of photography: the elements of the image that are capable of producing a deep emotional or physiological bond with the individual looking at the photograph (1980, p. 12).

Figure 3.6: Depiction of the "perfect afternoon" as depicted in Cyberschoolbus's Convention on the Rights of the Child. Photo by Peter Lucas.

The point of the Cyberschoolbus exercise is to train participants to move personal narratives out of an intimate, private register through the "lofty world out of abstraction" (as Marx (1998)[1845] eloquently put it in his famous discussion of the mechanics of philosophy) into visible evidence of human rights. By framing this image as evidence of a cultural vitality that needs protecting, these children's "perfect afternoon" is charged with a new symbolic value. *Recording personal experience is directly linked to promoting the human rights of children*. Though performance studies scholars like Diana Taylor (1997) have written about how activists such as the Mothers of the Plaza de Maya in Argentina draw on public performance as a means for exposing personal traumas to a larger audience of human rights advocates, Lucas' approach asks students to think about mobilizing home photography as a tool in promoting human rights (Lucas, 2013). The exercise is thus as much about how to teach young people to speak about the media they produce through the language of human rights as much as teaching them photography or other production skills. Thus, the Cyberschoolbus was designed to encourage students to develop a form of media literacy to help understand how the power of media might be harnessed to transform moments from their personal lives into building blocks in a much larger human rights project.[14]

When he came to Viva Favela, Lucas introduced the project to his strategy for reorienting training in media production (particularly photojournalism) towards its *embodiments of human rights claims*. Inextricable from this change in purpose was a

[14] Citizen journalism theorist Stuart Allan has recently referred to this as "second order" media literacy, a practice that "comprises gaining competencies in both understanding and *effectively using* socially constructed forms of communication and representation" (2013, p. 126, italics added).

change of audience: Viva Favela's materials were no longer intended to speak to Brazilian society exclusively. Through re-defining the goal of the site (as well as introducing the project to English-speaking venues for exhibition and publication), Lucas gave it an *international* orientation by tying it explicitly into the framework of visual human rights. It was about adding to a global conversation about visual rights as a form of rights claim that fits a "cultural rights" discourse that "imposes a emancipatory aura around traditions and practices" (Robbins and Stamatopolou, 2004, pp. 422-423). Photojournalism, in particular, lends itself towards this form of human rights. Harmon and Lucaites (2007) argue that photojournalism's ability to link a seemingly irrefutable record of individual experience with a public audience turns photography into a tool for fostering engagement: "Because of both its location as a form of public media and its conventional (and somewhat unavoidable) focus on individuals in tightly framed scenes on the scale of a family photo album, it reproduces a preoccupation with personal experience" (Harmon and Lucaites, 2007, p. 18). The medium-specificity of photojournalism offers a bridge of private and public spheres. This effect takes on a greater significance when thinking about these photos as cultural rights claims. Or, to rephrase things in Lucas' own words: "human rights can function just as effectively as proof of affirmation as they can evidence for denouncement (Lucas 2013, p. 23).

While many discourses on photography and human rights (Zelizer, 2004; Sliwinski, 2011) have focused on how the staging of atrocity in photographs impacts distant spectators, Lucas' invocation of photojournalism attempts to capture in favelas a

"form of cultural vitality" (Lucas, 2013, p. 214). Thus he was adding an international layer to the empowerment and media literacy objectives that Viva Favela was promoting.

As part of their project to use photography as a tool for promoting human rights Lucas and collaborators also introduced the idea of digital photography as an artistic practice. As Figure 3.7 illustrates, the photos produced by Viva Favela during the 1.2 version were significantly different than those in the 1.1 version. In the original Viva Favela project the goal of media production was to amass a repository of photographs and personal narratives about any and all facets of life in favelas. The aesthetic characteristics of the media produced were not part of the conversation. In the 1.2 phase, elements photographic composition, light/dark, the quality of the digital image itself, and other aesthetic questions became an integral component of the training. Comparing Figures 3.3-3.5 (above) with Figure 3.7 we can see a notable difference in the aesthetic characteristics of the image. Earlier images are blurrier, do not pay attention to questions of composition, color contrast, framing, etc. Newer images like 3.7 are much more aesthetically considered than their earlier counterparts.

Figure 3.7 This behind-the-scenes photograph of a carnival bloc in Morro de Formiga favela (near Tijuaca, Rio) takes on a new significance when re-framed as a document of cultural rights mixing personal intimacy and public display. Photo by Walter Mesquita, Viva Favela Staff.

As a result of Lucas' influence, Viva Favela adopted a much different philosophical orientation. It became more explicitly internationalized in scope and focus, and turned at least somewhat away from a focus on internal discourse in Rio and Brazil society about favelas. This was the earliest step Viva Favela took towards developing a more globally framed emphasis on human rights and citizenship.

VIVA FAVELA 1.2 IN ACTION: INTERNATIONAL EXPOSURE AND THE BEGINNING OF NATIONWIDE TRAINING PROGRAMS

As mentioned in the beginning of this section, the type of material produced by Viva Favela's correspondents did not change drastically after Lucas joined the project. The only main difference in what came out on the site was a gradual shift towards photography instead of written narratives. However, the project's use of the material changed. *Pictures and stories that had been theorized in earlier incarnations as weapons in the battle against discrimination in Brazil now became visual demands to incorporate favelas into the larger global discourse on protecting and preserving the human rights of marginalized populations*.

Two tangible outcomes arose from this shift. First, Lucas was able to utilize this language of visual human rights to attract funding from the Soros Foundation Open Society Program, the Guggenheim Foundation, and others to launch Viva Favela-themed shows in galleries in museums in the US and Europe (Lucas, 2013). Many of these openings provided international audiences their first exposure to life in favelas—as the press materials created Lucas by and the Viva Favela team mention on multiple occasions. They also offer the *first tangible outcome* of the photography and human rights program that the project had been developing. True to his commitment to collaborative creation, Lucas involved Viva Favela members including Bruno Zornita-Pereira, Walter Mesquita, Fernando Mascote, Rodrigo Noguiera, and others to participate in the production of these events as well as pay for their travel. The participation of these Viva Favela activists is notable as they would be some of the major instigators of the new nationwide training project launched a few years later. An important element of this new focus on exhibiting work from Viva Favela in art and education contexts was a rise in the

number of paid staff members that worked for Viva Favela. The project professionalized extensively at this point as it began to hire new staff with academic and professional training in digital media production to act as support for favela correspondents as well as adding a significantly more substantial focus on both technical training and philosophical grounding in human rights and citizenship to the courses aimed at favela residents. The original goals of promoting media literacy for the larger Brazilian population through de-stigmatization and empowerment through self-representation were re-formulated in a language that explicitly invoked central preoccupations of international civil society actors.

The second outcome came in the form of a deliberate attempt in 2009-2010 to incorporate favela communities outside of Rio de Janeiro into the project. In May 2009, Viva Favela launched its first nation-wide training tour. This tour, which began to set the foundation for the much larger 2011 tour launched by the 2.0 version of the site, moved through seven Brazilian states in a series of short trips over the course of four months. The tour was coordinated with media production programs, community youth centers, or residents' associations within each favela they visited. The first element of the tour was the public display: Viva Favela trainers would bring high-resolution photographs from the Viva Favela site and set up within public spaces in the community (Figure 3.8). The point of these events was to both promote Viva Favela and Viva Rio and to drum up interest in media production.

Figure 3.8 Print from public exhibition on Viva Favela from the Dom Amir favela, Uberlândia, Minas Gerais. Part of Viva Favela's first national tour in 2008. Photo by Peter Lucas.

Using these photos as both advertising for the classes and evidence of what kind of material could be produced, Viva Favela then held two day sessions that built on the hybrid human rights/production skills combination modeled after Cyberschoolbus. After the classes were finished, Viva Favela would recruit promising students to become Viva Favela correspondents for their community. These correspondents would then send photos and stories via DVDs or (for smaller files) digital channels to the Viva Favela editors who would process the materials and post them on www.vivafavela.com.br. The nationwide tour culminated in a 2010 week long project where 14 correspondents came to Rio to work with Viva Favela on creating a series of collaborative stories set in the Morro da Mineira favela. Though intended to be a fun activity for the visiting journalists,

the event was also designed to create conversations among favela-based journalists from across Brazil.

The week of training culminated on July 21 with a party at Viva Rio headquarters. Lucas served as the keynote speaker at the event, which was used both to provide an informal environment for Viva Rio members to meet all of the Viva Favela correspondents from across Brazil and to announce the launch of a new phase of Viva Favela. Christened Viva Favela 2.0, this "reboot" featured a completely redesigned website using a new technology that would allow any user, regardless of their relationship to the program, to upload material and comment on the Viva Favela site. As Lucas put it during the event, the new site represented the next stage forward in making Viva Favela a tool for democratizing communication for favela residents across Brazil and beyond (Lucas, 2010).

VIVA RIO AND VIVA FAVELA, 2001-2010: WEAK INSTITUTIONAL TIES AND THE PROFESSIONAL FIELD OF PHOTOJOURNALISM

When I interviewed César-Fernandes, Strozenberg, Sorj, William de Oliveira, and other Viva Rio founders between 2010 and 2013 to understand the relationship between Viva Rio and Viva Favela, most offered some version of this oblique response: "Viva Favela is part of Viva Rio but Viva Rio is not part of Viva Favela". As will become clearer in the two subsequent chapters, Viva Rio and Viva Favela began to exist autonomously from each other in an NGO environment characterized by large communication gaps between constituent elements. As I argue in the introduction, these gaps were created and exacerbated by a combination of ad hoc organizational

management and communication strategies and the increasing centrality of group leaders with their own professional and political commitments. To put it more concretely: the failure of the Future Stations project caused Viva Rio to loosen if not abandon most metrics for assessing the role of ICTs in favela community development. This abandonment of what Stoker (2005) and other community informatics theorists call the "quantitative faith in technological solutions" in many ways absolved Viva Favela's staff from having to reach certain quantifiable goals. (X. Vargas, personal communication, June 30, 2013). While many other wings of Viva Rio like its microcredit program or its community health center network were measured according to similar metrics to those used in their respective private counterparts, Viva Favela leaders were given an extremely high level of freedom in determining the direction of the project and in defining what constituted its "success" or "failure". This freedom of self-determination would lead Viva Favela in a variety of different directions often influenced by the commitments its leaders held due to a combination of habitus and professional field—to return to Bourdieu's theorizations from Chapter 1. In the 1.2 stage of Viva Favela (the first to really focus on the role of outside trainers), the professional field orienting the project was a form of *human rights-tinged photojournalism.* As laid out in the Cyberschoolbus project that Lucas worked with, this field emphasizes two interrelated elements. The first element, related to medium-specificity and potentially generalizable to all photojournalists, is the aesthetic importance of carefully conceived and executed shots. Just as the 2.0 version of Viva Favela we will discuss in Chapter Four emphasizes the collaborative function of the 2.0 site as the foundation of its project, this phase

focuses on what Sekula (1989) has called the social change potential embedded in the photographic image. The second element of this field is the idea of photography as visual evidence (Allan, 2013; Newton, 2009). As a visual representation of a moment in time and space, photographs can be used to provide evidence of certain claims made. Therefore, they play an integral role in promoting human rights. The third and potentially most important element is the project's explicit embrace of larger philosophical discourses about its role in favelas. These three elements combined to influence how the 1.2 stage of Viva Favela conducted its projects.

We can see in these first stages of Viva Favela between 2001 and 2010 how the project began to generate its own objectives rooted in first media literacy and then international human rights discourses. Investigating the next stage, called Viva Favela 2.0, further illustrates Viva Favela's move away from Viva Rio's original focus on bridging the divide between favelas and the rest of society in Rio de Janeiro. The early stages of the project helped create the conditions for this transformation by emphasizing the non-instrumental nature of favela-based digital journalism and by inviting international collaborators who helped re-frame the project in the more universal language of human rights.

Chapter 4. Viva Favela 2.0: Creating Nationwide Networks of Online Collaboration

THE GENESIS OF VIVA FAVELA 2.0

Returning to the history of Viva Favela, this chapter begins on the same night previous chapter ended, July 21, 2010. Roughly nine years and three months after the original Viva Favela site launched, the new site ("Viva Favela 2.0") was inaugurated as the "next evolutionary stage of Favela-based media production" (Jucá, personal conversation, August 5, 2010). For Viva Favela leaders, the so-called evolution of the site revolved around both its technological evolution as an interactive platform and its geographical growth from a localized project to an increasingly national and international one. From a technology perspective, the new site incorporated many transformations that had been developing over the last few years around user-generated content that had been pioneered by larger Web 2.0 platforms like YouTube, Digg, Word Press, and Flickr such as user-friendly photo and video uploading/sharing features and allowing users to comment and vote on individual stories. From a content perspective, speakers at the July 21 event, Viva Rio's publicity materials, and the Viva Favela webpage announced the new site as a forum for favelas across Brazil. This shift in geographical scope was actualized through a series of nationwide tours that built on the networking already begun by Lucas' tours discussed at the end of last chapter. Thus, Viva Favela re-fashioned itself as an explicitly national project (Lucas, 2010; Chagas, personal communication, July 25, 2012).

The first Viva Favela 2.0 project, announced at the July party and published in mid-August was a series of "Revistas Digitais"[Digital Journals]

(http://www.vivafavela.com.br/revistas) that contained topical essays that had been created by collaborators trained during Lucas' tours. (see Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1 Viva Favela 2.0 launch party showing VF Revistas Digitais #00: Festa na Favela" and #01: "Favela tem Memória", Viva Rio Headquarters, July 21, 2010. Photo by Stuart Davis.

These Revistas, which had been previously unpublished on the Viva Favela site, were designed to act as a transitional step between the two stages of Viva Favela. Each contained contributions of writers from different favelas across the Brazil as well as a few academic and activist writers from other areas. Though seemingly straightforward, the pieces in the Revistas were written according to specific guidelines, called the "pauta:

(the Portuguese for journalistic agenda) developed by the Viva Favela editorial team to emphasize drafting pieces in a manner that could speak to the commonality of experiences in favela communities within different parts of Brazil (Zornita-Pereira, personal communication, July 20, 2010; www.vivafavela.com/o-que-e-uma-pauta). An explicitly journalistic concept, the "pauta" would be used as an orientating element of both the 2.0 and 3.0 phases.



Figure 4.2 A portion of the table of contents for Issue #1 of the Viva Favela online magazine illustrates the heterogeneous geographical element of the project. This section includes contributions from New York in the US (Lucas' contribution), Rio de Janeiro state, Bahia, and Pernambuco.

The inaugural issues of the Revista reflect Viva Favela's attempt at expansion, offering pieces from correspondents located in seven Rio favelas as well São Paulo, Pernambuco, Bahia, Pará, and Minas Gerais. The publication of these Revistas was followed by a "Reunião de Viva" ["Live meeting"] where a group of the writers would teleconference together on the anymeeting.com website to expand upon and debate the initial discussions laid out in the web journals. These meetings were accompanied by a real-time twitter feed backchannel where any interested party could comment on the conversation or ask questions to any of the speakers. According to project leaders, the Revistas and the Reuniões provided pedagogical material that could then be incorporated into the teaching materials for the nationwide training classes (Zornitta-Pereira, personal communication, July 20, 2010; Jucá, personal communication, August 5, 2010).

The Revistas, which continued to be produced sporadically until June 2014, provided Viva Favela with a robust set of examples to help explain its new nationwide agenda. It launched its first series of trainings on interactive web publishing for the 2.0 site in Rio in August, 2010 (almost immediately following the July christening of the new site). From that point until December of 2013 it continued to hold classes in over nine different states across Brazil. It also sponsored classes or teams of "citizen journalists in training" from the United States and Norway to come and participate in the training. However, as it expanded its base of collaborators, Viva Favela began to meet resistance from critics both within Viva Rio and in other community journalism projects working in favelas that the project had lost its mooring in local issues and was becoming unattached

from the original community bases that provided the original team of Viva Favela correspondents.[15]

This chapter will investigate the tension between the continually expanding base of contributors to the online forum and the disaffection resonating at the local level in Rio about the project's diminishing relevance. It will argue that the form of networking proposed by Viva Favela 2.0 operates according to a horizontal logic that did not sit well with NGO members in support of turning the site to more explicitly advocacy-based journalistic endeavors.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIVA FAVELA 2.0: FROM HUMAN RIGHTS TO THE DIGITAL COMMONS

As the 2.0 phase matured, the earlier philosophical orientation towards human rights and photojournalism had less of an immediate influence—particularly because Lucas stopped working directly with the project around May 2011 in order to pursue a full team teaching position at the New School for Social Research. However, the project did retain a crucial theoretical element that posited the political potential of mundane or everyday activities. Hence, *the production and dissemination of images and narratives of favela life constitutes claims for a certain kind of political citizenship* More explicitly, this meant that the way favela residents were able to organically connect and exchange ideas/culture/etc. online was important for helping foster feelings of collective solidarity, shared history, and common political purpose that might translate into the offline world.

[15] For the sake of confidentiality I have to not disclose the names of various detractors who were not speaking in their official capacity as Viva Rio representatives. However, reflecting back on the organization's reputation as "Viva Rico" in the dissertation's introduction, many believed the project to be what?. Some even compared it to the Titanic, "a giant vessel lost in the ocean and getting ready to sink".

As we will see in Chapter 5, this notion was *the main point of umbrage* leveled by critiques of the 2.0 site.

Understanding the rationale for Viva Favela 2.0's focus of online collaboration as a primary tool for promoting community development in favelas across Brazil requires an engagement with the philosophical foundations of this approach as well as historical circumstances within contemporary Brazil that led to its widespread popularity as an interactive space (Carvalho Junior, 200 9).Drawing on an expansive taxonomy of the different forms of Internet or social media-related activism developed in recent work by Lievrouw (2011) and Earl and Kimport (2011), I want to distinguish between two theoretical positions regarding the role of communications technology in social change: one that advocates for a model of technology-enabled communication where digital communication networks intensify or accelerate the scope and speed of communication, and one that posits digital production and collaboration as a wholly new form of activism that transforms the nature of democratic participation (cultural studies theorists like Jenkins (2006), John Hartley (2002, 2013), Burwell and Boler (2014), and others who advocate for forms of DIY Citizenship), the form and shape of transnational social movement activism (Castells, 2012; Juris, 2008) or even more utopian-tinged treatises on the transformational aspect of digital media production (espoused by autonomist Marxist theorists like Hardt and Negri (2009). The following section discusses the implications of both for Viva Favela 2.0's version of Internet activism.

The fundamental difference between these two camps revolves around the *relative power given to the communications technology* (Earl and Kimport, 2011, p. 29).[16] For the first camp, technology serves what Lievrouw calls an "interventionist or supplementary role" (2011, p. 175). Many in the technology-enabled activism camp (which Earl and Kimport align with a larger discourse on computer-mediated communication) argue that innovations in ICTs serve to amplify the audiences for local social movements or campaigns in ways that were previously impossible. The volume of literature in this area boomed in the late 1990s and early 2000s as many scholars and activists began to analyze the role of the Internet in spreading information and winning civil society support in the Zapatista's global solidarity campaign (Cleaver, 1998; Bennett, 2003). Recent theorizations have argued that the spread of collaborative online communities and easy to use social media platforms has intensified the networking capabilities of social movements (Bennett and Segerberg, 2013; Castells, 2012; Juris, 2008). Many writing on the ability of transnational solidarity movements to protests in the Middle East and South America to draw on social media has expanded the Zapatistas initial usage and developed a new "repertoire of e-tactics" (Earl and Kimport, 2011, p 189) that make it easier to reach a large number of supporters by using new media. However, these authors maintain a focus on the supplemental role of ICTs instead of the transformational.

If the first camp argues for a form of technology-enabled communication where ICTs are able to expand and supplement political or social change projects, the second

[16] Though they don't draw on his work explicitly, the way they define gradations of power within different types of communication activism is very resonant with Manuel Castells' formulations in *Communication Power* (2009). For an extensive commentary on Castells' definitions, please see Stein, Notley, and Davis (2012).

camp argues that technology irrevocably transforms how social movements operate. This group, what Earl and Kimport label the "Theory 2.0" camp, claim that the online world resets the parameters of social movement activism to a point that "digital communication *necessitates model changes to existing theories of activism*" (2011, p. 29, my italics). Recent work by Manuel Castells (2009, 2012) and his collaborators (namely Juris, 2005, 2008; Juris, Caruso, Couture, and Mosca, 2013) has provided much of the recent theoretical work on the transformative impact of digital networks on social movement communication. Drawing heavily on the pivotal role of social networking sites and mobile social media platforms in creating decentralized support networks for massive political mobilizations in the Middle East, Greece, Brazil, and others, Castells' notion of "mass self-communication" argues that new communications technologies are creating "a novel form of mass communication that reaches potentially a global audience made through the p2p networks" that are "self-generated in content, *self-directed in reception by many that communicate with many* (quoted in Allan, 2014, p. 123, author's italics; see also Castells, 2009, p. 322; 2012). While this camp argues that digital media technologies have created new forms of networking that have lessened social movements' dependence on mainstream media for campaign-building and centralized planning and coordination by NGOs or similar actors, they still uphold media's position in facilitating social movements rooted in tangible antagonisms. Though these accounts argue that technology has created drastic transformations in how social movements spread information, they do not claim that what happens in the world of online production and collaboration has replaced processes in the physical world.

Henry Jenkins and collaborators (Jenkins, Green, and Ford, 2013) offer one of the most heavily debated analyses of the different ways participation in new interactive media environments can produce morals and values related to democratic citizenship and political engagement. Drawing on French philosopher Pierre Levy's notion of collective intelligence (1999), Jenkins and his research sift through a variety of online fan communities, culture jamming projects, and discussions of viral videos to look for examples of situations where a large number of users work together to create new knowledge (a la Wikipedia) or promote engagement with the democratic process (the satirical manipulation of images of George W. Bush and other politicians in Photoshop is one of his main examples of this phenomenon (2006). Jenkins argues that the specific topic of online discussion or deliberation is often not as important as the kind of *avenues for participation* it provides for users. In fostering exchanges between individual users, online communities create networks of exchange that can potentially turn into new ways of producing and receiving information. Thus, online participation can train users to participate new form of moral economy focused on cultivating democratic exchange, fostering political commitments, and learning cultural diversity. [17]

In the shift from Castells to Jenkins we can see a move from a formulation of digital media's ability to transform existing political networks to digital media's ability to create and instill values in participants. Drawing on (and potentially twisting) the work of legal theorists like Lawrence Lessig and Yochai Benkler, Michael Hardt and Antonio

[17] This notion of "moral economy" will play a pivotal role in Jenkins' later work where he argues that the main difference between for-profit online collaborative spaces (like YouTube) and free online spaces (like Wikipedia) comes from the latter's commitment towards promoting a moral economy of participation instead of attempting to colonize user interest. See Jenkins, Ford, and Green, 2013.

Negri's *Commonwealth* (2009) offers an even more romantic/utopian take on interactive digital technology in their concept of "laboring in common" (2009, p. 402). From this point of view, the online world provides a space of free and unhindered interaction among individual subjects in collaborative projects: "As Internet and software practitioners often point out, access to the common in the network environment—common knowledges, common codes, common communications circuits—is essential for creativity and growth" (p. 282). In this statement collaboration takes on an immensely powerful but non-specific (i.e. to what kind of "growth" are the authors referring?) position in the process of social change. The most important element of this formula, though, comes through its attachment of seemingly boundless change potential to the process of online deliberation.[18] This resoundingly utopian spirit undergirds many Web 2.0 activism projects, including the 2010 version of Viva Favela.

UTOPIAN VIEWS OF WEB 2.0 IN BRAZIL: THE WORKERS' PARTY, GILBERTO GIL, AND THE CULTURAL POINTS PROGRAM

Viva Favela 2.0 operates from this second ("Theory 2.0") position regarding the role of digital media in social change processes. In doing so it takes for granted the idea that what favela-based collaborators do in the online realm will have some impact in the offline/lived. Thus it promotes the utopian trope of the hacker/re-mixer/technologist as change agent. While it played a huge part in the group's revising of its mission statement

[18] It is worth noting that Hardt and Negri are, I would argue, misquoting the work of scholars like Lessig who argue that though the act of online collaborative production might have democratizing effects, these changes will be gradual and largely occur within the world of intellectual property and copyright (Lessig, 2008, p. 67). Crucially, Lessig and others associated with copy-left and Creative Commons have carefully tempered their utopian claims. For more on the larger politic ramifications of these discourses, see Berry (2006).

and restructuring of its training programs, this view was not native to Viva Favela staff members. It came instead from a much higher authority: the Brazilian Ministry of Culture who launched a program in 2008 that provided copious financial support for projects explicitly engaged with collaborative production.

Founded in 1985 with the waning of the decades-long military junta, the Brazilian Ministry of Culture (MIC) has been a hotly debated organization from its origins (Rufino dos Santos, 2008). Funded through mandated corporate social responsibility laws enforcing donations from state-owned corporations including national bank Banco do Brasil, oil giant Petrobras, and others, the Ministry of Culture is one of the heaviest funded public organs of its type in the world (Ibid., p. 4). Due to its financial strength, the Ministry has often been subjected to the political vicissitudes of the governments in office. Between 1985 and 2002 the Ministry served as an important playing piece between the various national parties vying for political power. As such, its mission generally oscillated drastically depending on the regime in power (McCann, 2008, pp. 82-95).

For the first fifteen years of its existence, the Ministry and its fluctuations remained mostly an issue for national debate. Everything changed in 2003 when the Ministry exploded into the international scene as president Luis Ignacio da Silva (Lula) of the newly elected Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) boldly appointed famous 1960s rock musician, *Tropicalia*[19] veteran, Afro-Brazilian rights activist, and political radical

[19] The Tropicalia movement was an expansive musical, literary, and artistic scene that developed in Brazil during the late 1960s. Heavily inspired by psychedelic rock music in the US and Europe, Tropicalia took an openly hostile tact towards the censorship regulations installed by the military

Gilberto Gil as the new Minister of Culture. Gil would spearhead a new national cultural policy that focused on instigating music, audiovisual, and web-based production in areas outside of the country's traditional cultural centers (Rio, São Paulo, and Salvador) and advocated for the adoption of Creative Commons licensing as the national standard for music publishing. During his tenure, one of Gil's main projects was the establishment of the "Pontos da Cultura" ("Cultural Points") initiative to fund programs designed to use digital media production for regional and local cultural activities including film, music, and web design. Presented as "a fundamental resource for revealing and circulating the various forms of expressive culture for all Brazilians to access" (Pardue, 2011, p. 94), Cultural Points' central function was to offer federal funding for NGOs deemed "cultural hubs" in order to help them create a network of projects with similar goals across the entire nation.

As Yúdice (2012), Rogério (2013), and Heritage (2012) have argued, the Cultural Points initiative can be best understood as the result of an intersection between a push for de-centralized local governance by President Lula's Partido dos Trabalhadores ["Workers' Party"] that went back to the late 1970s (Keck, 1995) and more recent conversations around information sharing and intellectual property management sparked by Gil's close interactions with the international Creative Commons movement and close personal friendship with Lawrence Lessig, the movement's central intellectual architect

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government after the 1964 coup. For more information on this movement, see Dunn (2001) and Ridenti (2007), among many others.

(Pardue, 2011; Lessig, 2008). The central point of overlap between these two positions is a heavy emphasis on *the promotion of local actors in determining development projects.*

From its earliest stages the Workers' Party (a collection of trade unionists, Catholic clergy, and political dissidents) distinguished itself from other left and far-left parties in Brazil by de-emphasizing orthodox versions of really existing socialism like state-planning and centralization of command for a model that gave local constituencies a greater degree of freedom in economic, political, and other spheres of activity (Keck, 1995). The Party's opposition to centralization even influenced radical social theorists like Felix Guattari to look to Brazil as an example of avoiding the Cold War double-bind between Soviet and American doxologies (Guattari and Rolnik, 2009).[20] This conceptual stance influenced a variety of early projects around things like economic planning, open government, and other early policies developed in the Party's home state of Rio Grande do Sul (namely in the capital city, Porto Alegre) and in São Paulo (which became a PT seat of power in the early 1990s). The most famous instance of this philosophy in action is the participatory budgeting process begun in Porto Alegre in 1989 and spread to other states in subsequent years (Pogrebenscheni, 2012; Hunter, 2012). The process, characterized by a commitment to include ordinary citizens in the process of democratic decision-making, is conducted through a complexly layered system where local citizens decide upon issues that are important to them, create plans (in coordination with experts),

[20] Though outside the scope of this brief introduction to the PT's ideology of decentralized control, the copious exchanges between Guattari and Lula have been collected in texts by Suely Rolnik (2008) and Gary Genosko (2003). Italian theorists from the anti-statist Operaismo movement like Mario Tronti also praised Lula's ability to "wrest communist politics from the grasps of the state bureaucrats" (Tronti, 2001 [1984]). Even a passing glance at these materials illustrates how attractive what Lula and colleagues proposed in terms of empowering local actors was to radical political movements worldwide.

and then vote on which plans should receive which amount of money. The apparent success of this plan in Porto Alegre inspired the Lula administration to incorporate participatory planning into numerous other aspects of governance from city planning to foreign trade policy (Avritzer, 2008). Though Lula and the PT have been attacked in recent years for embracing centrism, promoting clientelism over transparency, and acquiescing to the neoliberal agendas of economic elites (sources), it contains within its ideological foundation a commitment to local autonomy that influenced its support of Gil's radical new agenda for the Ministry of Culture.

Gil's burgeoning interest in Creative Commons provided a way to weld the PT's historical emphasis on the localization of political power explicitly to the practice of digital production. Before becoming minister, Gil had been heavily involved with copyright reform on an international level. Through his personal activism as a recording artist, he established connections with many of the major architects of the copy-left movement, specifically Creative Commons activists (Lessig, 2008, p. 66; Berry, 2008). Once named Minister of Culture, Gil created an official partnership between the Ministry of Culture and Creative Commons (the first of its kind in the world). Though this partnership did not have a massive impact on the music or other creative industries, it was symbolic in the sense that it showed that the Brazilian government supported this artist-centered and progressive approach to copyright enforcement (Heritage, 2009, 2012).

Gil also participated on a variety of international forums dealing with the role of creative industries in development, including the UNESCO Convention for the Protection and Promotion of Diversity of Cultural Expressions (CCD) in 2005 (Vilutis, 2009, p. 52;

Wojcikiewicz-Almeida, 2014). This Convention was explicitly designed to offer an alternative to the cultural exception model[21] for protecting individual countries from being forced to commit to trade patterns set through international statutes passed by the WTO and other organizations largely dominated by US-based interests. One of the main efforts of the Convention was to allow national governments in "developing" countries to adapt their own cultural policy regulations that would help domestic artists (widely defined) from being undercut within a national cultural economy by "dominant market forces" often taking the form of either American or multinational corporations engaged in film, music, or television production (Graber, 2006; Yúdice, 2012; 2014). Gil's specific addition to this discourse was to advocate for the role of Creative Commons licensing as a potential framework for undercutting the historical hegemony of global oligopoly interests in cultural production (such as the Sony Corporation). In short, Gil's domestic and international work as Minister of Culture was to harness Creative Commons and digital production to develop an alternative economy for music, film, journalism, and visual arts in Brazil.

Putting these intersecting theories into action, Cultural Points attempted to bridge geographical space and social classes through creating production spaces with state-of-the-art computer facilities for musicians, web designers, and similar creative occupations. The design of the project adopted a loose network that featured three types of

[21] The "cultural exception", or 'excepcion culturelle', model of protecting domestic audiovisual media within certain countries within Europe and North America from being regulated by the World Trade Organization was heavily critiqued by opponents for promoting a Eurocentric taste culture that privileges productions coming out of a certain kind of elite high culture. For more on this thorny and long-debated notion, see Galperin (1999), Buchsbaum (2005), and others.

organizations: individual projects called “Pontos”, regional centers called “Pontões” [big points] that housed two or more Pontos, and “Redes de Ponto”, larger networks that contained various projects (Veloso, 2009; McCann, 2008; Heritage, 2009). Importantly, the Cultural Points program was designed to establish digital skills training and production centers enters within regions that were underserved by mainstream news media and underrepresented in terms of major players in the national music, film, design, or other industries. (Pardue, 2011; Vilutis, 2009).



Figure 4.3 A network visualization of the way pontos and pontões acted as nodal points for various projects circa March 2010. Image courtesy of Brazilian Ministry of Culture.

Figure 4.3 illustrates the relationship between the pontos and the pontões. On the right is the ponto. These projects have a variety of different media-related activities

going on at the same time. The pontões (on the left) coordinate between various pontos in a given region.

Though Cultural Points was similar to Viva Rio's own Future Stations program or other public telecenter programs in other parts of the world, it had two fundamental differences: the promotion of media production (particularly artistic production in music and audiovisual materials) and the use of Creative Commons licensing (Lessig, 2008). In this spirit, the Ministry prioritized the design and implementation of projects that emphasized c*ollaborative digital production*, a process highly bound up with the technological transformations in information and communications technologies occurring over the last few decades (Kelty, 2008; Bruns, 2005).

VIVA FAVELA 2.0: SETTING THE STAGE FOR NATIONWIDE COLLABORATIVE NETWORKS

As Lucas, Walter Mesquita, and other Viva Favela trainers were designing and executing the earliest version of the nationwide training tour in 2008, other Viva Favela staff members were writing grants and setting up meetings with representatives of the Ministry of Culture in order to establish a pontão at Viva Favela. As the Cultural Points program began to recruit candidates, Viva Rio's history of collaboration with groups like Afro Reggae and its reputation for creating the first favela-based community news site made it a prime candidate for Cultural Points (M. Júca, personal communication, August 5, 2010). Furthermore, its attachment to the much larger Viva Rio NGO and recent national networking inspired the Ministry to name Viva Favela a pontão in early 2009.

For Viva Favela there were two main outcomes of the affiliation with the Ministry of Culture: the opportunity to intensify its national networking project and the financial backing to radically re-design the vivafavela.com.br website to match the Ministry's interest in collaborative online production.

Along with the funding to help national expansion, Cultural Points presented Viva Favela with a grant of approximately 75000 R$ to contract four designers from the first collaborative web platform in Brazil (an aggregator for alternative media projects called Overmundo) to create a new web site. This site, launched in July 2010 as "Viva Favela 2.0", was fully interactive: after registering, users gained the ability to upload photographs with text through a customized phase of the Flickr system and to upload video through an embedded YouTube interface. From the main page of the site, users had three basic options in terms of self-publishing. They could either post written narratives to the "Materia" ["Material"] section, publish videos in the "Video" section, or publish photographs in the "Imagens" ["Images"] section. All three of these sections were supposed to be entirely user-generated with no interference from the Viva Favela staff other than the posting of occasional announcements or promotion materials for Viva Favela-related events. Beyond these three self-publishing functionalities, the site also allowed users to comment on each other's postings. Finally, users could also utilize a system of "likes" similar to the one later adopted by YouTube and Facebook where users could vote on which stories/photos/videos they liked; stories with the most votes would appear in a special column on the main site. Figure 4.4 provides a snapshot of the Viva Favela 2.0 homepage.

Figure 4.4. The main page of Viva Favela 2.0 from May 06, 2013 (the day before the site was removed by Viva Rio). Screen Capture by Stuart Davis.

In this figure we can see the basic components of the 2.0 version. The column on the left contains basic information about the project (such as “Como Funciona” [“how it works”]; “Correspondentes” [“Correspondents”]) as well as a real time tracker that updates the most recent stories (“Recentes”), and the stories that have received the highest number of votes from other users at that specific moment (“Votados”). The wider middle column contains the three major content sections of the site. The “Materias”,

"Videos", and "Imagens" links allow users access to the blog, video, and image portions of the site where users can upload directly into the site's web-publishing template. The column on the right contains information about and a link to the current issue of the Viva Favela online revistas. Throughout the 2.0 version, the edited revistas continued as a way for introducing new themes to the site's collaborators (M. Júca, personal communication, March 31, 2013).

Once the interactive site went online, Viva Favela staff members began another nationwide tour. This time, however, they made an *explicit attempt to visit as many other groups affiliated with the Cultural Points program as possible*. In collaborating with these projects, they sought to capitalize on the dense national network that Gil's Ministry had been creating for the last two years (V. Chagas, personal communication, July 25, 2012). Beginning in the southeast of Brazil (Santa Catarina, São Paulo, and Paraná) and moving up to Recife and Fortaleza in the north, Viva Favela's main project became the creation of a nationwide network of collaborators for the interactive website. For the nation wide tour, Viva Favela created a significantly reformatted version of the *pauta* (training agenda) used in the original tour. This new training guide, largely written by Overmundo designer and future Viva Favela project leader Viktor Chagas, greatly expanded both the conceptual material and the training strategies for the classes.

THE VIVA FAVELA 2.0 TRAINING GUIDE: CITIZEN/PUBLIC JOURNALISM AND HISTORY LESSONS IN FAVELA-BASED MEDIA

While keeping the idea of "citizenship" as an anchoring point for conceptual discussions, the new training guides substantially expanded upon previous versions. In

terms of sheer volume, the 48-page 2.0 guide was almost twice as long as its predecessor. Building on the philosophical framework woven into the original guide by Lucas, the 2.0 training guide preserved discussions on the role of media production in producing citizenship. However, the way it interpreted this role was quite different. This version built extensively on Chagas, Júca, and others' knowledge of both the international discourse on public journalism and citizen journalism[22] and the history of the communicição communitaria ([community communication]) movement in Brazil (citations of exemplary works in it) to tie the goals of the interactive site more closely to community-based objectives within each favela.

Looking through the pages of the new guide indexes a shift towards citizen journalism (instead of human rights media) and a noticeably more substantial section on the history of community media in favelas. This version supplemented sections on citizenship with quotes about the way new technologies empower everyday individuals to *report the news* in their own lives and build a larger repertoire of public knowledge about favelas. Resonating with literature on citizen, civic, and public journalism (Glasser, 1999; Perry, 2002), the guide argued that the Viva Favela web site should act as a forum for favela residents to learn about the history of their own cultures, music, political struggles, social issues, and other shared aspects of life. To use a phrase from Ted Glasser's introduction to the theoretical function of public journalism, this new guide sought to use the digital platform to "convene the community" (1999, p.8) through the web site.

[22] The training guide contains copious references to theorists like Jay Rosen (2001), Mario Menéndez Rodríguez, and Al Giordano (the two founders of the Narco News Bulletin and The School for Authentic Journalism, two pioneering citizen journalism projects in Mexico).

Embedded within this new literature review is a fundamentally different view of the site's audience. *In earlier phases the Viva Favela site was designed to present written and photographic narratives of favela life in order to expose this culture to domestic and international audiences in an effort to de-stigmatize favelas and their residents, and make rights claims. In this phase the site is designed to serve favela residents themselves.* This re-orientation is heavily reflected in the way the guide turns from the language of human rights to that of civic engagement. While human rights projects generally address an institutional body like the UN or Amnesty International (Slaughter, 2002; Robbins and Stamatopoulou, 2004), projects centered on civic engagement often entail fostering engagement by community members (Zuckerman, 2013). Hence, conceptualizing the latest version of Viva Favela in this way allowed the 2.0 staff to think about how the website might act as a communication tool to increase conversations between favela residents in different parts of Brazil. The project was thus very grounded in a tradition of Brazilian activist communication research called "folk-comunicição" ["folk-communication"]. This tradition emphasized the role of traditional cultures in helping marginalized communities understand the ways societal transformations impacted their communities (Beltrão, 1980, p. 28; see also Garcia-Canclini, 1992). Following the folk-communication tradition the new training guide explained explain concepts like citizen and public journalism through examples culled by Chagas from his own master's and doctoral research on the history of community journalism in favelas before the "favela boom" of the 1990s (Chagas, 2009; Escóssia, 2004). Having this set of historical references in hand made it much easier to ground the technocentric concepts of

collaborative media production within the history of community media traditions in Brazil. The guide included examples of community newspapers and news magazines going back to the beginning of the dictatorship from favelas within Rio and beyond.

Figure 4.5. The cover of the December 1982 edition of *A União da Maré* [*The Community Meeting*], a news magazine produced in Complexo da Maré between 1978 and 1989 that would turn into *O Cidadão* [*The Citizen*], which still operates in the community. Photo courtesy Viktor Chagas/Viva Favela.

Figure 4.5, taken from the Viva Favela 2.0 manual, emphasizes a few central conceptual elements of the project. First of all, it reinforces the historicity of favela community media by giving an example of a politically-engaged favela publication created during the dictatorship by favela residents themselves. Many favela-based media production NGOs (including earlier versions of Viva Favela) treat their work as if they are filling a communication void that had been growing since the at least 19th century and not been addressed until the early 1990s (V. Chagas, personal communication, November 20, 2013). While, as I argue in previous chapters, this kind of origin myth helped Viva Rio secure domestic and international funding and Viva Favela brand itself as the "first" favela-based website, it drastically underreports the legacy of activism and activist media production within favelas nationwide. Therefore, when it came to the guide for training favela residents, archival examples helped frame the community nature of publication.

The technical side of the new guide included many more types of equipment training including videography, digital photography, blogging, and uploading using different user-based platforms like Flickr and YouTube. Most importantly, it showed users how to register and upload materials to the new interactive Viva Favela site.

VIVA FAVELA 2.0: ASSESSING THE IMPACTS OF NATIONWIDE NETWORKING AND DIGITAL COLLABORATION

As we will see at the end of this chapter and the beginning of Chapter 5, many Viva Rio board members declared the 2.0 version of Viva Favela to be less "effective" than previous versions. This claim is difficult to prove or disprove based on the ephemeral nature of community-based media production. Despite calls by Downing

(2003), Atton (2008), and others to create more metrics in alternative media research, it remains difficult to gauge the tangible impact of community media projects (including citizen journalism) because they often promote intangible or complex goals like "empowerment", "citizenship-training", or "political awareness". Therefore, my analysis of the "effectiveness" of this phase of Viva Favela is based largely on how the group accomplished its original objective: to build the base of users for the new site and help support other favela-based community media projects outside of Rio de Janeiro working with the Cultural Points program. In this section I will draw on the photo and video banks to examine the variety in geographical coverage and type of material produced as well as the project's impact on seeding community media initiatives in other locations in Brazil.

In terms of its ability to move outside of centrally located favela communities that had been heavily represented by previous incarnations of Viva Favela, the project had modest success in reaching out to collaborators. Between June 2010 and February 2013, the project conducted workshops in Brasilia, Curitiba, Recife, Fortaleza, São Paulo, Belo Horizonte, and other smaller cities within Brazil. These trainings, conducted through Cultural Points, other cultural production projects (hip hop, dance, graffiti, etc.), and other community centers, focused mostly on photography, video production, and navigating the interactive functions of the website. Figures 5.6-5.7 present the geographical distribution of the photos and videos uploaded to Viva Favela in this period.

City/Region	% of Videos Uploaded
Rio de Janeiro	51.5
São Paulo, SP	15
State of Rio de Janeiro	12.5
Brasilia, DF	10
Salvador, BA	5
Belo Horizonte, MG	4
Other Regions	2

Table 4.1. Table illustrating the distribution of photos and videos produced during the Viva Favela 2.0 project, 2010-2013.

The photo bank contains 1017 items with a majority (61%) being produced in Rio de Janeiro. Other contributors come from areas like Maranhão, Bahia, and Santa Catarina. In the 608 videos produced between 2010 and 2012 (Figure 4.6), the attempt to create national networks seems to have created a geographically diverse set of contributions. While more than half (51.5% or 308) of the videos uploaded were made by individuals or groups living in Rio de Janeiro, other locales also had copious videos—groups from Sao Paulo added 15% (88), from the Rio suburbs added 12.5% (75), from Brasilia 10% (60), from Bahia 5% (30), from Minas Gerais 4% (21), and from other states (Pernambuco, Paraná, and Espirito Santo) 2% (27). Looking in a little more detail at these different numbers, we can see a trend. While most of the postings are coming from the Rio municipality or state, there are a small number of dedicated posters from within other states. So, while there might be nine videos from Espirito Santo, they are all

being provided by a small number of correspondents. Thus, the project created a stable of semi-regular (defined as at least bi-monthly) collaborators in numerous locations.

A closer look at the content produced in these photos and videos shows both a diversity of cultural activities captured and the effectiveness of the training courses in helping grow new community media projects in other parts of Rio and Brazil. In general the contributions to the new site reflected similar themes to those in earlier versions. Some of the materials addressed social and environmental issues facing favelas including the pollution of drinking water, faulty electric wiring, the pacification process and similar police occupations in other areas, and life outside the drug trade while others focused on more personal topics. However, many more of the materials produced focus on cultural events, festivals, or historical narratives about favelas in different parts of the country. Some of these include a history of Carnival celebrations in the state of Santa Catarina in the south of Brazil, a photo-essay on the break dancing/b-boy scene in São Paulo, [23] and a hot dog festival in the Nilopolis suburb outside Rio. Figures 4.6 and 4.7 illustrate two images that typify the majority of the material being published on the site during the 2.0 phase.

[23] The Viva Favela 2.0 site seems to have functioned for some time as the main fan page for the São Paulo-based rap group "Negro Dollar".

Figure 4.6. Still from a wedding ceremony in a favela outside of Ouro Preto, Recife. June 21, 2012. Courtesy of Viva Favela.

Figure 4.7 Image from a photo essay on Christmas featuring children participating in a human nativity scene, Rio Verde, Goias, January 30, 2012. Courtesy: Viva Favela.

Taken on their own these images appear to be nondescript representations of relative normal cultural events. However, as part of the larger project of creating an exchange of knowledge and culture between favelas, these photos opened up space for discussions over similarities and differences in different areas. No matter the content, videos and photos sometimes sparked conversations about customs, politics, and even tactics for things like building cultural programming and creating different topic-themed festivals. Though they are not evidence of the "success" or "failure" of the 2.0 project, these materials reflect the facilitation of many online conversations among favela residents from a geographically dispersed area.

The 2.0 version of the project not only provided an open space for individuals from across Brazil but also acted as a publishing forum and incubator for smaller projects in Rio and beyond (M. Júca, personal communication, March 31 2013; V. Chagas, personal communication, July 30, 2013). In this pursuit, it acted as a temporary home for a variety of groups that would go on to design some of the largest community media projects in Brazil. As the Viva Favela training team moved from one Cultural Points center to another, they would offer to help projects by providing discrete areas of the Viva Favela website dedicated to individual groups (V. Chagas, personal communication, November 20, 2013). In the process, they helped seed many digital journalism and community media projects that are still in operation. Outro Olhar ["Another Look"], now one of Brasilia's largest public access news program, started as a project of Viva Favela training classes in 2010. Begun by a number of students from the University of Brasilia

who saw a perceived lack of coverage by news media in Brasilia covering social problems facing the many favela residents living in the north and western suburbs of the city, Outro Olhar partnered with Viva Favela to create a series of video newscasts. Outra Olhar still exists as a weekly web cast on public access television.

Two more famous participants were Patrick Granja, who would use the Viva Favela site to launch the video component of his newspaper *Jornal Novo Democracia* ["New Democracy News"] (www.anovademocracia.com.br), and Projeto Morrinho, the highly celebrated community-based art project that created a brick model of Rio's cityscape within one of its most dangerous favelas (Yúdice, 2009). Granja, based in city of Salvador, started O *Novo Democracia* as a print magazine in 2004 and a web site in 2007. It was designed to address the apparent lack of coverage of contemporary political problems facing favela populations in his home city of Salvador.[24] Viva Favela provided a section on the website where he could publish different editions of the journal in a similar manner to the way they published the "Revistas". The second group, Projeto Morrinho, was a popular community art project in the Pereira da Silva favela of Rio. In this project, community members constructed a model of the neighborhood in painted bricks that was used as a stage for producing skits featuring Lego toys, which would engage in comical renditions of everyday life events in the "typical" favela community. Even after receiving a copious amount of international attention, the project had trouble developing a local audience. In order to help build a following, the Viva Favela 2.0 let

[24] For an introduction to the enormous body of literature on the cultural industries in Salvador, see Pinho (2004). *Reinvencões da Africa na Bahia.*

them house their videos on the Viva Favela site as a way to build their base of viewers (R. Dias, co-founder, Projeto Morrinho, personal communication, July 26, 2012).

Figure 4.8 Still from A Revolta dos Bonecos [Revolt of the Toys], the most famous Morrinho film. Morrinho produced around 25 videos for the Viva Favela 2.0 site. Screen capture from Viva Favela site.

Providing a space for these projects was viewed by staff as part of a symbiotic process where the local groups could access wider audiences across Brazil while Viva Favela could use these projects to help build projects in other areas and thus expanding its horizontal network (Chagas, personal communication, July 30, 2013).

THE END OF VIVA FAVELA 2.0: "FALLING OUT OF TOUCH?"

Despite these achievements in moving the project towards national coverage, Viva Favela 2.0 did not mature into the nationwide horizontal network that its architects within the NGO envisioned. Though Viva Favela 2.0 continued to serve as an interactive

platform for self-publishing, critics began to raise issues with the site's seeming lack of direction as it moved into its third year of existence. By August 2012 the project had become part of a heated internal debate as higher-level members within Viva Rio began raised a series of issues. The first critique of the project was that it was becoming *redundant* because of the growing number of online community news sites that offered similar services. Many of Viva Favela's contributors would go on to create their own community-based news pages using blogging platforms like Blogger and Word Press. The ease of publishing using these platforms obviated the need to use the Viva Favela site. Even more importantly, the migration of web-based NGOs and media projects onto social networking sites like Facebook (and to a lesser degree, Orkut) facilitated the formation of new networks between projects and individuals that were not mediated by Viva Favela. With its status as first the only favela based news site and then the only interactive favela based news site gone, the Viva Favela 2.0 project faced a crisis of direction (R. Lapa, personal communication, August 02, 2013; B. Sorj, personal communication, August 14, 2013).

Taking a cue from these perceptions, Viva Rio leaders offered two reasons for moving Viva Favela away from its current version to a new model. The first reason was that in the eyes of many the project had started to sacrifice its original role as a channel to address social issues and *cover breaking news stories* in the favelas *of Rio de Janeiro*. Though many of the materials uploaded came from the Rio area, they did not necessarily cover pressing events. Many believed that with the ability of favela-based journalists to self-publish without using Viva Favela as an intermediary, the project should go back to

serving as a mouthpiece for favelas in Rio (many of which were facing increasing levels of police violence as a result of frictions over the citywide pacification program). A short example by Xico Vargas illustrates to me the inconsistency in news coverage. Vargas' example contrasts two different moments of the 2.0 site. In May 2012 when the first illegal evictions were being carried out by the city in Vila Autodromo (a small favela that sits on the grounds of the future site for the Rio 2016 Olympic headquarters) the Viva Favela site had three video stories and nine photo albums uploaded by site contributors documenting the police's conduct in harassing and intimidating residents. [25] However, at another point in November 2012, the site had one photo of an unauthorized police raid in the Baixa do Sapateiro section of Complexo da Mare, one of the favelas that has seen the most human rights abuses and uses of unsanctioned violence in Brazil.[26]

[25] See http://acervo2.vivafavela.com.br/imagens?page=9 for an example of this.
[26] An area that at the moment I'm writing remains under semi-permanent occupation by the Brazilian army.

Figure 4.9 The aftermath of an unsanctioned police raid in Baixa do Sapateiro, Complexo da Mare. July 22, 2012. Courtesy of Viva Favela.

Figure 4.10. Photo of a young child playing with dog, Guarulhos, São Paulo. July 22, 2012. Courtesy of Viva Favela.

In this anecdote we can see a forceful critique of the logic of collaborative online production. If left unattended, the site will follow the direction laid out by whomever is contributing during a certain time period (whether they are covering illegal evictions or a day at the dog park).

The second reason offered by Viva Rio was the project was seen as losing its connection with the other parts of Viva Rio. As the NGO had grown to incorporate a variety of other favela-related development activities within the city, leadership wanted to coordinate Viva Favela's communication projects with other parts of Viva Rio. Connecting these three is a strong sense of dissatisfaction with the way collaborative media production emphasizes a process of *horizontal networking among users* in

cyberspace instead of a vertical networking between the project and its constituencies (defined as the favelas of Rio).

ASSESSING VIVA FAVELA 2.0: THE SOCIOLOGY OF COLLABORATIVE PRODUCTION

Looking back at the dissonance between how the Viva Favela staff and Viva Rio board members defined the "success" of the collaborative phase points to a fundamental *ideological tension within the organization over the role of media in social change.* A good deal of this tension might be related to issues of age or personality differences (e.g. the "young, rebellious hackativists vs. old, square academics") or the fact that the nationwide Creative Commons fad ended abruptly in 2012 when Gil's successor Ana de Holanda defunded Cultural Points. Furthermore, some of the critiques proffered might justly be defined as a result of oversights on the part of staffers, including losing local commitments to the project by not preserving connections made with local correspondents over the first 10 years of the project, a general lack of commitment to social change projects that focus more on online activities than on the ground organizing (Bimber, Flanigan, and Stohl, 2005), or a failure to leverage Viva Rio's own deep-rooted connections within the Rio de Janeiro area, there is more going on here.
Nonetheless, there are deeper problems related to the way the 2.0 staff over-prioritized the online dimension of Viva Favela's project at the expense of the offline dimension—problems related to the sociological dimensions of the "field of digital journalism".

Looking back at Viva Favela 2.0, critics could present an argument such as, "This is just another example of how a widely-hyped passing fad created another detour

in an already bloated NGO project". While this dismissal carries more than a kernel of truth, it misses out on the larger stakes of what the 2.0 phase was proposing. In the same vein, a political economic analysis that noted the impact of the Ministry of Culture's new funding initiative on the way the 2.0 phase designed and implemented its vision of the site would help explain some aspects of this period of Viva Favela. This type of analysis could potentially highlight some of the major rhetorical or ideological trends in the Ministry of Culture's program in a vein similar to Leye's study of UNESCO's commitment to "empowerment" or Mazarella's study of the Indian government's love/hate relationship with ICT4D (Leye, 2007; Mazarella, 2010). However, taking this approach might leave unaddressed many ideological/professional beliefs and views that Viva Favela staff members brought to the 2.0 version of the site. To start with, there are at least three major areas where Viva Favela 2.0 diverged from the Cultural Points program.

1. While Cultural Points did provide additional funding for site re-design and hiring new staff members, the majority of Viva Favela's funding during and after the 2.0 phase did not come from this initiative. For most of its projects, Cultural Points largely provided large seed grants instead of regular allocations (Viantus, 2009, pp. 11-13).

2. Viva Favela was working to create a nationwide network before the Cultural Points program started. The 2.0 phase built on and extended the network made by the earlier version of the project. The major difference between the two phases was how the 2.0 website was treating the material produced through national training tours by de-emphasizing reportage in favor of community based reflections.

3. Many of the new features of the 2.0 phase were not necessarily resonant with Cultural Points. Heavily influenced by Creative Commons and copy-left, the main impetus of Cultural Points was to instigate digital media production within marginalized areas that could eventually led to the *creation of profits and/or employment* for local artists, musicians, programmers, etc. The 2.0 focus on building a digital forum for individuals to collaborate in the pursuit of empowering users is much more explicable if framed in the context of the intellectual influences on groups leaders: the rootedness of citizen and public journalism in local communities, the cultivation of horizontal networks that will help users exchange narratives about their lives, histories, and cultures, and the positing of their central objective as what Burkart has called "an opposition to the exclusion from a social means of realizing identity online" (2014, p. 57).

The reason the 2.0 phase generated so much controversy within Viva Rio was not because it focused on building the base of collaborators for the website (NGO leaders praised the 1.0 version of the project for this) or because it participated in Culture Points' nationwide networking experiment. For a group like Viva Rio that feeds on publicity, having Viva Favela being designated a Pontão was a welcome if not completely understood event (V. Chagas, personal communication, July 25, 2012). The deeper problem, which will make up the majority of the next and final chapter, is that Viva Rio leaders could not understand what the site was doing in terms of *social change objectives*. This was the only phase of the project to not define its position in terms of an outward audience. Connect the thoughts in these last two sentences more.

In order to not over-determine this period by reading it through political economic goggles, it is worth engaging with how seriously the 2.0 staffers took the idea of online collaboration as an avenue for producing tangible social change for favela residents. Again referring back to Bourdieu's concept of the "field", we can develop profiles for the Viva Favela staffers. In terms of habitus, most of the leaders of Viva Favela came from the same socio-economic and cultural backgrounds. For the most part, trainers were middle-class, college-educated techno-enthusiasts who held a very strong commitment to the idea that an integral link exists between what happens in online worlds and what happens in the lived world. Anthropologist Christopher Kelty's ethnographic study of early copy-left and open-source activists finds this commitment to be the ideological cornerstone of these movements:

> To many geeks, proselytization [of technology] seems an obvious route: Why not help friends and neighbors understand the hidden worlds of networks and software, since, they are quite certain, it will come to structure their lives as well? (Kelty, 2008, p. 77)

As Patrick Burkart (2014) has recently argued in his analysis of the Pirate Party in Sweden, one of the main ideological components of digitally-focused activism is the idea that what happens in the online world has an impact on the lived world. For the Swedish Pirate Party, this meant drawing a close analogy between the way they were protecting the online environment with the way Green Parties and other activists were protecting the physical environment. In the case of the SPP, this provided a way to network with activists involved in other spheres of political engagement. For Viva Favela, this potentially created a situation where the assumed impact of the web site was too heavily constructed around the notion that creating networks among favela residents through

participation on the site would bear tangible fruit in other domains. While the 2.0 staff did not measure the project's impact in terms of tangible impacts, this was largely the way Viva Rio approached its own work. Hence, it became grounds for trying to steer the Viva Favela project back towards a type of digital media production that more directly addressed social, political, and economic problems within Rio de Janeiro.

Chapter 5. Viva Rio 3.0: Social Unrest and Advocacy Communication in the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro

VIVA FAVELA 3.0: AN INTRODUCTION

The shift from Viva Favela 2.0 to Viva Favela 3.0 was by no means gradual. In December 2012, the project took an abrupt and extreme turn away from the collaborative site. In an attempt to "re-orient the project in a more strategic fashion that more directly addresses the problems facing favelas in Rio de Janeiro" (X. Vargas, personal communication, May 02, 2013), Viva Rio board members decided to phase out the 2.0 site in order to lunch another, much different site. Dubbed Viva Favela 3.0 by staff members in order to distinguish it from the previous incarnation, the 2013 site operates on a significantly different technological and conceptual logic. From a technological perspective, it has none of the interactive components present in the earlier version: users are no longer able to upload photos, videos, or audio materials. In fact, the registration and commenting systems are no longer functional, making it impossible for readers to comment or give feedback on materials published on the website.

Though this technological overhaul might seem like a step backwards, it represents a fundamentally different view of the site's function as a channel for community media production. Eschewing Viva Favela 2.0's position as a central node in a horizontally oriented nationwide network of users, this new version of the site is thought to act as an avenue for bringing problems facing Rio's favelas to the public attention. In short, Viva Rio 3.0 represents a turn towards Viva Rio's original goal of "speaking for" favelas. It was no coincidence that Xico Vargas, the new project

coordinator of Viva Favela, was also the first director of the Viva Favela when the project launched in 2001. Since returning in January 2013, Vargas has focused on how to use the website to build on the NGO's historical ties with favela community leaders and leading politicians and bureaucrats within the city of Rio's planning community to create a new site that will explicitly address issues related to political security, infrastructure, public health, and other pressing issues facing favelas (Viva Rio, 2013b). In the process, he attempts to "re-ground" the project in its original commitments to community development in Rio de Janeiro (X. Vargas, personal communication, May 02, 2013). Trying to remedy the perceived lack of direction in the 2.0 version of the site, Vargas' incarnation proposed two new tactics for integrating with what Viva Rio director Rubem Cesar and other leaders designated as the NGO's main priorities: public security and public health within favela communities. These two areas, which had been central concerns of Viva Rio (and ISER) going back to the mid-1980s but which had not received any sustained attention from Viva Favela, became the primary topical areas for the 3.0 phase of the project.

In order to address these areas of intervention, Vargas developed two new programs for Viva Favela: the "favela newsroom" project that trained local journalists from favelas across Rio to create first hand accounts of police and trafficker activity within their communities and the "citizen health journalist" program that modified the group's existing media production classes to teach to community-based public health workers participating in Viva Rio's Viva Comunidade project.

THE SHIFTING LANDSCAPES OF MEDIA USAGE IN RIO'S FAVELAS CIRCA 2013

Building off the critiques of Viva Favela presented by Viva Rio board members in the previous chapter, this section will investigate the larger transformations within Rio de Janeiro in recent years that precipitated the NGO's push to change the site. However, as I will argue in the conclusion, these are not causal factors that necessitated a re-evaluation of the collaborative phase. However, the intersection of these quickly shifting conditions did create within Cesar-Fernandes and others a *new feeling of urgency around Viva Rio's local purpose reminiscent of the 1992 founding of the projec*t. Within the professional/social field of journalism, the most apparent way to return to this period was to return to a model of muckraking journalism that featured a "righteous indignation to discover and ferret out the abuse of power" (Ticchi, 2004, p. xi). Before engaging with how Viva Rio promoted this particular form of journalistic practice, the conditions within Rio that created this urgency should be discussed.

Many within Viva Rio argued that the 2.0 version of Viva Favela's site's collaborative agenda did not resonate with either the shifting technological and political landscape of 2013 Rio de Janeiro or the kind of community-based intervention envisioned at the beginning of Viva Rio (based on series of interviews?). The technological transformations, discussed briefly at the end of last chapter, took the form of two trends: the massive spike in popularity of news blogs from individual favelas and the popularization of Facebook as a tool for organization and advocacy by favela-focused and other activists within Rio. Many of these blogs were created and maintained by tech

savvy favela residents who had previously attended trainings by Viva Favela or similar groups. These projects were largely directed by one or more charismatic individuals who generally acted as spokespeople in the press. These projects also usually receive a substantial amount of coverage in the international, English-speaking press. The most famous of the new favela community pages, Jornal Voz da Comunidade ("The Voice of the Community") from Complexo da Alemão, gained international attention in November 2010 when its founder Rene da Silva began to live tweet a particularly brutal military invasion into the neighborhood where he lived (Recuero, 2011). As his tweets began to spread and get translated, thousands began to start following the Voz da Comunidade Twitter account. Within two days of the initial postings, its number of followers had grown from 4,500 to 80,000 (today it has 150,000). Silva was interviewed by *O Globo* (the largest newspaper in Rio), *BBC News*, *USA Today*, *The Guardian*, and other publications (Hirsch, 2010). Since starting the site Silva has conducted global travels to talk about the web and self-publishing. Another favela-based digital journalist, Leonardo Lima, began the website Faveladarocinha.com in 2009. Lima had been a Viva Favela trainee in the 1.0 phase and had gone on to take university courses in photojournalism, web design, and news reporting. Furthermore, Lima had been featured in *The New York Times* and other publications as one of the what? (L. Lima, personal communication, March 28, 2013).

These new sites, largely constructed and run by small teams of charismatic young people with extensive training in backpack journalism, *represented new forms of journalism and international networking that were radically different than the way Viva*

Rio had envisioned these activities.[27] The international attention bestowed on these projects often snowballed into grant money from international grants from foundations like the Cyrus R. Vance Center for International Justice or local ones like Observatório de Favelas' Programa Rede Jovem (Youth Networking Program) that seeded local projects launched by favela residents under 22 years of age (M. Silva, editor, *Jornal Fala Roça*, and winner, 2013 Rede Jovem competition, personal communication, July 10, 2013).

A second and interrelated transformation was the massive popularization of Facebook as a tool for self-publishing and for social organization. As Neumer (2013), de Souza e Silva, et. al (2012), spell out organization name on first use (IHS) (2013), and others have analyzed, the occurrence of social media usage of mobile phones, tablets, and personal computers within favelas has increased gradually in the late 1990s and rapidly in recent years due to increasing competition between nationwide carriers like TIM, Oi!, Claro, and Vivo to create the cheapest pre-paid data plans in order to win consumers in the lower-middle classes who would not have the financial solvency to acquire a long term data plan. Resultantly, the number of users within these demographics exploded between 2009 and 2013 (Information Handling Services, 2013). As the number of smart phone users within the lower-middle and lower classes rose, Brazil also saw an enormous nationwide migration from Orkut (a Google-owned precursor to Facebook that had been extremely popular in Brazil and India) to Facebook between 2010-2012 (Hitwise, 2011;

[27] For example, as of the time of writing, Viva Favela has 4,000 "likes" on Facebook while Voz da Communidade has almost 35,000; Agencia Noticias de Favela (another online blog) has 14,000.

Hamann, 2011). These shifts in technology usage greatly impacted how favela-based media projects thought about venues for presenting material. *FaveladaRocinha.com* and *Voz da Comunidade* largely migrated from their own web pages to Facebook as a tool for publishing stories. Other groups began to look at other non-digital venues for publication. For example, Observatório de Favelas began to focus its trainings on production of high quality photojournalism that would be collected in a series of magazines called *Imagens do Povo* (M. Faustini (director, *Imagens do Povo* (2009-2012)), personal communication, July 16, 2010). Other projects like the Rocinha-based Jornal Fala Roça or Notícias da Favelas re-invested in bi-weekly or monthly print newspapers.

As the summer 2013 protests against transportation prices, services, and corruption, began to intensify, Facebook would become an integral organizing tool for demonstrations and related events as well as a place where individuals and groups could post pictures and videos in real time of these events (Davis, 2014). As such, a large deal of activist-related coverage moved on to social media. Viva Favela did not adopt either of these two responses; it neither migrated onto Facebook (though Viva Rio itself had a very active Facebook page) nor moved into other kinds of non-digital publication. Seeing these changes occurring with other favela-based digital media projects caused Viva Rio leaders to re-evaluate Viva Favela's position within the landscape of media production in Rio**.**

As important if not more important than technological shifts was the increasingly precarious public security situation in the favelas as a result of a municipal "pacification" process launched in 2008. Pacification, designed to integrate favelas with the formal city

through a combination of armed interventions undertaken to drive out drug traffickers and non-violent programs to improve education, health care, and social services, have been met with copious criticism and often hostility from favela residents (Williamson and Hora, 2012; Jovchelovich, 2014). The municipal pacification process operated according to a three-step process. The first step, directed at public security, consisted of massive invasions conducted by the police special forces and the Brazilian national guard into favelas controlled by drug traffickers in an effort to arrest or drive out those traffickers as competitors for armed control of the neighborhoods. The second element of pacification consisted of creating new permanent police stations for community-policing within "pacified" favelas in a process that many critics (Dowdney, 2013; Zirin, 2014) have likened to a military occupation. The third phase, labeled UPP Social and spearheaded by former Viva Rio board member Jóse Marcelo Zacchi, consisted of working with national initiatives like A Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento [The National Growth Program] and Minha Casa, Minha Vida [My House, My Life] to promote both infrastructure development (such as road widening, upgrading of faulty, out of date, or ad hoc wiring, and the building of permanent day care centers) and services (trash collection, maintenance, and recycling) in neighborhoods.

The reception of pacification operations has been mixed at best. Many community residents, activists, policy-makers, journalists (both domestic and international), and human rights organizations (including Amnesty International) have reflected that the program has been modestly effective in setting up permanent police stations within favelas (sources). However, the pro-social social elements of the third step have been

anemic or non-existent.[28] Across the large body of critiques leveled at the UPP program, a unifying theme has been the stark disparities between the community-policing phase (which continues to expand) and the social and infrastructural development projects, which have almost all stalled or been terminated (see Zirin, 2014).

The various critiques of UPP intensified drastically after the mass mobilizations in Rio de Janeiro between June 17 and July 8, 2013. Favela-related issues were not one of the original claims stated by protest organizers: the central antagonisms in the earliest stages of the protests were unchecked government corruption and egregious liberties taken by elected officials when agreeing to massive spending in order to win bids for mega-events like the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics (Lima, 2014). However, by June 25, mobilizations began to occur in favelas throughout Rio including Santa Marta, Rocinha, Vidigal, Mangueira, and Complexo da Máre. All of the favela-based mobilizations emphasized the perceived failures of the UPP program in producing substantial changes within favelas. Protestors argued that the military component of the UPP never failed to receive copious government funding and attention. However, when the traffickers were expelled or driven underground, the government quickly lost interest in making good on the other elements promised within the UPP Social model (Pastuk, 2012; Lima, 2013).

[28] For a semi-comprehensive list of all of the numerous complaints about pacification, see Zirin, 2014.

Figure 5.1 Sign from a July 8, 2013 mobilization against the UPP process in Santa Marta Favela (the first to receive a UPP). The sign reads "Fighting for Our Rights and Livelihoods"). Photo by Stuart Davis.

Viva Rio's history of collaborating with the city government and its affiliations with UPP Social led the group to avoid overtly attacking the UPPs. Instead, the group saw a second opportunity to offer its support as an intermediary between communities and the government. As Cesar-Fernandes and Viva Rio leaders noted, one of the most substantial criticisms of the UPP comes from the way they are perceived as ignoring the demands or criticisms of local residents (Cesar-Fernandes, personal communication, March 10, 2013). This has led many critics to accuse the program of imposing a "law of silence" (Pastuk, 2012, p. 39) that stifles both public demonstrations and community news that paints them in a negative light (Dias, 2013; Clarke, 2013;Williamson and Hora,

2012). Viva Rio thus began to work with the UPP's civil development wing (called UPP Social) to use its existing network of resources in favelas to cover some of the promised services including health and childcare until the UPP Social could re-arrange its financial situation.

The waning of Viva Favela 2.0 and the change to stage 3.0 became solidified as Viva Rio leaders began to think about how to use the media project to support its other activities as an intermediary actor. This led them to adopt a model of *advocacy journalism* (X. Vargas, personal communication, May 02, 2013).

VIVA FAVELA 3.0'S NEW GOALS: ADVOCACY COMMUNICATION AS A TOOL FOR PROMOTING SOCIAL TRANSFORMATIONS

The shift in Viva Favela's focus from creating and maintaining user generated networks to a more explicitly advocacy approach acutely illustrates one of the fundamental tensions within online journalism, community media production, and development communication: the negotiation between "building participatory platforms to attract greater communities of users and foster greater civic dialogue and the professional logic of retaining authority over information flow" (Lewis, et. al, 2010, p. 164). The main issue is how the NGO handles material produced at the community level: does it facilitate the individual's ability to control the production and circulation of content by leaving the web platform unstructured? Or does it adopt a potentially paternalistic position where they speak for the favelas? Neither one of these approaches represent a "better" or more accurate way of producing and disseminating content

produced in favelas; both approaches offer unique and potentially advantageous strategies (citation).

If collaboration is governed by a desire to consistently expanding networks of participation horizontally, then advocacy communication can be seen to be pragmatically preserving the privileged position of media to speak with an authorial voice above everyday practices.[29] While the governing logic of collaboration, that "experimentation never seeks its own conclusion" (Kelty, 2008, p. 301), emphasizes the process of creating circulation networks for community media in order to "build the collective knowledge base" (Ibid., p. 16), the main goal of advocacy is almost the opposite. The impact of the media product, not the process of its creation, is their central concern (Wilkins, 2014; Wallick et. al, 2009). On a fundamental level, advocates view community media as having a support function in its ability to act as channel between local communities and larger institutions in order to produce changes. Furthermore, it is built on the premise that "the professional is the one who determines what publics, see, hear, and read" (Deuze, 2005, p. 80). Media acts as an *ends-based* tool in social change processes.

Given this *highly instrumental* conceptualization of community media production in the development process, it is not surprising that the most comprehensive definitions of advocacy communication comes from bi-lateral organizations working with at-risk populations, namely the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), and the World Health

[29] The privileged role of the press in standing above the lived experience of individuals has been one of the foundational tropes of 20th century journalism. For one of the most vibrant and controversial expressions of this "noble calling" of the press, please see Walter Lippmann (1920) as well as Schudson's (2008) insightful commentary on the effects of this divisive claim on news media.

Organization (WHO). UNICEF, positing advocacy as most important goal for development communication, presents it as a direct procedure with a clear beginning and conclusion: "Advocacy is defined as the continuous and adaptive process of gathering, organizing and formulating information and data into argument, which is then communicated to policy-makers through various interpersonal and mass media communication channels. Through advocacy [we] seek to influence policy-makers, political and social leader in order to create an enabling policy and legislative environment and allocate resources equitably in order to create and sustain social transformation" (UNICEF, 2010). Comparing this statement with Castells' (2012) depiction of spontaneous, decentered mini-revolutions enabled by new communications technologies, one can see the numerous differences. The UNICEF position emphasizes a direct path from source to receiver, *a vertically oriented* set of power relations in which the institution or state holds more power relative to local communities, and a defined goal (usually taking the form of policy change). This type of community development is neither user-generated nor horizontally distributed. Instead it relies on an acknowledgement of structural hierarchies to the degree that it levels critiques at public institutions in order to promote change.

The applied nature of advocacy does not necessarily foreclose the possibility of community input. For example, a number of these programs have sought community participation in the design or creation of messages, for better effectiveness (Servaes, 2007). However, the nature of this kind of community input is radically different from the kind present in theories of horizontal media production. In advocacy communication,

empowerment is thought of not as something that arises from the act of media production (a la Rodriguez (2001; 2011)) but as something that comes as a product. Or as Servaes puts it: "advocacy utilizes the ability of communications to increase the power of people and groups and to make institutions more responsible to human needs" (2007; p. 499). Communication is conceptualized not as a tool for producing empowerment but as a tool pushing for institutional change. Empowerment comes not from the individual producing the content but more from how the content attempts to push for normative or structural change (Wilkins, 2014, p.112). In their work on building community advocacy campaigns for public health and violence prevention, Dorfman, Wallick, and the Berkeley Media Studies Group (1993) developed a series of questions used to structure an activist media campaign including "What are your media goals?" "Who is your target audience?" and "How do you interface with journalists in communicating your goals?" (Wallick, Dorfman, et. al, 1993, pp. 130-135). From this perspective, *social change is a product instead of a process*.

VIVA FAVELA 3.0: ADVOCACY JOURNALISM, TRUSTEESHIP, AND MUCKRAKING

Though I will argue that Viva Favela 3.0 operates according to an advocacy model, it is still a journalism project conceptualized and enacted by those who themselves through a certain vocational framework. This makes the 3.0 phase quite different than what has historically been considered the "advocacy model of journalism" in the United States (Schudson, 1999), Europe (Benson, 2005) and Brazil (Matos, 2008). As Schudson (1999) has argued, the practice of advocacy journalism has historically been

conceptualized as a partisan practice where media represents or speak on behalf of marginalized populations, political parties or social movements. Some examples of this form of practice would be the African American press in the United States (Simmons, 2006), localized newspapers published by Chicano activists in the 1960s (Lewels, 1974), or numerous other examples of activist media that represented the interests and goals of a certain marginalized population (Downing, 2001). In all of these cases all forms of media production from film to print journalism to street theater are subordinated to the political aspirations or strategic objectives of the group or movement. The medium-specificity of journalism does not matter.

Since it drops the previous phases' explicit references to public and citizen journalism, Viva Favela 3.0 *upholds the notion of journalism as a professional activity.* This makes the project more usefully defined as an instance of what Schudson calls the ""trusteeship model of journalism":

> In trustee model journalism, journalists are to provide news according to what they themselves as a professional group believe citizens should know. The professional journalists' quest for truth and fairness, exercising sound and critical judgment as measured by a jury of peers should dictate the shape of the news. (Schudson, 1999, p. 120).

Schudson, Carey (1999), and others argue that this trusteeship model of journalism acts as *a precursor* to citizen journalism in its call for a turn away from profit-driven corporate models to more civically engaged aspirations. While the trustee model describes more of a philosophical approach to journalism than a mode of news production, Rosen (2000), Glaser (1999), and other scholars have often attached it to the historical practice of muckraking. Muckraking, an early 20th century form of journalism that used newspapers to investigate and expose social problems, emphasized

characteristics like “a deep engagement with marginalized communities” and “the ability to put constituents over corporate interests” that would become cornerstones of the trusteeship model (Rosen, 2000, pp. 8-12; also see Carey, 1997).

Viva Favela 3.0 director Xico Vargas and other pivotal members of the group came out of a period within Brazilian media history where many investigative journalists had to negotiate with a phenomenon called “*denunciasmo*” that was seen as a *perversion of the muckraking approach* (X. Vargas, personal communication, June 30, 2013). As Waisbord (2000), Da Matta (1985) and many others have argued, the Brazilian journalism industry during and immediately after the dictatorship was highly bifurcated into a dissident press (which became a watchdog press in the post-dictatorship years) and the complicit press that often supported, if not openly collaborated with the regimes in power (Da Matta, 1985, p. 17). This division led to the creation of popular cadres of intellectual muckrakers who began to launch vitriolic assaults at government and military officials. Labeled denunciasimo because of its focus on publically attacking, denouncing and defrocking political, corporate, or cultural figures, this practice became widely popular in the post-dictatorship period (Lins da Silva, 2001; Matos, 2008). Despite its massive popularity as an avenue for attacking corporate and government elites (one could liken it to a print version of *Fox News* for 1990s Brazil), many journalists have subsequently attacked this practice for not investigating sources of information, using embellished language, and often attacking figures who disagreed with the editors of the individual paper (Waisbord, 2000, pp. 110-112, 140). Nonetheless, denunciasmo journalism played a pivotal role in social movements of the 1990s, including launching

the initial accusations of corruption against President Fernando Color de Mello's administration in 1992 that would eventually lead to the largest mass mobilizations in Brazilian history and the president's impeachment (Matos, 2008, pp. 108-118). Investigative journalism during the post-dictatorship period then had to contend with this model that simultaneously drew in a massive reader base (especially in the lower and lower middle classes) by making sensationalist claims and evacuated any of the fact-gathering and objectivity elements of investigative journalism (Waisbord, 2000, p. 109). Hence, Vargas and other members of the Viva Favela team (especially assistant editor Mariana Gago and curriculum director/head trainer Francili Costa) tried to design a version of the project that would preserve the energy and appeal of denunciasmo while teaching foundational skills in journalism from technical aspects to processes like information-gathering, engagement with sources, and trying to follow objectivity protocols (X. Vargas, personal communication, May 30, 2013).

VIVA RIO 3.0 INITIATIVES: THE FAVELA NEWSROOM

In line with Viva Favela 3.0's focus on public security issues raised by the pacification process, the favela newsroom project builds on the numerous ties Viva Rio has established with different types of NGOs and government projects to create a new program where residents are paid to be Viva Favela reporters. The process begins with a call for participation advertised in favelas with UPPs. After reporters are interviewed and selected, each reporter is assigned to work with the community associations in their community to collect perspectives on the effectiveness of security measures taken by the UPPs. After conducting research, the correspondents post two stories a month on their

own dedicated "Blog" section of the Viva Favela page. Reporters are expected to post two stories a month. The project offers a salary of roughly $300R per month/150R per story (or 140 USD per month/70 per USD story) a month for both stories. The original plan only had six month paid contracts; however, the group has continued to honor these contracts after six months to any correspondents who want to continue with the program (W. de Oliveira, personal communication, March 10, 2013). By financially compensating writers, Viva Favela is trying to create a situation where reporters stay with their "beat" long enough to start building working relationships with both community members and Viva Favela staff.

The central goal of the favela newsroom project is to offer a forum for residents to publically state opinions on potentially sensitive topics without fear of retribution from the police. Viva Rio's reputation within Rio as the most high profile NGO shields both the individual contributors and favela residents interviewed from experiencing retaliatory repercussions from the police (Vargas, personal communication, May 01, 2013; Marianna Gago (co-director, "favela newsroom"), personal communication, June 20, 2013). The favela newsroom project is also designed to create long-term dialogue between each community reporter, the leaders of a certain area, and the larger Viva Rio NGO. From the perspective of Vargas and his team, working within these networks would allow Viva Favela act as both a feedback mechanism for favela residents to respond to specific security projects (e.g. Schramm, 1964) and a collective mouthpiece for residents within participating communities to raise issues.

The favela newsroom program shares many similarities with the original version of the Viva Favela site from 2001. Residents are recruited to produce material about their communities that is then posted on the website. However, there are a few crucial differences. The first difference is the topical focus. The original project adopted an approach heavily resonant with citizens' media approaches that encourage participants to use media to organically produce their own news stories (c.f. Rodriguez, 2011). As such it explicitly asked participants to make media that addressed any aspect of their lives. The favela newsroom requires its participants to only cover stories related to public security and pacification. The second difference was the mode of journalistic practice encouraged by the second phase. While the early version of the project focused on a form of documentary journalism that attempted to capture slices of life within favelas, the favela newsroom project has an explicitly *investigative* bent. The point of the newsroom is to train citizen journalists to act as watchdogs serving favela residents. Hence, the training builds on protocols aimed at versing students in the theory and practice of investigative journalism, a discourse defined by the individual journalists' ability to uncover buried secrets or bring to light hidden injustices produced by corporate or state interests (Etemma and Glasser, 1998)[30]. Finally, the nature of the correspondents' interaction with Viva Favela is different. Namely, participating reporters are paid for the material they produce. Offering fiscal compensation for work accomplished builds a culture of

[30] Due to the snowball approach to recruiting participants, many correspondents already had rudimentary or even advanced digital production skills.

professionalism that helps the program adapt the lived experience of the workers to the field of professional journalism (X. Vargas, personal communication, May 30, 2013).

Many of the figures who started participating in the favela newsroom program were journalists or community leaders already affiliated with Viva Rio. Some of the notable participants were Marianna Alvim (who had also participated in the first phase), William de Oliveira (a well known and controversial community activist in Rocinha), Marcos Faustini from Observatório de Favelas, and a number of writers from the Voz da Comunidade project. Specifically aiming to move away from the inclusive yet potentially too heterogeneous contributor base of the 2.0 phase, the favela newsroom prioritized targeted recruitment as a way to tap back into the circuits of favela-centered digital journalism within the Rio municipality (X. Vargas, personal communication, May 30, 2013). Following this spirit, the favela newsroom roster read like a "who's who" list of the most active favela journalists. Many of these figures brought with them a history of favela activism and digital journalism production learned outside of Viva Favela's own training courses. By July 2014 the project had more than 18 different collaborators from eleven pacified favelas. It had also produced around 80 stories. Figure 5.2 shows a number of stories produced in March 2014 by Oliveira in order to give an illustration of the kind of topics discussed.



Figure 5.2 An example of the kinds of materials produced in the favela newsroom project. These are taken from William de Oliveira.

In this figure we see four different stories published by Oliveira in 2013-2014. Moving down from the top: The first piece covers two community protest in Rocinha that occurred in March 2014; the second presents community input on the unsolved case of a murdered teenager from Rocinha that many though the UPP police had a part in; the third describes armed confrontations between police officers and drug traffickers on Christmas Day, 2013; the fourth and final piece contains an extensive list of all the residents of Rocinha since the late 1990s who have disappeared (many of whom have been arrested

and released by police shortly before disappearing). More than any other participant, Oliveira's pieces capture the public security dimension of problems in his community.

Though it tried to follow a journalistically responsible model of media production more than any other phase of Viva Favela, the favela newsroom project experienced more flack from other journalists, activists, and local politicians than any other Viva Favela initiative. The heart of public backlash was that the site was participating in denunciasmo-like practices by serving as a mouthpiece for favela residents with particular ideological agendas. Because the newsroom solicited involvement largely based on the social networks established by Viva Rio, some of the individuals recruited were controversial figures. Two in particular, Marcelo Santos from Complexo de Alemão and William de Oliveira himself, created friction.

Santos had previously worked with AfroReggae and had participated in a project they launched to do police officer exchanges between Rio, Madrid, and Caracas, Venezuela (Subsecretaria de Comunicação Social do Governo, 2013). As part of these courses, AfroReggae accompanied Rio's military police to help talk about the effectiveness of community outreach in fostering police sensitivity. Out of all of the branches of Rio's police, the military branch has been the most historically distrusted in favelas. Created in the 18th century and incorporated into the Brazilian national armed forces during the first Vargas administration (1930-45), this branch of the police gained a notorious reputation during the dictatorship era in the 1960s-1980s. It has been the accused of committing innumerable human rights abuses (Soares, 2006), operating its own extra-legal protection rackets (Leeds, 1997), and escalating the armed struggle

between police and traffickers in the 1990s through its ruthless tactics (Dowdney, 2002; Arias, 2006). Given this history, many activists became distrustful of AfroReggae. Hence, giving a platform for AfroReggae members to voice their perspectives on pacification seemed to be an implicit gesture of support for their collaborations with the military police (R. Diniz, (photographer, Observatório de Favelas/Collectivo Favela em Foco), personal communication, November 03, 2013; Silva, personal communication, June 10, 2013; Costa and Leite, 2013).

In an almost diametrically opposed situation, critics of the favela newsroom saw Oliveira's indictments of UPPs a way for him to valorize the drug traffickers who previously occupied Rocinha (with whom he had longstanding ties). As McCann (2014) has recently argued in the first book length study of the pacification process, Viva Rio has historically been accused of inadvertently promoting the agenda of traffickers. McCann argues that in its attempt to serve as a mediator the NGO has often walked a very precarious line between providing an avenue for favela residents to voice problems with the police and providing a tool for drug traffickers to galvanize anti-police sentiment as a way of maintaining control of communities (McCann, 2014, pp. 166-167; for a similar assessment see Zalaur and Alvito, 2006, p. 110). As evidence he cites the large number of buses funded by trafficker-backed residents associations to bring favela residents to the original 1993 protests.

In this particular instance, critics found it suspicious that Viva Favela would recruit Oliveira due to previous charges against him of buying and selling military-grade arms as well as distributing cocaine for the Commando Vermelho branch controlling

Rocinha. Oliveira, who had collaborated with Viva Rio on projects in Rocinha since 1999, had also been a member of the Rocinha neighborhood association since the early 1990s (W. de Oliveira, personal communication, March 10, 2013). His reputation was greatly damaged in December 2011 when he was recorded via a hidden camera participating in a gun deal with "Nem", the leader of the CV branch that "ruled" the neighborhood (TV Globo, October 11, 2011).

Figure 5.3 Still from a video released December 02, 2011 by TV Globo News showing Oliveira (on the left) participating in an arms trade between a local militia leader (holding an AK-47 in the foreground) and "Nem", the leader of the CV branch in Rocinha until pacification (wearing the baseball cap and facing the camera). Screen capture from TV Globo website: www.redeglobo.com.br.

During Oliveira's trial, Viva Rio board members testified to his civic mindedness, his long history of working on anti-violence rallies, and deep investment in community development within Rocinha. Based on testimony and the ambiguous nature of the photographic evidence from TV Globo, Oliveira was acquitted in early 2012 (W. de Oliveira, personal communication, March 10, 2013). After being released, Oliveira took the occasion to start his own crusade in favor of media reform in Rio as well as heightened attention paid to police corruption and abuse of civil rights in favelas. He is now running for city council on an anti-corruption, pro-favela based infrastructure investment platform. Not surprisingly, many of his stories for Viva Favela have a similar message. More than any other participant in the favela newsroom program, Oliveira walks the line between muckraking and denuncianismo. This raises the fundamental issue leveled at denunciasmo by critiques: At what point are favela newsroom participants moving outside of their position as news agents and into their own political agendas?

The second potential issue is the perennial problem of keeping non-professional journalists in line with the project's organizing principles without overstepping editorial boundaries. Since May 2013, the project has steadily moved away from a strategic focus on public safety to become another open-ended depository for a vast array of topical pieces. After the first few months, the NGO's supervision over the projects began to loosen as the columnists got into routines. At this point, though, we can see a drastic expansion of issues covered have moved far beyond what might be considered "public security" even in the most catholic sense. While many of these are interesting, if not focused on public security (such as Eli Geovane from Complexo de Caju's discussion of

her own experience immigrating from Uganda to Brazil), many rehearse almost identical topics to the 1.0 version. Take this statement from a March 26, 2014 article by Rafael de Sousa Santos from the Santa Marta favela: "Hoje muito se fala na violência vivida nas favelas cariocas, no entando pouco se fala do cotidiano dentro das comunidades [These days a lot is said about the violence experienced in Rio's favelas, but very little is said about the daily lives inside these communities]" (http://www.vivafavela.com.br/blogs/blog/41/rafael-dos-santos-sousa). He is literally repeating the same sentence that Viva Rio put in its press materials when Viva Favela launched in 2001 (Viva Rio, 2001).

While the favela newsroom continues (and its participants continue to get paid), the material it produces on the Viva Favela site bears little resemblance to the type of material Vargas and staff envisioned at the outset of the program. At the same time that the favela newsroom was launching, Vargas and staff transformed the community media training classes designed in previous phases to try another kind of intervention: the "citizen health journalism program".

VIVA RIO 3.0 INITIATIVES: TRAINING "CITIZEN HEALTH JOURNALISTS"

The program designed by Viva Rio 3.0 to address public health draws on a much more direct advocacy/muckraking approach than the public security program. Working with Viva Comunidade, the NGO's public health program that runs over 10 hospitals and 120 public health clinics in favelas (Viva Rio 2013c), Viva Favela started a series of classes for community health workers called *"citizen health journalism."* From Viva Rio's perspective, Viva Comunidade provides an important entry point into favela issues

because it receives substantial funding from the Rio municipal government both to run public health programs and to report on sanitation issues of pressing concern that the city should address (Viva Rio, 2013b). More than any other of Viva Rio's programs, Viva Comunidade has been highly praised by Rio mayor Eduardo Paes and numerous city council members as a notable best practice example for NGO-based development (R. Lapa, personal communication, August 02, 2013; Viva Rio, 2013c). The health workers, whose jobs largely consist of going door to door to check on patients within favelas, are taught how to conceptualize, write, and photograph news stories through a 9 unit class that incorporates theoretical readings about human rights and the role of community media with applied exercises in collecting information, writing news stories, and producing video content. In the classes, the students are told to pick one issue they see in the community and develop a blog post with key information about a health issue that is not being addressed by the government (Francili Costa (designer, citizen health journalism program) personal communication, May 01, 2013). Crucially, materials produced will be posted on the Viva Favela web site along with a response from a representative of Viva Comunidade describing how the city's trash and sanitation departments would be addressing the issue raised by the Viva Favela citizen health journalist.



Figure 5.4 Map illustrating the sites of the first four Viva Favela citizen health journalism classes conducted May-July 2013. The red points indicate the locations of the training classes. Moving clockwise from the bottom right: Cantagalo (in the Ipanema neighborhood), Rocinha, Rocha Miranda/Faz Quem Quer, and Pavuna/Acarí. The green point indicates the location of the Viva Rio building in downtown Rio de Janeiro.

Each of the neighborhoods picked for the pilot versions of the "Citizen Health Journalism" classes represented a different demographic cut of the city. The first, Rocinha, was the largest and most relatively stable neighborhood. Relatively peacefully pacified in 2011 (though in recent months in 2014 it has experienced a significant upsurge of armed violence between police and traffickers), Rocinha has had a long history of active neighborhood organizations that managed everything from managing property titles to regulating utilities and mail services. Rocinha also has been one of the cornerstones of many Viva Rio projects historically and has the most heavily funded Viva Comunidade program. The second site, Cantagalo/Pavão Pavãozinho, was located

in a smaller community sitting above the popular tourist neighborhoods of Copacabana and Ipanema. Many of the issues discussed in this branch had to do with problems facing favelas within tourist areas such as gentrification, eco-tourism, and interfacing with the notoriously corrupt tourist police who often harassed both Cantagalo residents and health workers. [31] The third site, in the North Zone neighborhood of Rocha Miranda, was for Viva Comunidade workers in the near north favelas including Morro Foz Quem Quer, Mangueira, Complexo da São Carlos, and others. All of these favelas are located in the lower-middle class part of Rio de Janeiro between downtown and the northern suburbs (called the "Baixada Fluminese"). The public health workers at this center were by far the most overcommitted and seemingly worn out as their jobs took them across a large geographical area. This was also the least well funded of all of the centers and the only one without a wireless Internet infrastructure. The fourth site, in the neighborhood of Pavuna and serving the Acari favela at the beginning of the Baixada Fluminese, was located in an area on the frontier of pacification that was significantly less secure than the other three. Though this center was relatively well staffed and up to date in terms of technology, there was a palpable air of trepidation. As such, conversations in the classes here frequently turned more towards rumors or sweeping statements about the pacification process instead of details about public health and infrastructure issues in Acari. Beyond the characteristics of the areas where the centers were located, there was also a wide disparity in how the Viva Favela project was received by the staff at the

[31] Referring back to the "ethics" section of my introduction, it should also noted that the community health workers at Cantagalo branch were by far the least hospitable towards me as an American outsider sitting in and participating in their classes (particularly the men in the class) instead of going to the beach or "finding a girl".

centers. Many of these differences will be discussed in the next section when assessing the obstacles the course faced.

Though the favela newsroom trainings did not draw upon any of the training materials from the 2.0 version, the citizen health journalist classes adapted a short version of the training guide to use in its classes (Figure 5.5).



Training Program for Multimedia Community Correspondents

Summary of the Course

Teachers: Francili Costa and Walter Mesquita

Unit 1:

1. Journalism designed for you:
- Citizen News Producer: the case of Viva Favela
- Local issues of global importance
- The role of Information and Communications Technologies in news production
- The web: A democratic platform.

2. Health, well-being, basic sanitation and healthy behaviors in favelas
- The importance of Community Health Agents as potential correspondents.
- News in the palm of your hand.

3. Exercises:
- In class: Find and analyze news stories about health in favelas. How would you talk about these issues? What other issues do you think should be included?

Figure 5.5 A translated version of Unit 1 of the citizen health journalist classes. Courtesy of Francili Costa, Viva Favela (translated by Stuart Davis).

Unit 1 of the training classes illustrates the influence of the previous stages of Viva Favela on the project including ideas about "citizen news", the global importance of local stories, and discussions about the potential democratizing role of online production. Unlike previous guides, it also contained explicit reference to the role of public health in favela community development as well as a call for participants to recognize the importance of their personal perspectives as "professionals" who were at the front lines of favela-based health care, infrastructure development, and larger social change processes that Viva Rio was promoting. All nine units of the course feature this interweaving of conceptual discourses. The guide offers a useful look into the logic behind the 3.0 phase, as it tries to preserve the empowerment elements of citizens' media/citizen journalism with the applied elements of advocacy and investigative journalism.

VIVA FAVELA 3.0: ISSUES WITH PRODUCERS AND AUDIENCES IN THE CITIZEN HEALTH JOURNALISM PROGRAM

As the citizen health journalism program was part of a larger project to re-align Viva Favela's training programs with Viva Rio's strategic initiative in public health as well as the NGO's larger project of acting as an advocate for favelas within the political culture of Rio, it faced new problems that did not occur in either the 1.0 or 2.0 phases. Both of these phases had been self-selective: users volunteered to participate in the classes. The new program had to cultivate buy in from those who might not have volunteered for courses had it not been part of their job. Furthermore, the citizen health journalism program had to deal much more explicitly with questions of *social impact*. In

many ways earlier phases (particularly the 2.0 phase) created their own audiences because users were encouraged to read and comment on each other's materials. This phase had to think much more explicitly about how to plug materials from the Viva Favela webpage into other news outlets, government reports, or other channels for promoting strategic goals. As Schudson (2011, p. 147) and others have argued, it is incredibly difficult to assess the impacts of news media, particularly online versions, on political transformations. While there have been a few cases when single images or news stories have produced massive transformations (such as Malcolm Browne's photos of self-immolating monks in Vietnam), most of the time assessing the political impact of journalism has proven a difficult task (Schudson, 2011: Harmon and Lucaites, 2007, pp. 21-40). Negotiating the transformation in user profile and new questions about building audiences made it difficult to produce material and find a way to distribute the material anywhere besides the normal Viva Favela web site. Furthermore, this was really the first version of the project that considered audience metrics. The first version of the site received such fulsome praise for being the "first favela-based website" that it never was really held accountable for numbers (Sorj, personal communication July 12, 2010). By focusing so heavily on the interactive element of its project, Viva Favela 2.0 implicitly argued that the readers were the writers and vice versa. As the first version of the site to really consider impact and readership, the 3.0 version was really the only one called upon by the NGO to produce a public impact. Subsequently, the original plan for Viva Favela 3.0 included discussions of other avenues for publication including governmental web pages, other favela-based news sites, and print newspapers like *O Povo* popular within

favela communities (X. Vargas, personal communication, May 30, 2013). As of the time, none of these spaces have published content from the site.

Beyond its issues with finding strategic publication venues, Viva Favela 3.0 also experienced difficulties when attempting to teach community health workers to act as "professional" journalists. After observing 29 training classes conducted between May and September 2013 in four favelas across Rio (Rocinha, Rocha Miranda/Morro Faz Quem Quer, Cantagalo/Pavão-Pavãozinho, and Acari/Pavuna), I argue that the citizen health journalism program fills a crucial need: to provide the health workers with an avenue for expressing problems they experience working in extremely complicated and historically neglected areas. However, in providing this type of space, issues related to managing emotions and behavior arose. Throughout the class, the teaching team (Francili Costa, a Viva Favela trainer, and former photography editor Walter Mesquita) struggled with how to teach the health workers how to channel their frustration with the city's mismanagement of infrastructural improvement in favelas with the generic qualities of news writing (e.g. developing leads, including the "5Ws—who, what,where,when, why" of news writing (Viva Favela, 2013), interviewing sources) and digital photography. Picking topics like garbage and sewage disposal, flooding, unsafe electric wiring, and the spread of infectious diseases like tuberculosis, participants spent three weeks working on stories for the blog. Throughout the course the trainers struggled to teach the students how to narrativize their complaints in a way that followed basic tenets of journalism. The process of training the health workers to become citizen journalists has proven bumpy but

ultimately seems to be moving progressively forward (based largely on Costa's skills as a teacher).

One commonly experienced problem has been the professionalization of students who have no previous training in journalism. On one occasion Marcos,[32] a community health worker in Rocinha, experienced friction with the teachers when presenting his article on transportation problems in Rocinha. He had previously been a driver of one of the kombis, or passenger vans that served as public transportation within Rocinha. At the time he presented, these vans had recently been banned across the southern part of the city due to a heavily publicized case of an American tourist getting raped on an unregistered van (Lima, 2013), Upset because of the city's drastic decision, Marcos presented a rant against the mayor, the police lieutenant in charge of the Rocinha UPP, and a variety of other city officials. After half an hour of arguing with both Costa and the other students about how to write the story, he eventually conceded to adopt a more impartial tone in his writing.

On another occasion Linda, a health worker in Rocha Miranda, had difficulty describing a recent flooding-induced landslide in the favela Que Fazem Quer where she worked because one of her best friends had been killed during the disaster. The act of writing about and then giving a presentation on this event created a great deal of personal stress for the student and another situation in which Costa had to step in and mediate between the visibly shaken student and the others in the class that were trying to support

[32] For the community health agents, I have chosen to use pseudonyms in order to protect the identities of those who have not yet been published on the Viva Favela website.

her. After a short break the class that day returned to its regular course but Linda did not finish her article. Though these were the only examples I witnessed in which the classroom dynamic deteriorated to the point where intervention was required, retaining attention and directing the emotions of health workers into writing their articles proved a consistent difficulty.

Another central issue arising throughout the courses came from lack of buy-in by the Viva Comunidade administrators for whom the journalists-in-training worked. The decision to open the class for health workers was made at the central level of the program. Accordingly, the reception among the mid-level administrators has been mixed. In Rocinha, the administration was very excited about the course; subsequently, they closely monitored the progress of the correspondents. In Cantagalo, the course had full attendance until an unplanned change in vacation hours required four of the 17 students to miss the last three classes. At Rocha Miranda/Faz Quem Quer, the Viva Comunidade staff did not support the classes and would schedule the students for field duty during the scheduled class times. As a result, most of the class sessions only had three-four students in attendance at any given moment. A final issue with buy-in came from the health workers/students themselves. While they all volunteered to take the course, sustaining their trajectories from beginning to end has been a sizable task. While going to the classes counted as part of their workday, turning in projects did not. Therefore, students attended most of the training sessions but did not turn in completed final projects. The trainers are addressing this problem by working to allocate part of the new program to make working

as a journalist part of the health worker's salary (F. Costa, personal communication, July 28, 2013).

Despite these, the community health journalist program had managed to publish around 40 stories by the end of its first year (June 2014). Figures 6.6 and 6.7 present two stories representative of what the program was trying to produce.

Figures 5.6-5.7 Recent reports from the citizen health journalism program. The first one from Rocinha talks about setting up dedicated lanes for motor taxi drivers in Rocinha to reduce traffic congestion. The second (from a student from the Pavuna class) talks about a new center for autism that was established in the Penha neighborhood near the Complexo de Alemão and Acari.

Briefly examining these two stories from September 2014 we can see products coming out of the citizen health journalism classes. Housed in the "Reportagens" ["Reports"] section of the Viva Favela page, these two stories illustrate key elements of the training program. Both are written and photographed by participants in the class, feature elements of the 5Ws of news-writing and offer background information and citations for the pieces, and are written with attention to addressing both the specific case and the larger implications for favela residents. Despite the hurdles in cultivating buy-in, the actual materials produced resonate with the overall project design while adding the "experiential touch" (Rodriguez, 2001) of citizens' media.

The much more difficult question is how to turn the material produced into an instrument for aiding in the socio-political transformations Viva Rio has been promoting through its other programs and services. Throughout my interviews, not a single person involved with this phase of Viva Favela had really found a way for the more applied material to be directed to more specialized channels rather than just being publishing on the Viva Favela website. This second problem speaks closely to the difficulties of managing a journalism project (or really any project) within an NGO environment: if the project from the beginning has been based around the web site as visible evidence of accomplishment, what does one risk by trying to put the material in other kinds of venues?

ASSESSING VIVA FAVELA 3.0: THE SOCIOLOGY OF ADVOCACY JOURNALISM

In both of the new Viva Favela initiatives the elements of citizen journalism celebrated by previous phases became roadblocks in producing the kind of material the 3.0 staff wanted. Both the favela newsroom and the citizen health journalism classes funnel the *evidentiary quality of personal narratives* by favela residents that have guided the Viva Favela project from its inception into strategically defined projects with messages addressing a specific topic. However, preserving this element within a more directed form of journalism practice raises new potential problems. As we have seen explicitly in the "citizen health journalism' classes, the first of these is a consistent negotiation with levels of investment by both the potential health journalists and the other levels of the NGO with whom it is collaborating.

Returning again to how professional fields of journalists define themselves as communities, we can see these obstacles as a result of trying to impose an advocacy/muckraking agenda on a citizen journalism project that was so heavily centered in a single web page. The values of citizen journalism around open access, non-professional production values, and the freedom to choose what to produce collide with the demands of the muckraking and investigative styles of journalism to produce pointed and thoroughly researched news stories. Compared to Viva Favela 2.0, this phase was even less capable of negotiating between fostering participation and empowerment and producing media designed to achieve a specific political purpose. The recruiting practices of the favela newsroom and the citizen health journalism courses did draw upon lived experience of those who live and work in favelas in a way that most other publications on similar topics could not. The stories are more enriched by these personal touches.

However, from the perspective of an advocacy project, using a citizen journalism model raises potential problems with professionalism and reliability of contributors and considerations of how to use material produced to achieve strategic objectives (i.e. *where to publish the stories*). Neither of these elements are fundamental considerations from a citizen journalism or citizens' media perspective.

Once again the professional beliefs and values of Viva Favela staff redefine and re-orient the project's attempt to serve the marginalized populations within favelas. Those beliefs and values will define the field they are trying to produce. Whether it is human rights activists, collaborative media activists/hackers, or advocacy journalists, each stage of Viva Favela took a different approach to how material produced through community-based journalism is *circulated*. However, as the conclusion will argue, this is as much a testament to Viva Rio and Viva Favela's ability to draw in accomplished professional interlocutors as it is a critique of the group's inability to coordinate between stages of the project. The real problem is the way Viva Rio continues to create zero-sum games between different versions of the project where one gets resources at the cost of the other, particularly the 2.0 and 3.0 incarnations, through its inability to negotiate between different modes of journalistic production.

The final chapter will bring the three phases of Viva Favela together to look at the variations of the field of citizen journalism practice. Then, drawing on models of coalition building from recent social movement theory, I will propose a model for coordinating between potentially competing professional positions.

Chapter 6. Reframing Intra-organizational Antagonisms Through "Fields" of Activist Media Production

THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP ON LOCAL PROJECT DESIGN

The 2.0 and 3.0 phases of Viva Favela operate according to two very different agendas. While the collaborative phase offers the ability to grow the project in a horizontal network that both puts individuals in contact with issues, cultures, and customs from across Brazil and creates the seeds for new community journalism projects, it lacks the editorial focus to meet immediate and tangible problems experienced in Rio. Although it offers a more direct route towards addressing problems facing favelas and similar communities, the advocacy phase potentially sacrifices participant investment that one would find in a project that was more organically conceived and fueled by voluntary interest. Ideally, the advantages of both approaches could be strengthened through integration. However, this process of refinement entails a reconsideration about the cultural and organizational norms that underpin decision-making within the project.

The first step towards reconsideration is a holistic examination of how the community media project (digital or otherwise) relates to the larger organizational, cultural, or economic environment in which it operates. For Viva Favela, the organizational shift in Viva Rio from a community intervention to an international development actor coordinating a large number of programs working largely autonomous from each other had a profound impact on how the media program planned and implemented its initiatives. In other words, Viva Favela must be first and foremost

thought of as part of Viva Rio's larger overall development. Situating it thusly helps us move beyond falling into a moralistic register or policing the boundaries of what consists "authentic" or "inauthentic" community media—a practice that, as media anthropologist Eric Michaels powerfully argued over 25 years ago, denies the complexity of even the most "traditional" practices (Michaels, 1987 [1994], pp. 101-103).

Looking back at the intertwined history of Viva Rio and Viva Favela, we can begin to outline a *diachronic loop* initiated in Rio de Janeiro in the early 1990s through community interventions, expanded in the 2000s to other strategic locations in Brazil and globally through collaborations and sub-contracted south-south cooperative development projects (with the Haiti project being the most extreme example), and turned back to Rio in the form of the NGOs continued work in the city's favelas. As Viva Rio moved through this cycle it used the financial and political support garnered through international projects to raise money domestically, expand its staff, and continue to diversity its local initiatives.



Figure 6.1. Figure visualizing Viva Rio's transnational networking cycle. Created by Stuart Davis.

While Viva Rio's ability to navigate international civil society through collaborations with or contracts from central development actors exemplifies the enterprising attitude celebrated by proponents of social entrepreneurship (Anderson, 2012), the focus on expansion necessitated a scaling up. This scaling up produced two substantial transformations in the NGO's organization culture: an increasing number of professional employees hired to work within various subsets of the group (see Figure 2.4); and a repositioning of founding members' interest from projects in Rio de Janeiro to those in other locales (most explicitly evidenced by Cesar Fernandes' personal relocation to Port Au Prince to manage Viva Rio Haiti). As the organization expanded in scope and personnel, the design, implementation, and assessment stages of the Viva Favela project were turned over to professional staff. This shift in organizational composition ushered in a series of debates over the appropriate type of digital media production practices for fostering community-based communication within favelas.

COMMUNITY MEDIA AND THE "EVIDENCE OF EXPERIENCE" ARGUMENT

The remainder of the conclusion will draw once again upon Bourdieu's field theory to situate Viva Favela's three stages within various forms of training or pedagogy related to popular currents within community media production(namely "citizen journalism" and "digital storytelling". Given the number of media production programs engaged in projects these types of practice, it becomes important to examine in more specific detail the specific ideologies, goals, and strategies guiding each type of these projects. Within discussions on the role of media production in areas like favelas, a

lacunae exists around examining the professional beliefs or approaches to media production that might be *reproduced* by NGOs and other activists attempting to train individuals within these communities. From the pioneering work by the Canadian Challenge for Change Program's Fogo Island Process to projects launched under the "participatory communication" banner by the World Bank learning to produce media content is continually posited as a priority for marginalized populations. Taking a 2008 World Bank project on "Digital Media and Youth Empowerment" set up in West Bank refugee camps for Palestinians as an example, we can see why media production is important for international actors. It provides a audiovisual language for marginalized populations to reflect on their experiences, voice issues or problems with their living situations through means previously unavailable, and give these individuals the sense of being part of larger conversations on human rights and community development (World Bank, 2008).

What, then, is the problem? If the projects in question are effective in creating media production programs that offer alternatives to participating in illicit or disempowering activities (such as drug trafficking (Viva Rio) or prostitution (Kids with Cameras) , what necessitates a critique? The central issue revolves around what feminist historian Joan Scott has famously labeled the "evidence of experience" argument (Scott, 1989, p. 221). Though experiments designed to empower local users have been going on for decades, the mediating role of trainers is largely unexplored. Critical reflection usually only occurs when the project in question is attached to a larger ethnographic study or a consciousness-raising agenda of a social movement (Carroll and Hackett,

2006). Therefore many training guides, academic texts, and other accounts of developing community journalism or digital media production programs, almost always contain an under-theorized conceptualization of the political aims or underpinnings of the project in question. Instead, many projects are seen as "successes" if they are able to train a critical mass of individuals from a given population how to produce digital media. Hence, they operate according to a logic where the creation of projects becomes the evidence of the training program's success. Thus programs able to generate products are viewed as empowering.

This lack of deeper investigation into how activist media training works has led critics to question both the effectiveness and their deeper ideological commitments of these programs. Perhaps the most controversial example of contemporary digital media production aimed at "empowering" marginalized populations comes through the "kids with cameras" approach popularized by the filmmakers of the 2004 film *Born into Brothels*. The film, which documents the lives of young children in the slums of Calcutta whose families work within the local prostitution trade, has become a lightning rod for criticism directed both at how it depicts urban poverty and for the media-training NGO called Kids with Cameras director Zana Briski created to continue the project begun in the film. As mentioned above, this project was certainly not the first media-training program aimed at marginalized subjects. However, Kids with Cameras raises precisely the type of issues with training that I would like to discuss. On one level, the NGO operates according to an "emancipation through media" logic where children use photography and blogging to detail their lives in an attempt to "assert their own rights"

(Rangan, 2011, p. 151). However, as Pooja Rangan (2011) and other critics have argued, there is another, more explicitly economic element to the project. Kids With Cameras uses the material produced by participants into published books and pamphlets that are both sold commercially to raise money for the NGO and packaged for exhibits and programs launched by other NGOs on human rights and empowerment. Hence, the photos, blogs, and other products are actually a symptom of replacing one potential form of exploitation (sex work) with another (producing digital photographs and written narratives to be consumed by Western audiences). The critique of media training here raises a number of concerns expressed a decade earlier by activist filmmaker Jill Godmillow that this type of work creates a dynamic where " 'helping' marginalized groups make media acts as a healing service for 'us' through our ability to understand their distress and see them work through it" (1999, p. 92).

Moving out from the Kids with Cameras model, one could make the argument that one of the most effective outcomes of media training programs for marginalized groups is to produce a steady stream of material that can be used to justify the continued funding of the program. However, after a substantial period of working with one of these groups, it becomes apparent that this critique does not do justice to the complex motivations and aspirations of trainers. Instead, I argue that these projects are largely created at the intersection of political commitments and professional training. Investigating these two factors entails a theoretical reflection on both the socio-economic positionality of activists and the institutional rules and norms that influence their behaviors.

BOURDIEU REDUX

In order to examine how training practices within community media production are influenced by professional norms, we must move beyond dominant accounts that posit citizen journalism and other forms of non-professional media as the *antithesis* of professional news production. In *Citizen Witnessing* (2013), journalism theorist Stuart Allan attempts to problematize claims that citizen journalism operates as an autochthonous process that flies in the face of professional norms. In particular, he argues against many popular accounts that posit technological innovations as an alternative to the dogmas and guidelines of legacy media. He ends the book with a call to "examine the myriad modes of reportorial form, practice, and epistemology that are all too often obscured by apparent 'revolutions' in technology" (Allan, 2013, p. 176). This piece draws on the work of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu to examine how institutional norms direct or influence how different activists conceptualize the practice of community media.

Though the question of how certain values are reproduced through training in the context of grassroots media production has largely ignored within activist media projects, it has been discussed extensively within larger discourses on the education system in the US and Western Europe. From August Comte's early treatises on the need for teaching positivistic social science in the 19th century to work by 1970s work by Marxist political and cultural theorists like Louis Althusser that attempted to examine how class positions become reproduced through institutions within a capitalist economic and political system (Althusser, 1970), the question of how sociocultural values are reproduced and

transmitted over generations through education have been produced for generations. Within media studies, the work of Stuart Hall, Larry Grossberg, Herman Gray, and many others has looked at the various roles that popular media has played in this process. Once again, though, activist media production is largely theorized as not only exempt from this process of value transmission but often posited as an antidote to counteract the influence of popular media. While it is tempting to argue that the "kids with cameras" model represents an exploitative practice harnessing the affective labor of participants in order to gain international prestige and money and/or soothe Western guilt, this critique fails to understand the complicated motivations that drive activists to engage in training.

Returning to the question of how professional cultures impact media production training, Bourdieu's interrelated concepts of "field" and "practice" offer a way to interrogate factors influencing training without over-determining the process. In the most basic terms, "practice" refers a set of norms and rules that govern the behavior of different segments of society, whether they are social, political, or economic subsets (Bourdieu, 1979). Though there is the potential for improvisation in individual behavior, practices are generally determined at the macro level by fields. As opposed to orthodox political economy approaches that privilege the economic dimension of power as a determining force on media production, field theory looks at the "web of mediations that exist between Marx's "infrastructures" and "superstructures" (Benson and Neveu, 2005, p. 10). This "web of mediations" is largely composed of different institutions in society that have developed semi-autonomously from their original economic or cultural positions.

Two important elements of field theory developed by Bourdieu and interlocutors help us think through the values and ideologies of activist media production: the concept of *habitus*, which posits that individual identity is created at the intersection of traits articulated at the personal level like class position, gender, and education as well as norms and rules codified in institutions. The second crucial element for our conversation is the power of *social inertia* within fields. Unlike social movement theorists who argue that single events like revolutions or technological innovations can rapidly instigate large-scale transformations, Bourdieu argues that once established professional norms become calcified they are resistant to radical shifts (Bourdieu, 1985, pp. 727-730). [33] Instead, they attempt to understand challenges through the interpretative frameworks available to them. While not explicitly referencing Bourdieu, Barbie Zelizer offers the clearest and most succinct explication of this calcification by linking it to the way nationalism draws on shared mythology: "In a way reminiscent of Benedict Anderson, journalists particularly use their discourse to lend shape to challenges that are thought to upset the status quo of journalism" (Zelizer, 1999, p. 156).

DEVELOPMENT COMMUNICATION AND THE PERSISTENCE OF "DIGITAL STORYTELLING"

The 2.0 phase of Viva Favela drew heavily on a form of *narrative construction* influenced by a digital storytelling approach. The popularity of this practice can be traced to a boom in the 1970s-1980s of international projects aimed at providing access and

[33] For an extensive discussion of how Bourdieu's theory of inertia puts him a odds with social movement theorists like Alain Touraine and Charles Tilly who argue that revolutions or innovations can produce rapid changes in social orders, see Beasley-Murray (2010).

training in portable media production to marginalized populations (including many projects in favelas).[34] In the 1990s this trend intensified as large bi-national organizations like the World Bank began to sponsor programs designed to build communication channels between funders and their respective audiences (Tufte and Mefalopolos, 2009). One of the primary results of this shift was the popularity of "kids with cameras"-like projects that provided media production technologies to marginalized groups.

Returning to Bourdieu, we can argue that Viva Favela's reliance on digital storytelling can be attributed to a set of normative guidelines, albeit not those coming from the professional field of journalism. Instead, the professional field of development communication provides the framework for this stage. More specifically, I follow McLagen (2007), Godmillow (1999), and others who argue that digital storytelling has become *the* dominant communication practice valorized within many NGO and development agency agendas. The ossification of this type of media production follows Bourdieu's claim that professional fields (like the societies out of which they arise) are characterized by a profound *intransigence*. If a certain set of practices becomes widely accepted and shared by practitioners, radical transformations are almost never adopted immediately and often take a substantial amount of time to get adopted—if they are adopted at all (Bourdieu, 1979, pp. 7-22; Benson, 2006, p. 20). Furthermore, the possibility of radical change usually either results in rejection or appropriation/re-channeling by ensconced institutional actors. In every case the innovation has to negotiate with the pre-established parameters of the field. While user-generated content

[34] See Davis (2015) for a more extensive discussion of early community media projects in favelas.

of the type Viva Favela produces might be less supported by the professional field of journalism, the field of development communication has been much more receptive to incorporating this type of production precisely because it captures the experiences of individuals within marginalized areas. Development communication, a field whose origins can be traced back to mass communications projects launched in the 1950s to help reinforce economic and political modernization programs led by the United States, faced a crisis in the 1980s and 1990s as practitioners began to argue that local communities within the 3rd world should have more control over the design of production of media (Cooke and Kothari, 1999; Mefalopolus, 2002;). Though this moment of crisis has been heavily documented, it is worth noting that as a result nearly every international development agency from the US Agency for International Development to the UN to the World Bank began to sponsor "community media" training programs. The World Bank's *Guidebook to Participatory Communication* (Tufte and Mefalopulus, 2009), a working pamphlet that synthesizes the results of two decades worth of these projects, offers a two-fold agenda for this type of production: to help local communities have an avenue for preserving their culture; and to provide a feedback mechanism for helping them understand and process the social change projects implemented within their living areas. The first of these objectives would come to characterize an enormous number of media production projects across the globe.

The idea that digital media production programs offer *storytelling* platforms for marginalized populations provides the second major characteristic of the 2.0 phase's training programs. Though the Cultural Ministry's nationwide initiative provided the

explicit inspiration for Viva Favela 2.0, the mode of representation it utilized was very resonant of other digital storytelling programs. In particular, the way their curriculum casts pupils as interpreters-in-training who can tap into the "unique cultural and political perspectives of their communities" (Lambert, 2009, p. 5) resonates with storytelling programs launched by the Australian government in underperforming rural schools (Hartley, 2009), community media production programs in Afghanistan (Sienkewicz, 2015), and (of course) the original Kids with Cameras project. Perhaps the definition of digital storytelling most relevant for Viva Favela trainings is the popular model offered by the Berkeley-based Center for Digital Storytelling (CDS). This group, who has contracted with over 150 international organizations, created what would become a widely used textbook for building digital storytelling programs. The guide, penned by CDS founder Joe Lambert, offers a step-by-step model that helps guide the participant from the formulation to the execution stage. These steps include "owning your insights", "owning your emotions", "finding the moment", "seeing your story", "assembling your story", and "sharing your story" (Lambert, 2009, 29-48, *passim*). All of these stages focus on how the individual acts as an intermediary for the community. Furthermore, the CDS guide was designed explicitly as a tool for individuals who often have been "excluded, stigmatized, or marginalized within the larger communities where they live" (Ibid., 18).

Though heavily wrapped in the language of Creative Commons, digital citizenship, and participatory culture, Viva Favela 2.0 much more heavily reflected an approach to media production heavily indebted to the storytelling traditions of the development industries.

PUBLIC JOURNALISM AND CITIZEN JOURNALISM AS OVERLAPPING FIELDS

If the 2.0 stage of Viva Favela reflects the values of the professional field of development communication, the 3.0 stage attempts to introduce an explicitly political purpose to the act of news production that resonates with theoretical and popular discourses on citizen journalism and public journalism. Both of these views paint a picture of the citizen journalist as a cosmopolitan, technologically sophisticated iconoclast, A widely used by scarcely explained concept, many definitions of citizen journalism come through memoirs of practitioners.[35] Though often recounting experiences from very different parts of the world, these texts always posit two fundamental attributes of the citizen journalist: a high level of technological competence and a level of theoretical sophistication about his or her own role as a representative of a community. Though citizen journalism is often defined as an egalitarian movement, its heroes often tend to be technology-savvy and globally oriented. In his recent *Citizen Journalist's Handbook* (2014), photographer and founder of pioneering citizen journalism blog *Photography is not a Crime* Carlos Miller lays out a 200-page catalogue of the key citizen journalists of the 21st century (Miller, 2014, p. ix). However, all of the journalists profiled are from the United States. Furthermore, many of those profiled are highly educated Americans who moved to places like Ciudad Juarez, or Johannesburg to volunteer with aid groups. The only mention of a journalist or movement that did not

[35] A few prominent exceptions to this claim are the articles, monographs, and edited collections produced by Stuart Allan, Einer Thorson, Melissa Wall, and Mark Deuze (see Allan, 2013; Allan and Thorsen, 2010; Wall, 2012, 2014; Deuze, 2008). These authors offer many of the sociological critiques of this process that inform this article.

arise in the US is a four-page write up of the Arab Spring (Ibid., pp. 130-134). Despite the populist sentiments expressed in the book's title, Center for Citizen Media founder Dan Gillmor's *We the People: Grassroots Media by the People for the People* (2004), creates a history of the citizen journalism that fully places responsibility for launching the movement on open source activists and early bloggers like Linux founder Doc Searls and himself (Gillmor, 2004, pp. xiii-xx). Perhaps the most explicitly cosmopolitan-driven genesis story for citizen journalism comes in *Citizens Rising* (2014), a text written by Internews director and famous freedom of speech activist David M. Hoffman. Hoffman, who became famous for helping set up underground news stations in Soviet-aligned countries during the Cold War, draws on his personal experiences to create a composite of the "new citizen journalist". Throughout the book, he creates lineages between the "citizen diplomats" working to undermine state broadcasting in the USSR with the "young and media-savvy" wave of citizen journalists ushering in the Arab Spring (2013, p. 34). Across these accounts we can see a few defining features of this new model of cosmopolitan and digitally literate journalist.

. Though they do not emphasize the technological element as heavily, writings on public journalism offer a resonant characterization of the journalist's role in society. This public journalist, often linked to Lippman's idea of the "expert class" populated by those capable of "discounting their own expectations" (cited in Schudson, 2008, p. 109), is directly rooted debates over the role of mass communication in society waged in the early 20th century. Though the concept would gain international prominence (see Waisbord, 2014), "public journalism" developed out of a core set of debates over how journalism

functioned within the sphere of public life. It is crucial to note that the idea of the public sphere in this movement is very different than the model famously delineated by Jurgen Hambermas in the 1960s. While his falls into a romantic if not pre-lapsarian notion of public life in Europe, this public sphere is characterized by the potentially antagonistic relationship between the intellectual class and society as a whole. In perhaps the most rigorously theorized version of this kind of journalism, Michael Schudson offers a few criteria that characterize this type of journalism including "methods, training, and experience that provides the expert competence in knowledge areas where most people are not competent and an ethical or professional commitment to truth-seeking according to the best standards of the expert community" (2008, p. 118). These criteria resonate closely with the type of education Vargas and others envisioned in the training processes.

Though the immediate impetus for its launch came from Viva Rio board members' frustration over the direction the 2.0 phase had taken, the 3.0 phase of the project reflects larger "professional" concerns related to discourses of citizen and public journalism.

REFLEXIVITY AND BRIDGEWORK IN ACTIVIST MEDIA PRODUCTION

The overlapping influence of these two discourses within the same project produced several unintended consequences. As mentioned above, consistency among the final videos and blog posts became a continual issue. Some followed a more investigative formula and discussed social issues while most detailed personal or quotidian events of individuals' lives. Furthermore, the variety in types of story might potentially affected readership of the project. Though the site had experienced a relatively high number of

readers for years due to the fact that it was the only online favela-based news site, in the early 2010s its readership declined as technological changes made it easier for individuals or community groups to start their own sites. This decline intensified during the 2013 period when I was researching the project. While it would be impossible to draw a causal relationship between training practices and declining readership, many staff members of commented that the project had been experienced a serious branding issue as other types of favela-based production exploded. The lack of consistent purpose and unifying characteristics among stories only makes re-establishing an identity for the project more difficult.

Investigating how Viva Favela and other grassroots media are influenced by the values and norms of different types of professional field helps us rethink the idea of "practice" in community media production in a way that affects scholars and practitioners. Adding a critical or reflexive layer moves conversations beyond dichotomies between "authenticity" or "radicality" and "co-optation" that often dominate conversations around this type of work. To put it another way, this paper offers modest evidence of how a researcher might attempt to intervene in discussions about activist media production without denigrating the overall contributions towards democratizing communication processes offered by these programs or acting in bad faith towards interlocutors that share ideological values and political purpose. Walking the line between advancing critical reflection and criticizing these individuals requires the adoption another one of Bourdieu's concepts, *reflexive engagement.* This technique, which has played a substantial role in reorienting the role of the researcher in humanistic

social sciences like anthropology (see Clifford, 1988, among many others), has not produced a huge impact within discourses on media and empowerment, citizen journalism, or activist media production. Critically reflecting on community media projects within marginalized areas like favelas will help us look at the multiple occasions where the characteristics of different professional fields intersect with the political aspirations, everyday habits, and perceived needs of local communities.

Negotiating the balance between efficacy and participant interest will continue to be a problem with this type of media production unless citizens' media projects are linked to larger communication and social change narratives. Viva Favela became the subject of a battle between two disparate approaches articulated by two very different types of activist-journalists committed to citizens' media focus on capturing the empirical experiences of individuals. The architects of the collaborative phase occupied the ideological position associated with a form of internet-based and modeled activism that posits transformations in the digital realm as progenitors of lasting effects in the physical world (Castells, 2009). The proponents of the advocacy phase operate on the idea that news production should influence institutions on behalf of marginalized populations. These two positions are not mutually exclusive, especially for project with a reasonable budget and well-trained paid staff. However, coordinating between them would entail re-thinking the way two different types of citizens' media production interact with each other. The concept of *bridgework* from recent social movement theory (Ryan, 2005; Munkres, 2008) might pave the way for this type of organizational redefinition. Bridgework refers to the ability of a single group to maintain a coalition of different

actors with different investments through a combination of maintaining autonomy and encouraging dialogue between constituent parts (Ryan, 2005, p. 117). In our case, this system of checks and balances would potentially build communication channels between both sets of activists within Viva Favela while still preserving the ideological integrity of each approach. From a bridgework perspective, both the horizontal (collaborative) and vertical (advocacy) networking processes might serve symbiotic instead of contradictory functions. As the advocacy side continues to leverage Viva Rio's public reputation to push for strategic infrastructural and political development, online collaboration can push the project further into the hands of favela residents across Brazil while developing strategies that community media or citizen journalism activists might draw on in future years.

APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS AND RATIONALIZATIONS

1. Sample questions for individuals representing foundations/funding organs such as the World Bank, the Brazilian Ministry of Culture, the Inter-American Development Bank, or the Gates Foundation:

How long have you been working with this organization? How did you get this job?

What is your background in this field?

What did you study this in college or in a graduate program (if you went)?

Were you working on similar Internet-related projects OR microfinance projects before you started working at this organization?

For your job, what projects do you oversee? How many people work under you?

Have you ever been to the project site for this program?

If yes, how many times? How long do you spend there? How

I**f no,** which individuals in your organization are tasked with doing site visits?

Rationale: These questions are designed to gauge the role of the individual being interviewed within the infrastructure of the funding organization as well as to gain background information in as many people within each funding body as possible.

In your own opinion, why do you think the Internet is important for helping communities? What do you think the most important function of the Internet is

How would you define "community growth"? What does that mean to you?

Why do you think favelas are important as sites for economic or cultural development? What do you know about favelas? What did you know before you came to work for this group? Have you ever had the chance to visit a favela?

Do you work in any other country besides Brazil? Have you before? How would you compare the experiences?

Rationale: This set of questions is intended to get an idea of the way the individual understands/conceptualizes ICT usage and to see how much he/she knows about Brazil and favelas.

How would you describe philosophy of your organization?

In particular, how do you think ICTs fit within your group's goals?

If you feel comfortable answering, how much of your organization's budget goes to this group or groups with similar projects? What are the projects that you tend to devote the most money for?

Does your group sponsor any similar projects? If so, how do you decide on which projects to fund?

Can you describe some of the other projects you fund? Do many of them focus on training in computer technologies? How do they use technology in different ways than the one I have been talking with you about?

How did your group find out about this project? If you started it, why did you decide to use _____ neighborhood?

Rationale: These are meant to address through the individual being interviewed the agency/institution/foundation's overall strategy towards ICTs' role in economic development. It will be very useful when framing my study to see what other types of projects these organizations are funding and how they relate to the funder's overall ideas about the role of technology in development.

2. Sample question list for "mid-range" individuals from the groups: Individuals working as paid employees/volunteers at one of the groups

Are you from Rio? If so, what neighborhood or *morro*(hill)? If not, where are you from?

Where do you live now?

If IN favela…How long have you lived in _____ neighborhood? Have you lived in other parts of the city? Did you grow up there? Does most of your family live there?

If NOT in a favela…Have you lived in a favela before? How many times have you been to a favela? For what reasons did you visit favelas?

What is your background in this field?

What level of school did you attend? Did you study communications, media studies, computer science, business, or related fields in college or in a graduate program (if you went)?

Were you working on similar Internet-related projects before you started working at this organization? What is your experience in this area?

Rationale: These questions are designed to get background information on the members working in my two case study projects. The most important factors in this set are education level/training before entering the project and familiarity with favelas in terms of both residency and reasons for visiting these communities in non-work contexts. Neighborhood familiarity is important because in previous fieldwork I have found that many paid employees had never visited a favela before getting their present job.

How long have you been working with this project/NGO?

How did you find out about the project?

IF paid employee… How did you get this job? What made you this job seem appealing to you?

IF volunteer…. Why did you start volunteering here? Do you volunteer with other groups? Would you want a job with this group if you could get one? What is your main occupation?

In your job/volunteer position, what area do you work (advertising/fund-raising, training, community outreach, etc.)? What projects do you oversee? Does anyone work under you? How often does your job require you to interact with people in favela communities?

How would you describe your daily work here? What would a typical day look like for you?

What are the other areas of the group besides the one in which you work?

How often does the group meet as a whole? Where are the meetings? Who usually attends?

How often does your area of the group meet? Where? Who attends these meetings?

Do you work for any other similar NGOs or businesses?

If Yes…In your estimation, how much time do you spend with this organization as opposed to others with which you work?

Rationale: These questions will help me understand how members got involved with the project, what they do in the organization, and with which other members they collaborate.

Questions about the different component areas of each group and the regularity/place/members in attendance of meetings will help provide a sense of the infrastructure of each case.

These questions are also (particularly the last question) designed to gauge the commitment level to the group by members. This is extremely important because in previous research conducted with these two groups and in literature on the organizational structure of grassroots NGO's, it is common for individuals to make careers out of "free-lancing" with various NGOs, drifting from project to project based on which ones offer the most substantial monetary compensation (Elyachar, 2005, pp. 28-48).

How do you think the project is helping the community? What changes do you think this project is making in the community? How would you characterize the project's "community outreach"? Is there anything that you think the project could be doing more of that it isn't doing at this moment?

Does your project work with any pre-existing community organizations in the neighborhoods where you work? Have you ever personally ever consulted with them?

Are you familiar with other projects working in the favelas where you work? What other NGOs in Rio do you know about? How would you say your project is different from these? What do you think is unique about your project?

Describe the future directions of the project. In your opinion, where can the project go from here? What should the next step or steps be?

Rationale: This final set of questions will gauge the individual's assessment of the role the project in favelas, including relationships with community organizations and NGOs in each neighborhood, and overall vision of the group's project. Though an obviously sensitive issue, it will be useful to see how individuals would possibly change project strategies.

3. Sample question list for participants in information fairs, demonstrations, and public training sessions

What neighborhood do you live in? Where did you grow up?

How old are you and what do you do (if you don't mind me asking)?

Why did you come to this event?

How did you find out about the event?

What do you want to get out of this training?

Have you come to any other events this group has held? If so, how many times?

What were the other types of events this group held that you attended?

Do you know anyone who is either a volunteer or employee of this project?

Rationale: These questions address demographic information about the individual as well as expectations about the event and recruitment strategies used by the group. Hearing from the participants about recruitment will hypothetically paint a different picture of this process than the one presented by members.

How comfortable in general do you feel with the technologies and tools they are using at the trainings today?

Did you have any computer training, photography, web design, or blogging experience, before you began working with these groups?

If so, where did you receive this training? Was it at home, as part of your schoolwork, at a course at a LAN house[internet café], from another NGO, or somewhere else?

IF at Viva Favela trainings/events….Do you have any experience with any of the tools being used(digital cameras, web design software) or the programs (Word Press, Photoshop, etc.)? If so, where did you get it?

Have you been one of these trainings before?

IF you attended a previous session….How many sessions have you attended in the past? What did you those sessions cover? How would you compare those sessions with the one you are at now?

Rationale: These questions are designed to ascertain both skill levels/and previous experiences with ICTs. They are also useful for getting an idea of how many people at an event have worked with the group in quest before. This might become crucial information as I attempt to analyze the effects of trainings on individuals. Also, the more events I attend in the process of conducting fieldwork, the more I will be able to figure out which participants come repeatedly to trainings.

Do you think Internet access has changed life in favelas? How? Are you optimistic about what the Internet can do for your neighborhood?

Speaking more specifically for a second: do you feel using the Internet has opened up opportunities for you or your friends or family? Do you think it might help you get a job?

How would you say the Internet or computers or anything related to them has helped you?

Rationale: These final questions attempt to get a provisional idea of how the perceived recipients of these projects view the relationship between ICTs and economic development. Also, they attempt to capture in the words of the participants what changes they envision these technologies accomplishing in their lives in the economic sense and more broadly defined.

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